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R ichard F. S t r a w n  II
Certified Public A ccountant
7 7 7  Campus Commons Road, Suite 2 0 0  
Sacramento, C A  9 5 8 2 5  
( 9 1 6 )  5 6 5 - 7 4 2 4
May 21, 1996
Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager, Audit and Attest Standards
File 2690, AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
Re: Proposed Standard on Auditing Standards, Consideration of Fraud
The exposure draft arrived today, and it caught my attention 
enough to generate these immediate comments. First of all, I have 
been a sole proprietor for nine years, and have worked in CPA firms 
for 14 years. Even though I perform few audits and peer reviews,
I believe that auditing is what distinguishes our profession.
First, this exposure draft is long-awaited. The public, of 
course, has always thought that we had a greater responsibility for 
fraud detection.
Second, however, this is so important that it is a mistake to 
rewrite the auditing standards on a piecemeal basis. Let me repeat 
that point: the entire auditing standards codification should be 
rewritten in light of this new emphasis. It is that sweeping a 
change. Anything less will be inadequate.
Third, this one illustration indicates what I mean be the 
preceding paragraph. The auditor's standard report (AU 508.08) 
should say, in the second paragraph, "... free of material 
misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud." This phrase is in 
the proposed statement and elsewhere in the Auditing Standards; it 
should be in the report as well.
Engagement letters, representations letters, and all sorts of 
other documents need revision. So, the exposure draft is a good-, 
start, but that is no longer enough.
Please call me with any questions or concerns about any of
this.
V e ry  t r u l y  y o u r s ,
ichard F. Strawn II, CPA
D EPA R TM EN T O F TH E  NAVY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY. CA 93943-5000 IN REPLY refer TO
23 May 1996
Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2690
American Institute of CPAs
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
I strongly support the proposed SAS dealing with fraud. 
There is a need for such a standard, and the proposal 
seems to fill that need very well. Incidentally, I 
applaud the use of the more familiar term, "fraud," 
instead of "irregularities."
A separate standard on fraud is appropriate to
emphasize its more serious nature, as compared with 
errors. As a matter of fact, if the subjects were to 
be combined in some way, I would suggest one standard 
for errors and misappropriation of assets and another 
one for fraudulent financial reporting. The latter is 
the more critical concern in connection with the 
auditor's responsibility to third parties. And it 
would, presumably, always be material, while 
misappropriations of assets are more likely to be 
immaterial. [Why would a company deliberately misstate 
its financial statements by an immaterial amount?]
Thank you for the opportunity to comment.
FRANCIS J. McKEON, JR., cpa
FINANCIAL CONSULTANT
7777 BONHOMME 




Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit- and Attest Standards File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
Dear Ms. Mancino:
As one in the audit field for many years, having discovered 
two frauds, one while with a "Big 8" firm, one while self- 
employed, I regret that the ASB has chosen to propose the subject 
of fraud detection, apparently due to the proliferation of fraud 
and the perception of poor or inadequate audit work.
My great concern is that there will now be, no matter how we 
try to let it slide off our shoulders, the hope that auditors 
will find, should find, must find, all elements of fraud and 
none, even though inconsequential, will go undetected.
By zeroing in on the subject, as suggested by the 
recommended amendments, there will be placed almost undue burdens 
to "look, look, look" and "dig, dig, dig" for fear of perhaps 
missing something.
The "professional skepticism" that exists in well-trained 
auditors, as well as the use of in-depth, well planned audit work 
by well-trained auditors, as far as I am concerned, precludes the 
need for these amendments which will do much more to create the 
public and, heaven forbid, the legal perception that "all is 
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W estern  K en tucky  U niversity  
1 Big Red W a y
Bow ling G reen , K Y  42101-3576
Jane Mancino
Technical Manager
Audit arid Attest Standards
File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
RE: ED on Fraud
Reference Comment
Para. 28 Should the term “closing entries” really be “adjusting entries”?
Appendix C Update for “he”, “his” (as has been done for example in Appendix
B, para. 2).
Appendix C, para. 16 Note: “Risk of material misstatements, whether caused by error or
fraud.” This phrase is not used in SAS XX; rather, only the phrase 
“the risk of material misstatements due to fraud” is used. Using the 
former phrase implies that there is also a “risk of material 
misstatements due to error” (a phrase never used in the Standards) 
that is to be addressed by the auditor. Are these two separate 
assessments (risk due to error and risk due to fraud) that are to be 
combined into the “risk of material misstatements due to fraud and 
error?” (See also next comment)
Appendix C, Para. 16: “risk of material misstatement, whether caused by error or
para. 16 and 27 fraud”
Para. 27: “risk  that... misstatements (whether caused by error or. 
fraud)...”
Suggestion: For consistency, change para. 16 to “risk of material 
misstatement (whether caused by error or fraud)”
Thank you for considering these comments.
Sincerely,
Janet L. Colbert PhD, CPA, CIA 
Meany-Holland Professor
The Spirit Makes the Master
Counsellors at aw
Hutchins, Wheeler & Dittmar
A Professional Corporation
101 ederal Street, oston, assachusetts 02110 
TELEPHONE: 617-951 -6600  FACSIMILE: 617-951-1295
June 5, 1996
Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Atest Standards
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re:  Exposure Draft Entitled. “Consideration of Fraud in the Financial Statement
Audit”
Dear Ms. Mancino:
Enclosed are my comments to the Exposure Draft. I would be pleased to discuss these 
comments with you if you would like to contact me.
JDH/ad/74979-1
Enclosure
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 and the AICPA Auditing Standards Board’s 
Exposure Draft on Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit: Two Ships Passing in the Night
By: John D. Hughes, Esq.




In December of last year, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995. The purpose of this legislation was to reduce significantly frivolous securities litigation 
which often victimized the accounting profession, particularly the Big Six firms.
Title III of the Act is subtitled, “Auditor Disclosure of Corporate Fraud”. The 
Conference Report describes the section as requiring “independent public accountants to adopt 
certain procedures in connection with their audits and to inform the SEC of illegal acts of their 
auditing clients.” Section 301 of the Act creates a new section, 10A, to The Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.
In relevant part, this Section 10A provides: “each audit required pursuant to this title of 
the financial statements of an issuer by an independent public accountant shall include, in 
accordance with general accepted auditing standards, as may be modified or supplemented from 
time to time by the Commission — (1) procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of 
detecting illegal acts that would have a direct and material effect on the determination of 
financial statement amounts....”
Section 10A later defines an “illegal act” as “an act or omission that violates any law, or 
any rule or regulation having the force of law.” (emphasis added). The term illegal act in Section 
10A is qualified, as follows: “that would have a direct and material effect on the determination 
of financial statement amounts....” Thus, the statute does not merely concern an illegal act which 
has had “a direct and material effect on the determination of financial statement amounts”, but all 
illegal acts which “would have” that effect.
Auditing Standards
Before Congress passed this legislation, the obligation of an auditor to plan and carry out 
his audit so as to detect his client’s illegal acts was addressed in Section 317 of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) Professional Standards. That Section 
provided: “The auditor’s responsibility to detect and report misstatements resulting from illegal 
acts having a direct and material effect on the determination of financial statement amounts is the 
same as that for errors and irregularities as described in Section 316....” Section 316 states that
the term “errors” refers to unintentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in 
financial statements. Section 316 further states that the term “irregularities” refers to intentional 
misstatements or omissions.
Section 316 explains that the primary factor that distinguishes errors from irregularities is 
whether the underlying cause of a misstatement in financial statements is intentional or 
unintentional. Furthermore, Section 316 provides that “[b]ecause of the characteristics of 
irregularities, particularly those involving forgery and collusion, a properly designed and 
executed audit may not detect a material irregularity.
Comparison of Existing Auditing Standards with Section 10A
Unlike Auditing Standards Sections 316 and 317, Section 10A requires the auditor to 
design and carry out procedures to detect all illegal acts that would have a direct and material 
effect on the determination of financial statement amounts, including illegal acts which may not 
have resulted in a misstatement. The Auditing Standards, in contrast, focus first on the 
determination of whether there is a material misstatement or omission in the financial statements. 
If so, the Standards then deal with classification of that misstatement or omission as either an 
error or an irregularity. Under these Standards, if no material misstatement or omission is first 
detected, there is no obligation on the auditor to proceed further to determine whether an illegal 
act has occurred.
Under Section 10A, the obligation to detect illegal acts is not conditioned upon a 
predicate finding of a material misstatement or omission in the financial statements. Both the 
House and Senate Reports issued at the time the Act was passed confirm that the detection of 
illegal acts by auditors is not limited to only those which in fact resulted in the appearance of 
material misstatements or omissions in the financial statements. This duty imposed on the 
accounting profession was the price for a limitation on the abilities of plaintiffs to bring suit for 
their losses occasioned by securities fraud. Congress clearly decided that the responsibility for 
the detection of corporate wrongdoing would be shifted from the plaintiffs’ securities bar to the 
accounting profession.
This shift meant that the legislation required a different approach by the accounting 
profession to its audit work, something in addition to what the Auditing Standards already 
required. As the Senate Report stated: “Title III of this legislation would impose new reporting 
obligations on public accountants. Although these obligations will increase the costs of 
conducting audits, it is not possible to estimate precisely the extent of these new costs.” 
(emphasis added) Similarly, Congressman Ron Wyden stated: “This amendment is important to 
the legislation we are working on, because fraud and abuse often result in securities litigation.
By providing new tools to root out financial fraud, Congress can help prevent securities lawsuits 
from ever being filed....” (emphasis added)
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The Auditing Standards Board’s Exposure Draft
In an obvious response to Section 10A, on May 1 of this year, the Auditing Standards 
Board of the AICPA issued an Exposure Draft of a new auditing standard entitled,
“Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit” with amendments to Statements on 
Auditing Standards Number One, “Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures” and 
Number Forty Seven “Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit”. Based upon this 
Exposure Draft, it would seem that the Auditing Standards Board does not understand the 
dramatic difference in focus between Section 10A and Auditing Standards Sections 316 and 317.
Basically, the Exposure Draft merely substitutes the term “fraud” for the term 
“irregularities” in the Auditing Standards. In doing so, the Auditing Standards Board ignores the 
Congressional intent that the detection of illegal acts be independent of any finding of a material 
misrepresentation or omission in the financial statements. Furthermore, the Exposure Draft deals 
exclusively with auditing procedures designed to detect “fraud”, even though Section 10A 
concerns the detection of “illegal acts” and never once uses the word “fraud”.
The intent of the Auditing Standards Board to merely substitute “fraud” for 
“irregularities” as used in existing Auditing Standards is first seen in the proposed amendment to 
Auditing Standards Section 110. In explaining this new provision, the Auditing Standards Board 
wrote:
Although fraud is a broad legal concept, the auditor’s interest specifically relates to 
fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. The primary 
factor that distinguishes fraud from error, is whether the underlying action that results in 
the misstatement in financial statements is intentional or unintentional.
Auditing Standards Section 316.04 not surprisingly formerly provided: “the primary 
factor that distinguishes errors from irregularities is whether the underlying cause of a 
misstatement in financial statements is intentional or unintentional....” Similarly, the proposed 
new paragraph to Auditing Standards Section 110 contained in the Exposure Draft states, in part: 
“The auditor has no responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance 
that errors or fraud that are not material to the financial statements are detected.”
Perhaps the best proof that the intention of the Auditing Standards Board was to merely 
replace the term “irregularities” with the term “fraud” can be seen in comparing a sentence from 
Auditing Standards Section 317.05 to the proposed revision to Auditing Standard Section 312, 
paragraph 5, footnote 5. Auditing Standard Section 317.05 provided, in part: “the auditor’s 
responsibility to detect and report misstatements resulting from illegal acts having a direct and 
material effect on the determination of financial statement amounts is the same as that for errors 
and irregularities....” Proposed Auditing Standard Section 312, paragraph 5, footnote 5 states in 
part: “for those illegal acts... having a direct and material effect on the determination of financial
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statement amounts, the auditor’s responsibility to detect such illegal acts is the same as that for 
errors or fraud.”
The Audit Standards Board’s Misunderstanding
The Auditing Standards Board’s misunderstanding of the focus of Section 10A is glaring. 
As noted earlier, “irregularities” by definition are a category of financial statement misstatement 
or omission; those caused by intentional conduct. Section 10A imposes an obligation to detect 
illegal acts and not merely misstatements or omissions caused by illegal acts. This obligation is 
starkly different from that imposed under existing Auditing Standards Section 317, which 
provides: “the auditor’s responsibilities to detect and report misstatements resulting from illegal 
acts having a direct and material effect on the determination of financial statement amounts is the 
same as that for errors and irregularities....” (emphasis added).
Even more evidence of the Auditing Standards Board’s misunderstanding of the 
obligations imposed by Section 10A is found in proposed subparagraph 12 to Auditing Standards 
Section 230 contained in the Exposure Draft which states:
“Because of the characteristics of fraud, particularly those involving 
concealment and falsified documentation (including forgery), a properly 
planned and performed audit may not detect a material misstatement....
[A]udit procedures that are effective for detecting a misstatement that is 
unintentional may be ineffective for a misstatement that is intentional and 
is concealed through collusion among client personnel and third parties or 
among management or employees of a client.”
Likewise, proposed paragraph 7 to Auditing Standards Section 312 would provide in part: 
“Although fraud is a broad legal concept, the auditor’s interest specifically relates to acts that 
cause a misstatement of financial statements....”
Again, Section 10A requires the detection of illegal acts regardless of whether they have 
actually caused a misstatement as long as they “would have” a direct and material effect on the 
determination of financial statement amounts. In this regard, the qualification Section 10A 
imposes on illegal acts concerns their effect on the determination of financial statement amounts, 
rather than whether those actual financial statement amounts have been accurately recorded on 
the financial statements themselves.
Conclusion
The Exposure Draft reflects a well-intentioned effort by the Auditing Standards Board to 
assist auditors in the detection of material misstatements or omissions in financial statements 
caused by fraud. Nevertheless, the Exposure Draft is essentially a rewrite of existing Auditing 
Standards which concern the detection of errors and irregularities. The Auditing Standards
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Board has decided to merely substitute the term “fraud” for the term “irregularities” which 
appeared in previous Auditing Standards.
The most troubling aspect of the Exposure Draft is its failure to recognize that Congress 
in Section 10A required auditors to plan and cany out their audits so as to detect illegal acts, 
regardless of whether those illegal acts actually had caused a material misstatement or omission 
in the financial statements, as long as those illegal acts would have a direct and material effect on 
the determination of financial statement amounts. Unfortunately, the Exposure Draft wrongly 
provides that auditors have no responsibility to detect illegal acts which have not actually 
resulted in material misstatements or omissions.
Obviously, fundamental change is necessary either in the Exposure Draft, or the Federal 
legislation, in order to bring them into harmony. Unless this divide is closed, auditors who 
follow the guidance of the Exposure Draft will face significant legal claims for their failure to 
comply with Section 10A.
72432-1
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June 1, 1996
Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: Comments regarding Exposure Draft —
Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards —  
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit
Dear Jane:
My comments with regard to the Exposure Draft are as 
follows:
In paragraph 16. the second dash automatically includes 
all small owner managed businesses.
I believe it is inappropriate to do this.
Accordingly/, some means should be made to cut out small, 
privately held owner/managed businesses from paragraph
16.
In paragraph 26/, the word "conservative" should appear 
somewhere —  possibly in the third bullet.
In paragraph 40, item e should be added to cover 
compliance with the new Securities Litigation Reform Law 
of 1995.
In paragraph 41, why is there such an extended effective 
date. Why not make it effective for periods ending on 




165 West 66th Street, Apartment 21 B 
New York NY 10023 
June 24,1996
Ms. Jane M Mancino, Technical Manager
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York NY 10036-8775
RE: Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690
Dear Ms. Mancino:
I read the Exposure Draft, Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, (the "Proposed 
Statement") and have the following comments.
I believe that the Proposed Statement may unintentionally lead the reader to 
believe that management does not misappropriate assets to any great extent. 
For example, Paragraph 5 states in part, "...misappropriation of assets is 
committed... most often by employees." Paragraphs 17 and 18 speak 
principally to risk factors relative to employees.
Although the greatest number of defalcations may well have been committed 
by employees, there have been many cases involving significant dollar 
amounts where management or members thereof have committed the 
defalcation. In some instances, related parties have been used to cover the 
fraud and in other instances documentation has been doctored.
I believe that the Auditing Standards Board could consider addressing the 
issue of management misappropriation specifically.
Thanks for the opportunity to comment.
Richard D. Isserman
Scharf Pera & co
July 3, 1996
Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager, Audit and Attest Standards 
1211 Avenue o f the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Ref. : File 2690
Dear Ms. Mancino:
I am writing on behalf o f my firm in response to the exposure draft of “Consideration of Fraud in 
a financial statement audit” . Our firm is composed of three partners and a professional staff of 
eight; we perform audit on small and medium sized non-public companies. We feel that this 
standard is redundant o f SAS-53 and serves only to create additional exposure to clients and third 
parties.
Background information on the exposure draft purports that this proposed standard is intended to 
“enhance auditor performance”. The guidance or “standard” formed by SAS 53 is sufficient in 
relating the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud or “irregularities”. Enhancing performance 
should be the job of the profession through continuing education and effective peer reviews, and 
not through a “standard” .
Specifically, the most consequential section of the proposed standard may well be the risk factors 
listed in paragraphs 15-19. The first concern related to these factors is that many small to 
medium-sized firms inherently have many or these attributes, in fact, many entrepreneurial 
companies are characterized by owners who are “dominant” in the management o f the business, 
“aggressive” in financial targets, compensated “significantly” by bonuses based on reaching 
objectives, managed with a lean staff where segregation of duties is unrealistic, and etc., etc. The 
mere delineation of these “risk factors” in a standard produce excessive exposure for the auditor if 
a fraud is uncovered. Making judgements has been the most decisive action the auditor will take, 
and this standard would not change that.
Additionally, our legal counsel has advised us that the adjectives used with these risk factors are 
subject to immense interpretation, especially by plaintiffs attorneys. This would include phrases 
such as . “ineffective means”, “domination of management”, “unduly aggressive”, “significant 
disregard”, and etc.
Member___________
Division for CPA Firms AICPA
TEL. (617) 423-2211 
FAX (617) 423-2625
Michael K. Schaefer
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCO UNTANT  




PERSONAL FIN A N C IA L SPECIALIST
Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical 
Manager
Audit and Ethics Standards, File 2690
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
This letter is in response to your exposure draft of the proposed SAS entitled 
"Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit" issued on May 1, 1996. In 
the past we have come to expect proposed and final auditing standards to be clear, 
concise, well thought out and generally representing the best interests of the 
profession, even if the stands taken therein are controversial or contrary to my own 
personal views. I  find this draft to be lacking all of the above, and generally in need 
of serious revision. My objections to the draft are several-fold, as follows.
First, the drafting appears to be vague and at times sloppy. For example, 
certain factors noted in paragraph 16A apply virtually to al, management in all 
engagements, among them are:
a) Management setting unduly aggressive financial targets and expectations
(this is almost universal in small, start-up companies);
b) Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory authorities.
(Few managers are fond of the Internal Revenue Service, OHSA, or other public 
agencies directly impacting their operations);
c) Unreasonable time restraints regarding the completion of the audit. (Few 
auditors ever assert that client-proposed deadlines are reasonable or allow 
totally sufficient time);
d) Other examples under 16A are replete with similar kinds of vague language, 
which could arguably apply to virtually any and all audit engagements.
American Institute of CPAs 
July 11, 1996 Page 2
there is any inherent risk of fraud, the auditor will need to perform tests for those frauds. In 
most cases, the auditor will be better off by testing controls. Additional guidance should be 
included in SAS 47 and SAS 55, and the Internal Control Guide could require further revision.
In addition, footnote 5 on page 17 should be incorporated into the text.
Enhance the guidance concerning EDP
The proposed SAS contains almost no guidance concerning the role of electronic data 
processing in evaluating the risk of fraud -  both fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. The client's use of EDP changes the inherent and control risk. In 
evaluating these risks, the auditor needs to understand and evaluate the EDP general controls 
(especially security) and the EDP application controls of important systems. In many cases 
especially in larger entities, the auditor will need to test these controls because they are the only 
management tool that prevents and detects fraud and provides the auditor with reasonable 
assurance that material fraud has not occurred. Where the EDP controls are not adequate, the 
auditor will need substantive tests that actually test for material fraud. While more detail 
guidance could be in an Audit Guide or Auditing Procedures Study, the basic guidance 
concerning the importance of EDP controls should be in the SAS.
Provide more guidance on misappropriation of assets
For small audits, misappropriation of assets is often a greater risk than management
misrepresentation. A recent study indicated that 4 out of 5 frauds involve misappropriation of 
assets, with the greatest losses involving misappropriation of assets by management. More 
guidance about the typical steps of misappropriation would be helpful. The auditor is most 
concerned with misappropriation combined with alterations of records. Typically, when assets 
are stolen, there temporarily remains a "defalcation debit" in the balance sheet -  an asset on the 
books that no longer exists. The thief desires to "conceal" or "remove" the defalcation debit. 
Concealment means the debit is identified as something other than what it is so management 
will not be concerned (for example, a suspense account). Removal means the defalcation debit 
is written off against the net worth of the company (for example, the theft of inventory is 
written off to cost of sales as part of the process of taking and recording a physical inventory).
The auditor should understand typical ways of misappropriating assets, determine whether 
controls are in place to prevent and detect misappropriation of assets, and test those controls-as 
appropriate.
Provide more guidance on what to do when the auditor judges that the risk of fraud is high-
In many small audits, there is a lack of segregation of duties, and management places its trust in 
a key employee (who often has access to both assets and records). Often the owner of the 
business is above the control structure. In these audits the auditor will judge that the risk of 
fraud is high; he or she will then need to obtain satisfaction that no material fraud has occurred.. -  
This may involve testing for lapping and kiting, checking a year end bank reconciliation by 
obtaining an independent bank statement, confirming accounts payable, testing for duplicate 
transactions, obtaining a duplicate set of inventory tickets at the physical observation and testing 
to the priced inventory, and using computer assisted auditing to search for unusual transactions. 
More specific detailed guidance on what to do when faced with high fraud risk is needed.
American Institute of CPAs 
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Clarify the definition of misappropriation of assets
The proposed SAS notes that misappropriation of assets may involve management, employees 
or third parties. The SAS provides no guidance on dealing with fraud against the entity by third 
parties; for example, vendors, customers, policyholders, patients. Customers may steal 
merchandise from a retail store; health care providers may bill an insurance company for 
services that were unnecessary or not performed. These may be a cost of doing business for the 
entity and may not involve employees or management. While the auditor can evaluate the 
inherent risk of these types of fraud and consider the entity's controls to prevent and detect 
them, it will be difficult to test whether these frauds have occurred in material amounts. Thus, I 
would prefer that the SAS indicate that the auditor does not have a responsibility to detect 
fraud committed by those outside the entity, but if the Board decides otherwise, more guidance 
is needed.
Consider changing the standard auditor’s report to mention fraud
The standard report does not mention fraud. Fraud needs to be included if the public is to 
understand what auditors do. The report should include a statement that "material 
misstatement includes material error, material fraud committed by employees and management, 
and material illegal acts that directly affect the financial statements." This would help both 
auditors and the public understand the auditor's responsibility. We shouldn't be afraid to say in 
our report what is in an SAS.
Provide an earlier effective date; encourage immediate application
The proposed SAS states very little that a jury would not already read into current standards. 
There is no reason why this guidance should not apply to calendar year 1996 audits. The public 
expects application in 1996; in fact, the public believes the auditor is already doing and 
exceeding what this guidance requires.
Sincerely,
Abraham D. Akresh 
CPA
The second difficulty is that the focus of the criteria set forth in 16A appear to 
have been unduly influenced by concern for publicly-held companies and large 
corporate audits. Many of the criteria listed therein apply to virtually all small and 
medium-sized businesses and would almost automatically impose expanded scope of 
fraud audits, with substantial cost increases related thereto, on the typical small-to- 
medium-sized business audit. Among the criteria in this category are:
a) Domination of management by a single person or small group;
b) Financial management's excessive participation in selection of accounting 
principals;
c) Ineffective accounting staff (most small businesses have generally a 
bookkeeper or a clerical-type person responsible for most accounting records, 
and generally lack segregation of duties of larger organizations).
Again, this laundry list of criteria appear to have been developed without 
adequate consideration as to the audits of small- and medium-sized businesses, which 
are of primary importance to most of the practice units within the AICPA. If adopted, 
these criteria would very clearly create an unreasonable financial burden and 
professional workload requirement with respect to these audits.
Perhaps more compelling is the fact that the standard itself appears to 
contradict the overall reason for its establishment. ASB has said that this standard is 
necessary, not to increase auditor's responsibility as defined in SAS' 53 and 54, but 
to more clearly delineate them. I believe that the impact of the language in the 
proposed standards does the exact opposite. Certainly from a legal liability standpoint 
it appears to create obligations for additional auditing when none exist, and imposes 
obligations on business auditors that are not present under current standards. In fact, 
these standards would contradict the AlCPA's own model engagement letter, which 
contains a specific paragraph to the effect that we are not responsible for detecting 
fraud as part of our audit, although we would notify management should we detect 
any instances of fraud. Contradictory pronouncements can only create the prospect 
of more, rather than less, litigation against accountants with regard to fraud, and it 
appears that paragraph 16A provides a road map to a plaintiff's attorney for 
hammering CPAs based on vague and poorly drafted criteria.
During our recent attendance at the NAATS conference, a representative of the 
ASB indicated that the legal issues addressed above have been "cleared" by legal 
counsel for each of the big six firms. This appears to be a totally inappropriate 
manner of developing auditing standards, and may explain the bias and disregard for 
small and medium-sized audits noted above. Certainly such legal counsel have no 
responsibility to persons other than their clients, and it is apparent that the drafting 
issues noted above were of little interest to them. If legal counsel is to be sought out 
in these matters, and I believe that it should given the apparent increased exposure 
the SAS would entail, the counsel should be more representative of the majority of the
practice units in the AICPA, and should be knowledgeable about the thousands of 
small and medium-sized business audits that would be impacted by these standards. 
A suggestion might be to seek out legal counsel for the AlCPA's sponsored liability 
insurance plan, and the litigation attorneys they employ to represent them; or perhaps 
seeking the advice of counsel representing some of the larger regional or larger local 
firms in major cities and communities around the country. I believe the legal input to 
these issues would be far more balanced and responsive to the needs of the 
overwhelming majority of those that would be impacted by this statement.
The ASB has done a admirable job in balancing various competing issues in the 
development of auditing standards over the past 10 years, dealing with a 
expectations gap" liability explosion, the practicalities and burdens of professional 
practice, and the best interests of the public in general. By and large their work 
products have been good, well-drafted, and well-reasoned. This draft does not meet 
those standards of excellence that we have come to expect. As I have stated above, 
in my view it is poorly drafted, has an improper emphasis, and a lack of appropriate 
consideration on its impact on both the practicalities of public auditing practice and 
the related impact on legal liability issues. I also question whether or not this SAS is 
even necessary and whether SAS 53 and 54 need to be expanded, but if the project 
itself is not to be abandoned in its entirety, this exposure draft needs a serious
reworking to address the issues described above.
Thank you for your time and attention, and if you have any further comments 
that you'd like to discuss with me, please feel free to contact me at your convenience.
Michael K.Schaerer  
MKS:apl
ABRAHAM D. AKRESH  
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
9209 Gatewater Terrace 




o f Certified Public Accountants
July 11, 1996
American Institute of CPAs 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attention: Ms. Jane M. Mancino 
Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards
Re: File 2690
Gentlemen:
I have read the proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, "Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit." I strongly support issuance of this statement because.it clarifies the 
auditor's responsibility for fraud detection and because it has the potential to reduce the 
expectation gap. I agree with most of the decisions the Board made in writing the proposed 
SAS. However, I believe the guidance can be further strengthened by implementing the 
following recommendations:
Provide more guidance concerning the need to evaluate the client's procedures to prevent and
detect fraud
Although the proposed SAS requires the auditor to ask the client for his views about the risk of 
fraud, the SAS does not require the auditor to ask the client how the entity prevents and 
detects fraud. Typical procedures include internal audits, hot lines and special investigations. 
The auditor should be required to evaluate the client's procedures for preventing and detecting 
fraud and to document that evaluation. Only by understanding the client's procedures can the 
auditor make an appropriate risk decision.
Internal control is an important management tool to prevent and detect fraud, especially 
misappropriation of assets. Accordingly, the auditor will need to enhance his or her 
understanding of controls. It is unlikely that the auditor will be able to set control risk at the 
maximum if the objective of the audit is to be satisfied that the financial statements are not 
materially misstated because of fraud. Setting control risk at the maximum means the auditor is 
planning the audit assuming the client has no procedures to prevent or detect material fraud. If
Ms. Jane M. Mancino 
Page Two 
July 3, 1996
We would implore the ASB to consider dropping this proposed standard and then emphasize and 
publicize SAS 53 to the profession. .
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Wayne T. Spransy 
Partner
CHARLES L. LESTER. C.P.A. 
AUDITOR GENERAL
State of Florida




ms. Jane m. Mancino
Technical Manager
Audit and Atest Standards
File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
l appreciate the opportunity to comment on the May 1,1996 
Exposure Draft, proposed statement on Auditing Standards, 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, and 
Amendments to Statements on Auditing Standards No. 1,
Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures, and no. 47, Audit 
Risk and Materiality in conducting an Audit. Overal, I strongly 
support this proposed statement. As can be seen from my folowing 
comments I also strongly believe the statement should include 
stronger emphasis on the importance of considering a lower level of 
materiality when fraud is discovered than might be applied to other 
items. The consideration of fraud should not be limited to its 
efects on the fair presentation of financial statements taken as a 
whole. Materiality at that level could lead to large dolar amounts of 
fraud being ignored because of the size of the entity.
Comments on specific paragraphs and issues folow.
Paragraph 2. (pages 15,16) The first sentence reads "Although fraud 
is a broad legal concept, the auditor's interest specificaly relates to 
fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of financial
111 WEST MADISON STREET -  POST OFFICE BOX 1735 T A L L A H A S S E E   F L
Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager, Audit and Attest standards
July 9,1996
Page 2
statements." Also, footnote 3 to the third sentence of this 
paragraph says, "Unauthorized transactions also are relevant to the 
auditor when they could cause a misstatement in financial 
statements." Paragraph 5. last sentence (page 16) "Both types of 
fraud can but do not necessarily result in materiaL misstatements of 
an entity's financial statements." (Emphasis added) Paragraph 10 
(page 17) Three references to material misstatements, (emphasis 
added) References to material misstatements are included 
throughout the document.
Taken together, or separately for that matter, these statements 
would seem to imply that, when discovered, fraud should be of 
concern to the auditor only when it is material to the financial 
statements as a whole. Appropriate materiality thresholds is an issue 
auditors constantly wrestle with. They are usually calculated as a 
percentage of an item such as total revenue, total assets, net equity, 
etc. The percentage used will vary from auditor to auditor, and 
from audit to audit, since materiality is a judgement decision, and 
should remain so.
However, most auditors will stay within a 3% - 7% range, if we 
go all the way down to 1%, and revenue, or assets, or whatever our 
base is, amounts to $50 billion, the materiality level at 1% is $500 
million. Are we to take the position that any fraud of less than $500 
million is not relevant? While, under our present concept of 
materiality, in this example, a $450 million fraud would not affect .... 
our opinion as to the fairness of the presentation of the financial 
statements since it has been deemed immaterial, I would think that 
even for an entity the size of General Motors or Coca-Cola or the 
state of California, a fraud of $450 million should be of interest to 
the auditors, management and stockholders (citizens), some sort of 
mechanism should be provided to require disclosures of this nature 
to be disseminated to all those who might be interested in it, be it 
some form of footnote disclosure, an emphasis paragraph, or a
Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager, Audit and Attest standards
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Report on Fraud. Obviously, whatever is considered should be 
reviewed by the Auditor's legal representative.
I will readily admit that it is impractical to design an audit to 
ferret out all conceivable fraud. Yet I remain concerned that we 
continue to take the approach that an audit always be approached 
from the mindset that the only, or primary, purpose of an audit is to 
be able to opine on the fairness or presentation of the financial 
statements taken as a whole. A lot of sins can be, and have been, 
overlooked with the “taken as a whole" approach, we should have 
some method to disseminate other findings of importance, such as 
fraud, and this standard should emphasize that.
paragraphs 25 and 28, which include discussion regarding risks 
applicable to specific account balances, appear to allow material 
misstatements to be related to the specific account balance level, 
but also allows material misstatement to be related to the financial 
statements as a whole. Relating to materiality to the specific 
account balance level should be more strongly supported. This 
would help answer my concerns, if materiality levels still relate to 
the financial statements taken as a whole, then my concerns would 
remain.
Paragraph 33 (page 28) partly speaks to this concern. However, 
this paragraph seems to imply that the auditor should further 
evaluate a misstatement that is not material to the financial 
statements only for the purpose of determining the likelihood that 
the particular misstatement would become material upon further 
evaluation. The document continues to imply that the auditor 
should be unconcerned about fraud below the level of materiality to 
the financial statements as a whole, even if the dollar amount is 
substantial ($450 million in my prior example).
in paragraph 38, (page 30) the ED finally gets around to saying
Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager, Audit and Attest standards
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that the auditor might have some interest in passing along evidence 
of fraud that is less than "material", but is too low key about it. The 
auditor should pass along to appropriate management evidence of 
fraud discovered during the audit even if it is a small dollar amount. 
This may be the beginning of a fraud that would escalate if ignored.
Footnote 15 (page 29) is a good addition.
Appendix A, paragraph 2 ( page 33) The last sentence states 
"The auditor has no responsibility to plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance that errors or fraud that are not 
material to the financial statements are detected." I agree with the 
intent and concept of this sentence. However, I remain concerned 
about the high level of materiality usually chosen. This ED is about 
fraud and not materiality but the dollar threshold of materiality 
chosen in a particular audit is so critical to the consideration of 
potential fraud that materiality becomes a key issue, in planning an 
audit to obtain reasonable assurance - the words reasonable 
assurance are appropriate - that fraud will be detected if it exists, 
perhaps the auditor should also adopt some minimum dollar level of 
materiality, in addition to a percentage approach, in the example of 
the $50 billion dollar entity, perhaps the level at which fraud would 
be considered as worthy of some kind of disclosure should be in the 
$1 million to $50 million range, even though this would be less than 
1/10 of 1%. we may discover evidence of "only $10 million" in fraud, 
but that could be just the tip of the iceberg. Again, when fraud that 
is not material to the opinion on the financial statements is 
discovered, the standard should emphasize that it may, nonetheless, 
be worthy of further audit work and the standard should discuss the 
possible disclosure mechanisms.
Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager, Audit and Attest Standards
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The additions and changes shown in Appendix B are very good, 
paragraphs 12 and 13 are especially helpful. I also support the 
changes reflected in Appendix C.





Roberta. Kadison, C.P.A., P.C.
Certified Public Accountant
A20 exin ton Avenue ew Yor , N.Y. 10170 
(212)631-9131  FAX (2 I 2) 682-5279
July 2, 1996
Barry Melancon, CPA
President, American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
Dear Barry:
I am taking the liberty of using your good offices to directthis letter to the appropriate auditing committee. I would
like to make some comments on the proposed new standardsrequiring the detection of fraud. When I first studiedaccounting systems and auditing, we were taught that if a
system is designed where A is supposed to check on B and Aand B are in collusion, the system is effectively overridden.
That was forty-five years ago. Nothing has changed since
then except there has been the enormous growth in the size of 
business organizations and the computerization of financial 
records. In its own way this makes it easier to conceal 
transactions.
In addition to collusion, we have what I call the "boss
factor". That is when a C.E.O. or a C.F.O. instructs an
employee to draw a check, make a payment or make entries in
the books to achieve a certain financial result, the
instructions of the boss are invariably followed and if an
employee objects, another employee will be found to carry out 
the instructions. When you factor in this "boss factor" it 
becomes apparent that any fraud either to themisappropriation of assets or to the misstatement of
financial results can be readily concealed.
This proposed standard is supposedly in response to thepublics' perception that "auditors should detect fraud"in a "knee jerk" reaction. The AICPA is considering passing
a new rule. The fact that the rule cannot honestly becomplied with is besides the point. Of course, what shouldbe done is the profession should educate the public as to the limitations of our work. The public would like doctors to cure all forms of cancer. The A.M.A. does not pass rules making it mandatory that all doctors cure cancer each and every time or they are in violation of professional ethics.
Barry Melancon, CPA
President, American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants 
Page 2
They cure some, and we accountants discover some frauds. To 
represent that we can do otherwise would create a mis-leading 
inference.
I would appreciate your forwarding these comments to the 
appropriate committee. Thank you for your courtesy. 
Sincerely, .
RAK:mk/0490
J a n e  M. M a n c in o ,  T e c h n ic a l  M a n a g e r
A u d i t  and  A t t e s t  S t a n d a r d s ,  F i l e  2 6 9 0
A IC P A , 1211  A v e n u e  o f  t h e  A m e r ic a s ,
New Y o r k ,  NY 1 0 0 3 6 -8 7 7 5
C o n s id e r a t i o n  o f  F ra u d  i n  a  F i n a n c i a l  S ta te m e n t  A u d i t .
1 .  The  p r o p o s e d  s t a t e m e n t  o n  a u d i t i n g  s t a n d a r d s  a p p e a r s  t o  b e
s e e k in g  a n  e x c u s e  f o r  n o t  b e in g  a b le  t o  g u a r a n te e  t h e  a u d i t .  
I t  w o u ld  a p p e a r  t h a t  t h e  o n l y  w ay t h a t  c a n  h o n e s t l y  b e  
s h o w n  i s  b y  h a v in g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s t a t e m e n t  a p p e a r  a t  t h e  
b e g in n in g  and  e n d  o f  e a c h  r e p o r t :
"W AR N IN G : A l t h o u g h  t h e s e  s t a t e m e n ts  a r e  s ig n e d  b y  C e r t i f i e d
P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t s  ( o r  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t s ) ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  a u d i t  e v id e n c e  a nd  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  F r a u d ,  
t h e r e  i s  no a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  M a t e r i a l  M is s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  
d e t e c t e d  . " 
2 T he  d e s c r i p t i o n  a n d  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  f r a u d  s h o u ld  a p p e a r  
o n l y  o n c e  i n  t h e  e n t i r e  S ta te m e n ts  o n  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s .
A c h a n g e  in  a n y  c o m p o n e n t o f  a S ta n d a r d  w o u ld  n o t  r e q u i r e  
a c h a n g e  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  S t a n d a r d .
3 .  E x c e p t io n  i s  t a k e n  t o  t h e  p ro p o s e d  a m e n d m e n t t o  SAS # 1 . T h e  
p r o p o s e d  l a s t  s e n te n c e  t o  p a r a g r a p h  2 s h o u ld  h a v e  t h e  l a s t
s e n te n c e  o m i t e d .  "T h e  a u d i t o r  h a s  no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ................. "
d o e s  n o t  b e lo n g  w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s .  I t  may p r o p e r l y  be  
a f o o t n o t e  co m m m e n t. T h e  s t a t e m e n t  w o u ld  a p p e a r  t o  b e  an  
e x c u s e .
R e s p e c t f u l l y  s u b m i t t e d
B EN JA M IN  P O D G O R  
ATTORNEY A N D  COUNSELLOR AT LAW  
3 2  ABBEY STREET
MASSAPEQUA PARK. NEW YORK 11762
( 5 1 6 )  3 4 1 -9 2 9 2  
( 3 1 6 )  5 4 1 -6 0 3 4
Soldavini Accounting, P.A.
5415 Jaeger Road, Suite B 
Naples, Florida 33942
Office: (941) 591-4747 • Fax: (941) 591-2991
June 21, 1996
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear .Sir:
I am writing in support of the proposed new standard regarding 
fraud that the Auditing Standards Board is in the process of 
writing. I believe there are several issues that will need to be 
addressed and 1 would like to express several concerns that I have 
regarding this statement.
I would first like to give you some background concerning an 
embezzlement and fraud case that I was involved with. Our firm was 
hired to compile financial statements and a tax return for several 
companies that have the same owner/manager. The problem was 
occurring by the owner/manager of an investment fund. This fund 
was a limited partnership with several partners and several million 
dollars worth of investments. There was extensive fraudulent money 
movements occurring on a regular basis by the owner/manager of this 
fund. Once we confirmed our suspicions we contacted an attorney 
and much to our dismay we were told that the only recourse we would 
have is to withdraw quietly from this client. We were also told 
that when this event becomes knowledge of the shareholders we would 
probably be brought into the case as a defendant. This fact 
surprised and sickened me. We have done nothing wrong and will 
most likely be sued and need to defend our. actions. However, 
looking at this from a shareholders point of view, I don't blame 
them for filing suit against the accountants. The only recourse 
accountants have at this level of service is to walk away and allow 
criminal action to continue. If it was my money, I would be 
furious that nothing was done.
The concerns I have regarding, this standard involve the level 
of service the standard will be written for, the level where fraud 
and embezzlement are occurring, and the reporting requirements.
The first issue concerns the type of service. It is my 
opinion that the standard should cover all services from 
compilation to audits. The embezzlement and fraud that I was 
involved in was detected during a compilation for a tax return. If 
the standard is written primarily for an audit it could leave 
several accountants in t h e  c o l d  w h e n  d o i n g  o t h e r  types of services.
The next consideration is that white collar crime or fraud is 
usually occurring at the an upper level of management or ownership.
A Full Service Accounting
The way the current regulations are written, accountants are 
required to report to an audit committee or upper level of 
management anything that is found that seems suspicious. If the 
fraud is committed at the owner level, and there is no audit 
committee or the level of service does not require one, the only 
recourse we have as accountants is to withdrawal. A possible 
solution to this problem is allowing accountants to report to the 
shareholders/partners of the company for any service. The 
shareholders/partners are the actual owners of the companies and 
really have the right to know. Inadvertently they are the people 
who hire us. If we could have gone to the partners of this limited 
partnership and requested an audit be performed to confirm our 
suspicions, a lot of grief and money could have been saved.
And my final concern is the accountants responsibility of 
reporting and client confidentiality. It is my understanding the 
law states there is a level of confidentiality with respect to 
client and accountant. This rule is like walking on a tight rope 
for our profession. We need the confidentiality and respect in 
order to help our clients but when a law is broken we have no 
recourse. In the case I spoke of there are several shareholders 
involved who are going to loose millions when this blows up. 
Because of client confidentiality we could not tell anyone of our 
suspicions and if we did we could be sued by the owner. However, 
once the case blows up we could also be sued by the shareholders. 
Where do we win as accountants? I feel the inability to expose 
criminal actions could have an adverse affect on our profession. 
Accountants may stop accepting audit engagements due to the 
liability or the fees will need to be incredibly high to compensate 
for the level of risk. Also, the more lawsuits that are filed 
against accountants the less confident the clients will become with 
the reliability of audits, reviews, etc.
I really believe that there needs to be some major overhauling 
of this area of the code. We need to somehow come up with some 
protection for accountants and give them some strong guidelines as 
to what to do when embezzlement and fraud are detected. Walking 
away from the client is NOT the answer. It increases our insurance 
rates due to possible law suits not to say the legal fees. I hope 
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Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager - Audit and Attest Standards 
File 2690
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
We are pleased to have the opportunity to respond on the proposed statement on auditing 
standards ("SAS"), Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (the "Exposure 
Draft"). Our overall conclusion is the Exposure Draft will provide sound guidance for our 
profession in performing attest engagements with situations of increased fraud risks. 
However, as noted in paragraphs 26-28, we believe the Exposure Draft is relatively vague 
with respect to what procedures are actually required (of the auditor) when significant fraud 
risk factors are identified. We recommend the Exposure Draft be revised to include audit 
procedures that "should be implemented" if fraud risk factors surface during an attest 
engagement, provided that mitigating controls are not evident to reduce fraud risk to an 
acceptable level. Also, we are somewhat concerned about the relationship implications our 
profession could bear in addressing fraud considerations with our attest clients. Without 
proper guidance, implementation of the Exposure Draft may be difficult as auditors could 
realize relationship constraints whereby attest clients may view fraud inquiries as 
questioning management's integrity. Accordingly, as noted above, we believe the Exposure 
Draft should be revised to require auditors to perform certain procedures when significant 
fraud risk factors are identified, versus the current form, which only suggests that auditors 





Number (s) Current Wording
Proposed
Changes/Comments
18 16.a "An ineffective means of 
communicating and 
supporting the entity's values 
or ethics."
Due to the vagueness of this 
statement, we recommend the 
Exposure Draft be expanded to 
include examples of "ineffective 
means."
19 16.a "An excessive interest in 
maintaining or increasing the 
entity's stock price or 
earnings trend through the 
use of unusually aggressive 
accounting practices."
We recommend the Exposure Draft 
delete the word "unusually," as the 
identifiable fraud risk factor should 
relate to aggressive accounting 
practices in general.
P h o n e  (501) 664-8739 • (800) 482-8739 in  A rkansas • Fax  (501) 664-8320 
E-Mail: 102651.2237@ compuser ve. com




Number(s) Number(s) Current Wording
Proposed
Changes /  Comments
21 18.b "Unexplained unusual and 
observable changes in 
behavior of employees with 
access to assets susceptible to 
misappropriation."
22 18.c "Accounting system in 
disarray"
33 Appendix "the financial statements are
A free of material misstatement,
Paragraph whether caused by error or
2 fraud."
We recommend the insertion of 
"changes in behavior and/or life style 
of employees..."
We recommend the following 
revision," Accounting system with 
inadequate and ineffective control
techniques"
As the proposed Exposure Draft will 
amend SAS No. 1 to reflect the 
auditors' responsibilities relating to 
fraud, and as our profession currently 
must adhere to the responsibilities of 
detecting illegal acts as part of our 
attest engagements (under SAS No. 
54), we recommend the amendment 
to SAS No. 1 be reflective of the 
auditors' responsibilities to detect 
both illegal acts and fraud. 
Accordingly, we propose the 
following revision, "the financial 
statements are free of material 
misstatement, whether caused by 
error, an illegal act or fraud." 
Additionally, this insertion would 
eliminate the necessity for the last 
sentence in footnote 1 on page 33.
We appreciate your time in reviewing our comments, and if any questions arise, please do not 
hesitate to contact us at 501-664-8739.
Very truly yours,
J. Mitchell Collins, Chairman 
Accounting Principles and Auditing Committee 
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STATE AUDITOR
February 2,1996
Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manger 
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690 
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
We have reviewed the Exposure Draft, Consideration o f  Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. 
Here are our responses to the 10 questions included in the Commentator Guide To Significant 
Issues section of the Exposure Draft:
1. Does SAS No. 53 clearly articulate the auditor’s responsibility to detect and report errors 
and irregularities?
The auditor’s responsibility to detect and report material errors and irregularities was clear 
in SAS No. 53. However, the current ED gives expanded guidance on the factors that the 
auditor might consider in order to plan and perform the audit to afford reasonable assurance 
of detecting and reporting material irregularities (or fraud) in particular. The additional 
guidance would be of great benefit to heighten the auditor’s awareness of factors that might 
suggest an increased risk of fraud. This may in turn help narrow the expectation gap 
further by moving the auditor closer to the public’s expectation.
It must be understood, however, that there can be great subjectivity in assessing the risk of 
fraud based on some of the factors identified in the ED and based-on other factors. It is 
often easy to see in hind sight factors that might have indicated to the auditor, that his audit 
work should be adjusted because of a perceived increased risk of fraud. However, because 
of subjectivity, the fraud indicators may not be as clear during the audit. The ED alludes to 
this need for good professional judgment in paragraph 10 and indicates that this is one of 
the reasons why the auditor is able to obtain only reasonable assurance of detecting 
material misstatement.
To narrow the expectation gap further, it may be of benefit to more clearly articulate not 
just to the auditors their responsibility, but also to the users of audit reports what are the 
more common limitations of an audit detecting fraud as indicated in paragraphs 7-10 of the 
ED. This may help to narrow the expectation gap further by moving the public closer to
what the auditor can reasonably do (i.e., what reasonable assurance means and why it is not 
absolute assurance). Currently, the auditor’s standard report explains one of the reasons for 
reasonable assurance, i.e., examining on a test basis. However, as noted in the ED, audits 
in accordance with GAAS rarely involve authentication of documentation, nor are auditors 
trained as experts in such authentication. Additionally, fraud can be concealed through 
collusion. These are two very significant factors regarding material fraud and the auditor’s 
ability to detect it. Additionally, with the technological advances and accessability to 
computers, falsified documentation can be created easily to look very realistic. The 
auditor’s report should identify these significant factors when explaining that the audit 
opinion affords reasonable assurance.
The discussion in the amendment to SAS No. 1 regarding reasonable assurance (paragraph 
No. 10) would seem to be an appropriate basis for adding a statement indicating the 
following to the second paragraph of the auditor’s standard report: “Absolute assurance is 
not attainable because of the nature of audit evidence and the characteristics of fraud, 
particularly with regards to collusion and falsification of documents.”
There is another somewhat related problem which might be resolved in this new proposed 
statement. Yellow book requires us to report all “illegal acts” which would be required to 
be communicated to an audit committee. There are some who say this includes all 
intentional and unintentional violations of law unless they are clearly inconsequential. This 
has caused several states to spend a lot of time discussing this issue without a resolution. 
Even though it is not the purpose of this proposed statement, it would be nice if it would 
answer the questions: (1) Does “illegal act” include any unintentional violation of any law, 
or does it only mean fraud. (2) If “illegal act” means any violations of law which are 
clearly consequential, what does “clearly consequential” mean?
2. Should the auditing standards contain a separate standard on fraud or continue with a 
standard that encompasses both fraud (i.e., irregularities) and error?
As noted in our response to Question No. 4., we feel a separate fraud risk assessment is not 
necessary because it is based on and is a duplication of internal control risk and inherent 
risk which cover the risk of misstatement due to fraud and/or errors. Therefore, we feel that 
a standard regarding fraud should be encompassed within the standards regarding inherent 
and internal control risk assessments (i.e., Codification o f SAS AU Sections 312 and 319 
generally). The same lack of internal controls that allows errors, also allows fraud to occur. 
Inherent risk factors can possibly be divided into those factors that increase the risk of 
errors (i.e., complexity) versus those that increase the risk for fraud (i.e., stability). 
However, there is overlap (i.e., judgment required).
3. Should a new standard on fraud encompass both fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets?
Y e s . The two types of fraud that relate to the auditor’s interest of detecting material 
misstatements, involve both fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets. 
Therefore, any standard regarding fraud should address both types. However, see our 
response to Question No. 2. above and 4. below.
4. Should the auditor, in a financial statement audit, be required to specifically assess the risk 
of material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud (fraud risk)?
No. It is not necessary nor practical to breakdown assessments of audit risk further from 
inherent risk, internal control risk, and detection risk. The requirement to specifically make 
an assessment of fraud risk, would bring greater attention to the auditor concerning his 
responsibility regarding the detection of material fraud. However, fraud risk is based on 
internal control risk and inherent risk; just as the risk of errors is based on internal control 
risk and inherent risk. This is noted by Footnote No. 5 and by the first statement in 
paragraph No. 6. which indicates that fraud involves: a) a pressure or an incentive to 
commit fraud (inherent risk) and b) a perceived opportunity (internal control risk).
Separately assessing fraud risk would be a duplication of assessing inherent risk and 
internal control risk. This can be seen by comparing the factors one considers in assessing 
inherent risk and internal control risk with the factors identified in the ED that the auditor 
would consider in assessing fraud risk. There is a duplication. The ED reiterates the 
internal control risk and inherent risk factors with perhaps more detail; however, there are 
no factors to evaluate for fraud risk that are different from the factors the auditor evaluates 
in order to assess inherent risk and internal control risk. Specifically, the risk factors and 
categories identified by the ED can all be linked to inherent risk and/or internal control risk 
factors. (For instance, Codification o f SAS AU 319.84 identifies internal control risk 
components such as 1) control environment, risk assessment, and monitoring risk factors, 
which correspond with the “Management Characteristic” factors and 2) control activities, 
information and communication, risk assessment, and monitoring risk factors which 
correspond with the “Controls” factors all identified by the ED. AU 312.20 identifies 
inherent risk factors which correspond with the “Industry Conditions,” “Operating 
Characteristics and Financial Stability,” “Susceptibility of Assets to Misappropriation,” and 
“Employee Relationships or Pressures” factors identified by the ED.)
The following statements reiterate our concern that a separate fraud risk assessment is not 
necessary or practical because it is a duplication of the existing inherent and internal 
control risk assessment. If internal control risk and/or inherent risk is assessed high, of 
course the risk of fraud (as well as errors) is increased for the same reasons identified for 
assessing internal control risk and/or inherent risk high. Conversely, if fraud risk is high, it 
is due to that fact that inherent risk and/or internal control risk is high for the same reasons. 
That is the whole point in assessing internal control risk and inherent risk.
The proposed statement should be changed to provide the additional detail it gives without 
requiring the separate fraud risk assessment.
5. Should the proposed standard contain categories of risk factors that the auditor should 
consider, specific risk factors, both, or neither? 
The standard should provide the categories of risk factors that the auditor should consider 
and provide the specific risk factors within those categories that the auditor might consider. 
The specific risk factors identified in the ED should not be construed as all-inclusive. For 
instance, there may be other factors to consider that relate to a governmental engagement; 
whereas some of the specific factors identified by the ED do not relate to a government 
engagement as well. Any list would be incomplete and yet also not be completely 
applicable to every situation. The auditor should use professional judgment with suggested 
guidance from the standards in determining the necessary specific considerations for risk 
assessment for a particular engagement.
6. How should the auditor respond to the fraud risk assessment?
We agree with the ED, that the response depends on the circumstance and the ED’s 
guidance seems appropriate.
7. Is there a need to document the fraud risk assessment, and if so, what should be 
documented?
As noted in our response to Question No. 4 above, we don’t believe a separate fraud risk 
assessment is necessary because it duplicates the existing assessments for internal control 
risk and inherent risk. Therefore, we do not feel that there is a need to document a separate 
fraud risk assessment.
8. Should the auditor’s communication responsibilities to management, the audit committee, 
and others change with the proposed standard?
No. The ED and the existing standard are essentially the same on this point and the 
proposed standard seems appropriate.
9. Do you agree that the SAS appropriately balances costs and benefits? How much 
additional work, if any, will this proposed SAS create for your audits?
As explained above, it will not create a significant amount of additional work. However, as 
explained in our response to Question No. 4 it will be a duplication of effort. The 
responsibility to plan the audit to detect material fraud and the responsibility to assess risk 
already exists. However, the ED does seem to require additional unnecessary 
documentation to break out (or identify) a part of inherent risk and internal control risk to 
show the basis of a fraud risk assessment.
10. Other concerns.
As noted in our response to Question No. 1. above, to narrow the expectation gap, the 
auditor’s report should also clearly articulate the auditor’s responsibility regarding the 
detection of fraud by explaining the basis for providing reasonable assurance--and not 
absolute assurance—beyond identifying that the audit involves examining evidence on a test 
basis.
If you have any questions, please call me.
Sincerely,
Auston G. Johnson, CPA 
Utah State Auditor
cc: Kinney Poynter, NASACT 
2401 Regency Road, Suite 302 
Lexington, KY 40503
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July 26, 1996
Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards 
“Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit”
Dear Ms. Mancino:
The Accounting Principles and Auditing Procedures Committee is the senior technical 
committee of the Massachusetts Society of Certified Public Accountants. The Committee 
consists of over thirty members who are affiliated with public accounting firms of various 
sizes, from sole proprietor to international “big six” firms, as well as members in both 
industry and academia. The Committee has reviewed and discussed the Proposed 
Statement on Auditing Standards “Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit The views expressed in this comment letter are solely those of the Committee and 
do not reflect the views of the organizations with which the Committee members are 
affiliated.
Based on the Committee’s review of the above-named exposure draft, we concur with the 
requirements and recommendations of this exposure draft, as outlined. However, we can 
envision situations in which the guidance of paragraph 40 might cause confusion regarding 
the determination of materiality. If you receive similar comments about this item, you may 
want to reconsider the wording of that paragraph and provide additional guidance on how 
to apply the provisions of that paragraph.
We appreciate the opportunity to present our comments and thank you for your 
consideration.
Very truly yours,
Thomas J. Vocatura, Chairman 
Accounting Principles and Auditing 
Procedures Committee of the MSCPA
U K Urbach Kahn &. Werlin PC
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
July 29, 1996
Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Jane:
I have the following comments on the proposed statement 'Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit* ('Proposed SAS"), including the related proposed revisions to SAS No. 1 and SAS No. 
47, where applicable.
1. ¶ 10 of the Proposed SAS notes that The auditor is able to obtain only reasonable assurance that 
material misstatements in the financial statements are detected." A parallel statement in proposed 
112 of SAS No. 1 is worded slightly differently. I suggest that both references be the same.
2. 1113 of the Proposed SAS requires that an auditor inquire of management to obtain the client’s 
view regarding the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. While specific inquiries may be an 
appropriate audit procedure in some cases, I recommend they not be mandated. This inquiry 
requirement will most often produce nothing more than a representation from management which 
for example SAS No. 19 notes is not a substitute for the application of those auditing procedures 
necessary to afford a reasonable basis for his opinion on the financial statements. The placement 
(under the main heading 'Assessment of the Risk of Material Misstatement Due to Fraud') of this 
requirement to inquire, in the same category as the mandate to specifically assess, elevates it to 
an important procedure in clarifying the auditors detection responsibility when in fact it will result 
in very little, if any, useful evidential matter.
inquiry procedures should be treated as guidance only and placed elsewhere in the document, 
as an add on for example in U 23 which deals with inquiries regarding fraud prevention programs 
or to the bullet item in 1128 dealing with conducting interviews of personnel involved in areas in 
which a concern about the risk of material misstatement due to fraud is present.
3. The documentation requirement in H 36 is confusing, inasmuch as it requires "evidence of the 
performance of the assessment. .  . , '  and as written is more process oriented than conclusion 
oriented (evidence of the performance rather than the judgment as to the risk). I suggest a more 
straight-forward requirement such as simply documenting the auditors assessment of the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud.
4. The last sentence of I I 36 uses the word "increased" to describe the risk assessment of material 
misstatement due to fraud that might result from factors or other conditions noted during the 
performance of the audit. This word may inappropriately imply that a specific degree of risk be 
initialiy assessed in some quantitative type terms (i.e. low, medium). It would be more appropriate 
here to use the term "changed' rather than "increased."
66 State Street, Albany, NY 12207-2595 (518) 449-3166 FAX (518) 449-5832'
Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
July 29, 1996
Page Two
5. Appendix C - Proposed Amendment to SAS No. 47 adds a new paragraph 18 which would 
require the auditor to consider the extent to which auditing procedures should be performed at 
selected locations or components. This paragraph, as it currently stands, has no context or 
connection to the other revisions to SAS 47 which are all based on the need to provide a 
foundation within the audit risk model for the consideration of fraud and the incorporation of 
certain guidance relating to errors that was formerly included in SAS No. 53.
I suggest that this paragraph be eliminated, or appropriately modified to specify that this 
requirement is in the context of the circumstance when the auditor has reached a conclusion that 
there is significant risk of material misstatement of the financial statements, as discussed in the 
preceding paragraph.
Thank you for this opportunity to respond. If the Task Force needs any additional information on these 







Audit & Atest Standards
File 2690
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Gentlemen:
This leter is to give you my thoughts on the Exposure Draft (Draft) of Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit.
Overal Comment - I believe the ASB wil be making a mistake to approve the Draft. I believe the 
basic premise that CPA's wil find more fraud is not necessarily correct and that the price to find 
whatever is found wil be very high. I do not believe it is in the best interest of the profession to put 
CPA's in public practice more at risk than they are (which I believe approval wil do). In addition, 
approval may give the public some reason to believe it is the CPA's job to find fraud (which it.is 
not). I also believe the Draft is ambiguous and requires extensive clarification.
I would prefer the issues related to fraud be addressed in an Audit Alert, an additional report on 
fraud for SEC or public clients similar to that used in "Yelow Book" audits for compliance, or 
some other means besides a standard seting document.
General Comments - 1) Any reader of this Draft must conclude that the ASB is adopting new 
tougher rules that are designed under the presumption that auditors wil find more fraud. The Draft 
implies there is very litle that is new included and uses the terms "expanded", "clarify", "enhance" 
to prove that, but those are a sham. The real purpose is set forth very clearly under Background, on 
page 8, third paragraph, last sentence: The ASB ".. has .. articulated it to provide auditors with 
appropriate guidance in furthering the objective of detecting material misstatement.. from fraud." 
This is clearly opposite to the profession's assertion that we are not responsible for detecting fraud.
I was very interested to hear Mary Eklund (an atorney who is very involved with litigation 
defending CPA's and a speaker at the National Accounting & Auditing Symposium for the past 
several years) say unequivocaly that the Draft wil be a significant help to plaintiff atorneys suing
980 ee-ann riv e NE ■ PO Box 909 ■ Concord nc 28026-0969 
elephone 704-786-0171 ■ fax 704-786-0179
P a g e  2
CPA's. She was clear that she felt the Draft would undo relief Congress enacted in a 1995 law. Her 
hand out material addresses some o f the issues she sees with regard to litigation and I recommend 
the ASB review that and discuss her comments.
AICPA representatives at her session stated attorneys for Big 6 firms had looked at the Draft and 
said it would not hurt our ability to prevail in a lawsuit. I strongly suggest that additional attorneys 
representing CPA's in lawsuits be consulted and their opinions shared with those in the profession 
who will be impacted by the Draft before approval.
2) There is no question that direct audit costs must increase (in my view this will be a significant 
increase)' to cover the Draft's new requirements. The indirect audit costs o f potential lawsuits will 
probably increase as well. When considered nationwide, the additional cost each year will be huge. 
Of course, the A I C P A  will do well by selling its publications and CPE classes to "help” CPA's 
implement the new rules.
3) I don't believe the ASB needs to issue the Draft. I believe an audit risk alert or other non 
standard setting document would work just as well. If  the Draft is issued, small CPA firms will 
encourage their clients to switch from audits to reviews.
4 )  Have the advocates o f CPA's in small firms.(the PCPS) reviewed the Draft and made comments?
I believe they will see the Draft as an addition to standards overload and an additional reason for 
firms to quit doing audits.
Specific Comments - 5 ) 1  would like to see language in the early part o f the Draft that specifically 
states that clients are responsible for detecting fraud; CPA's aren't; auditors are not trained 
investigators o f fraudulent activities; that the chances of a CPA finding fraud, even in a properly 
planned and conducted audit, is small; that just because fraud is found does not mean a CPA's 
professional judgment was wrong; and that the CPA has no responsibility to anyone not in privity to 
the CPA. These assertions are implied by reference to other SAS's and are stated in various places 
in the Draft, but they would be much more helpful if  stated unequivocally in the early part o f the 
Draft.
Paragraph 10 says "cannot obtain absolute assurance" and "may not" detect fraud. I think those 
terms are to weak. I believe "can only obtain reasonable assurance" and "probably not" should be 
s u b s t i tu te d .
6 )  P a r a g r a p h  4 includes "misusing assets". This is nebulous and does not provide assistance t o  a n  
a u d i to r .
7) Paragraph 12 says the auditor "should consider fraud risk factors ... in each ... category ... in 
paragraphs 15 and 17". Paragraphs 15 and 17 are expanded by the examples in paragraphs 16 and 
18. T h e r e f o r e ,  th e  a u d i t o r  is  r e q u i r e d  to  a d d r e s s  a l l  th o s e .  T h e  la n g u a g e  in  16 and 18, however, is 
again nebulous and subject to wide disparity in interpretation. For example, what does 
"ineffective", "domination", "inadequate", "timely", "unduly aggressive", "significant disregard", 
"significant", "excessive", "unrealistic", "domineering", "aggressive", "unusually high", "marginal",
AICPA.
"stress", "observable", "personal financial pressures", "appropriate" and "disarray" mean and how 
can an auditor distinguish those terms in one audit from another audit? It would certainly put a 
burden on any CPA defending themselves to explain why he didn't catch a fraud when these 
nebulous examples are present and another CPA "hired gun" says they weren't properly considered.
It is unclear whether Footnote 5 changes the requirements of 12 when it says "... may ... using 
different categories o f risk factors ...". It is also unclear whether the last sentence of Footnote 5 is 
saying "other fraud risk factors" must be considered only when control risk is assessed at the 
maximum or whether that applies in all assessments of fraud risk. Paragraph 26 (Controls) also 
implies an additional understanding must be obtained.
8) Paragraph 15 is also nebulous with the terms "abilities", "pressures", "style", "attitude".
9) Many audits of small companies, in particular those with no, or few, office staff and those with 
only an owner manager, will likely have many of the examples cited in paragraphs 15 through 18. 
The guidance offered in paragraph 21 is woefully inadequate. What does an auditor do when many 
of the risks are present and the owner is the manager? Saying the auditor must exercise professional 
judgment in the Draft is not sufficient, particularly in hindsight.
10) Paragraph 22 is unclear as to whether, after gaining an understanding o f  controls and 
concluding to assess control risk at the maximum, a requirement is imposed to obtain an additional 
understanding of the fraud risks and to assess what controls there are for purposes of mitigating the 
fraud risks. Most small audits have control risk assessed at the maximum. The guidance is unclear 
on the new requirements in that situation and what steps must be taken. I f  an additional 
understanding is required or not, are controls to mitigate fraud risks required to be tested?
11) I would hate to see an auditor being sued try to rely on paragraph 25 as a defense. Please see 
comment 5.
12) Paragraph 26 (under Professional Skepticism) used more nebulous terms: "increased 
sensitivity" and "increased recognition". Those sound like the ASB is trying to be "politically 
correct".
13) Paragraph 26 (Assignment of Personnel) appears to impose an additional burden to use 
personnel"... commensurate with the ..." fraud"... risk..." Would we, in addition to all the other 
documentation, be required to document the selection of staff to work on specific sections o f the 
audit, or do we wait until we are sued to prove a staff person was "qualified"? When is someone 
qualified to detect fraud; are they qualified right out of college or do they need 5, 10, 15 years 
experience, or some CPE class?
14) The documentation o f paragraph 36 is going to be extensive. Many small audits are going to 
have a multitude of risk factors. Each of those will have to be addressed with their impact, scope of 
work related to factors, any factors found during the audit, and a final overall conclusion. Leaving 
out anything would make the auditor very vulnerable upon being sued. I believe the ASB should 
draft examples o f the memos to be written for guidance if the Draft is approved.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 (212) 596-6200 • fax (212) 596-6213
cpaThe Never Underestimate The Value."
AICPA
15) Footnote 4 relates "electronic form" to falsified documentation. I don’t see any other references 
to the relationship of fraud and computers, additional commentary might be helpful.
If you have any questions about my comments, please contact me.
Yours tru ly .
Irvin T. Newberry
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 (212) 596-6200 • fax (212) 596-6213
The Never Underestimate The Value.5"
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Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2690
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards-Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit
Dear Ms. Mancino:
We are enclosing the comments of the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants 
in response to the above proposed statement. The comments were prepared by the Society’s 
Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee.
If you have any questions regarding the comments, please call us and we will arrange for 
someone on the committee to contact you.
Very truly yours,
Chairman, Auditing Standards and Director, Professor Programs
Procedures Committee
Enclosures
cc: Accounting & Auditing Committee Chairmen
COMMENTS
OF
Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee of the New York State Society of Certified Public 
Accountants
ON
Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, Considerations of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit :
General Comments
Overall the Committee believes that the document is a useful and practical document that 
contains needed guidance on auditor responsibility, procedures and courses of action in dealing 
with fraud in an audit of financial statements. Nonetheless, we are concerned with the overall 
intent of the proposed standard.
The response section of the document is written in such a manner as to indicate that the 
auditor can routinely overcome the significant risk that the presence of risk of fraud presents in a 
financial statement audit. This may lead the practitioner, especially the small business auditor 
where many fraud risk factors may be present, to believe that audit procedures can always be 
modified to alleviate the threat of risk of fraud
As the guidance in the document is of necessity general and subjective, the Committee 
would like to see this issue addressed in an implementation guide and/or by modifying already 
issued practice oriented professional literature (e.g. industry audit guides). This guidance would 
be useful in determining minimum fraud risk factors and how they differ during different phases 
of the audit, and give specific examples of appropriate auditing procedures at varying levels of 
fraud risk assessment and the auditor's responses to them. Otherwise, the Committee would be 
concerned that compliance with the standard will be arbitrary, inconsistent and ineffective.
Specific Comments
Footnote 2 to paragraph 2 indicates that the auditor has no responsibility to determine 
intent, yet the term “intentional” is used in the document, such as in paragraph 3 concerning 
fraudulent financial reporting. The Committee would like to see this issue clarified, as the 
concept of intentional versus unintentional seems confusing
There is an apparent contradiction in the initial response paragraph (no 25) in that the 
auditor's response is to be directly influenced by the degree of risk assessed. However, the 
assessment paragraphs deal with only evaluating the risk of fraud being present. This apparent 
contradiction may lead to numerous practice problems.
Paragraph 16(a), third bullet, deals with a client's interest in maintaining earnings through
aggressive accounting practices. Aggressive accounting practices should be a factor in itself. 
The Committee also notes that overly conservative accounting policies may also be used to 
deflate earnings when that is useful to management or owners.
Paragraph 17(b) deals with unexplained and observable changes in behavior of 
employees. The Committee feels that this should specifically include changes in the economic 
lifestyle.
The South Carolina Association of Certified Public Accountants
July 29,1996
Jane M. Mancino 
Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards 
File 2690, AICPA 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Reference: Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, Consideration of Fraud 
in a Financial Statement Audit
Dear Ms. Mancino:
Our Committee agrees that a separate standard on fraud will help to clarify the auditor’s 
responsibility to detect and report material fraud. S AS 47 also seems to be a logical place 
to include the guidance regarding errors previously encompassed in SAS 53.
The detection of fraud (material or immaterial) is a general concern of users of an audit. 
Investors and other users of financial statements often “expect” that an audit has been 
designed and performed to detect fraud. We believe that a separate audit standard will 
narrow this “expectation gap” and address the needs of the users of audited financial 
statements. However, the standard should clearly explain the potential that frauds may 
still not be detected due to acts such as collusion within the organization and with 
outsiders, falsified documentation and other sophisticated schemes. The language in the 
proposed amendments to Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1 appears to 
adequately define the auditor’s responsibilities regarding “reasonable assurance” and 
should be added to the introductory section of the Proposed Statement on Auditing 
Standards.
Paragraphs 16 through 18 of the Exposure Draft give an excellent .overview of various 
risk factors to be considered in assessing an entity’s exposure to fraud. However, our 
committee also feels that the Proposed Statement should emphasize the heightened risk of 
today’s electronic environment. This includes technological advances in duplicating 
equipment, electronic transactions, and lack of attention (and understanding) of third 
parties such as banks. It further includes lack of sufficient expertise by persons who are 
an integral part of an entity’s internal control in the ability to detect sophisticated use of 
computer manipulation.
570 Chris Drive, West Columbia, S.C. 29169 • (803) 791-4181 • Fax (803) 791-4196
The CPA. Never Underestimate The Value.
A concern o f  some o f our committee members is the implementation o f  another 
“checklist” to document the risk o f material misstatement due to fraud. Committee 
members suggest that instances o f the failure to detect fraud have been more related to 
not gaining a proper understanding of internal controls, not wanting to offend the client or 
not being skeptical enough to recognize the fraud. These situations are adequately 
covered in existing literature. However, we agree that a  means to focus audit efforts 
specifically towards fraud should, at a minimum, increase the awareness o f  its potential 
for, material misstatements and we suggest that the AICPA develop some detailed 
practice aids to help members assess the risk o f fraud. These should include a guide that 
contains the m ost common types o f fraud that have occurred, the internal controls that 
were circumvented and the key indicators o f that fraud.
Finally, the standard should address revised wording for the standard representation letter 
and potentially the standard attorney letter request.
Very truly yours,
Jeunes E. Hazel, Jr., CPA 
Chairman
South Carolina Association o f 
CPA’s Technical Standards Committee
NJSCPA
New Jersey Society of Certified Public Accountants
425 Eagle Rock Avenue 
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Audit & Atest Standards
File #2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York City, NY 10036-8775
Re:  Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards -
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
Dear Ms. Mancino:
The Auditing and Accounting Standards Commitee (the "Commitee") of the New Jersey 
Society of Certified Public Accountants ("NJSCPA") is pleased to submit its comments 
on the AICPA’s Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards entitled Consideration of 
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (Exposure Draft). The views expressed in this 
leter represent the majority of the members of the Commitee and are not necessarily 
indicative of the ful membership of the NJSCPA.
In summary, the Commitee is supportive of a separate standard to codify what many 
practitioners and, indeed, the courts, have held as the auditor’s responsibility to detect 
fraud.
The folowing are specific comments regarding the Exposure Draft:
1. Paragraph 2 indicates that there are two types of fraud: fraudulent financial reporting 
and misappropriation of assets. Although aluded to in paragraph 7 through 
paragraph 10, a distinction should be made between fraud that an auditor can 
reasonably detect and fraud which cannot be reasonably detected.
Although the distinction may at times be unclear, it would be helpful if the standard 
gave specific examples of what the auditor should reasonably be expected to detect. 
For example, should an auditor be expected to detect the type of colusion discussed 
in paragraph 8? We believe that this distinction, coupled with specific examples, wil 
not only guide auditors as to their responsibilities, but wil help eliminate the 
"expectation gap".
-2-
2. Although the Exposure Draft discusses in detail the risks associated with various 
types of fraud and the appropriate consideration at the account balance, class of 
transaction, and assertion level, we believe that more specific examples are needed 
in paragraphs 29 and 30; for example (revenue recognition). If management 
misstates revenues by failing to disclose the existence of amendments or "side deals" 
to contracts, a well designed and properly transmitted and received written 
confirmation may disclose the misstatement (the type of fraud an auditor can detect). 
However, if a fictitious company is established by management or based on collusion, 
a customer does not properly respond to the confirmation (i.e., signs an affirmative 
response that there are no amendments or "side deals" when in fact there are). What 
additional step is the auditor expected to take? Perhaps this is the type of fraud that 
cannot be detected.
3. Paragraph 38 indicates that whenever the auditor has determined that there is 
evidence that a fraud may exist, it should be brought to an appropriate level of 
management and if it involves senior management, it should be brought to the Audit 
Committee. This may be appropriate for large or publicly traded companies. 
However, for smaller, closely-held entrepreneurial companies, fraudulent financial 
reporting would only exist at the behest of senior management/owners. The 
Exposure Draft should give specific examples of what actions should be taken by 
auditors in such situations.
Very truly yours,
Raymond M. Temple, Chair 
Auditing and Accounting 
Standards Committee
The University of Oklahoma
SCHOOL OF ACCOUNTING
Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690 
AICPA
Dear Auditing Standards Board:
I am writing this letter in response to your request for comments on the exposure draft entitled 
"Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit." My interest in this SAS stems from the fact that 
I recently completed my doctoral dissertation at the University of Arizona on this topic. My dissertation 
experimentally investigated the effects of separately assessing the inherent risk of fraud on auditors' 
planning decisions. 108 practicing auditors from two of the Big-Six audit firms participated in the study. 
These auditors had, on average, over five years experience. The experiment provided the auditors with a 
computerized audit case which monitored their time assimilating fraud cues. Two versions o f the 
instrument manipulated, between auditors, the type of inherent risk assessment required (i.e., 
separate assessments for intentional and unintentional misstatements or a combined assessment). 
A second manipulation varied the risk o f fraud as indicated by cues in an audit case. Auditors' 
planning decisions for accounts receivable (i.e., staff budgets and audit tests selected) are used to 
measure their response to the risk o f fraud. When comparing audit plans between the high and 
low risk cases, a greater difference in planned audit effort is expected for auditors who separately 
assess fraud risk when compared with auditors who make combined risk assessments. Another 
hypothesis' predicts that auditors who make fraud risk assessments will spend more time attending 
to the fraud cues in the case when compared with auditors who assess combined risk. I believe 
the results o f my study may provide useful information for anticipating the economic effects o f the
new SAS. Thus, my comments will include a summary of my results where pertinent.•
First, I generally believe that the proposed SAS will be a significant step forward. I was surprised as I 
developed my dissertation to  talk to auditors at the senior (and even manager) level who believed that they 
were not responsible for detecting fraud. Although my sense is that most auditors understand that they are 
responsible for detecting fraud, I think the SAS will serve to drive this responsibility home. Additionally, 
although current standards specify that auditors should assess the risk o f fraud, I believe that the current 
practice o f assessing misstatement risk does not always engage auditors in thinking about fraud. For 
example, some auditors have told me that they simply do not have any clients who would commit fraud. 
Furthermore, I also received feedback indicating that some auditors do not normally consider what I believe 
are fairly intuitive fraud cues in their risk assessments simply because they do not think that determining 
the risk o f misstatement requires consideration of these cues. Given the many public perceptions that 
auditors are failing in their responsibility to detect fraud, requiring auditors to explicitly assess fraud risk 
on every engagement is an important step in getting auditors to think more about fraud indicators. The 
results o f my dissertation support these assertions as time spent reading fraud indicators increased 
significantly for the auditors who separately assessed fraud risk. Furthermore, the results indicate that 
auditors who separately assessed fraud risk considered the red flag cues to be more relevant to their 
planning decisions.
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Next, as I have discussed the exposure draft with practitioners, I have sensed a concern that the SAS will 
lead to enormous increases in audit costs which will be resisted by clients. My response to this concern is: 
Getting auditors to do a better job considering fraud cues will not necessarily translate into enormous 
across-the-board fee increases. My research provides some evidence on this point: I expected auditors who 
made a separate fraud risk assessment to become more sensitive to fraud indicators and adjust their budgets 
accordingly. My expectation was that the auditors who were required to assess fraud risk would be more 
likely to reduce (increase) budgeted hours for the low (high) fraud risk case when compared with auditors 
who assessed combined misstatement risk. The results indicate that separately assessing fraud risk did 
cause auditors to increase their sensitivity to fraud risk factors and adjust their budgets accordingly. When 
controlling for each auditor's individual budgeting tendencies the data indicate that auditors who separately 
assessed fraud risk budgeted much lower hours for the low fraud risk case while budgeted hours for the 
high fraud risk case were not significantly different from those of the auditors who did not make a fraud 
risk assessment. Thus, it appears that by becoming more sensitive to fraud risk auditors will be more 
efficient when fraud risk is low.
One possible explanation for the result described above is that under current practice auditors are not as 
likely to attend to the fraud risk factors but have a conservative cushion built into their budgets to 
compensate for this. Furthermore, when they were required to look for fraud risk factors and they saw that 
fraud risk was low they took credit for it and reduced this budget cushion. Another possibility is that 
auditors who were focused on misstatements (and not the intent behind the misstatement) simply assessed 
inherent risk as high for accounts receivable and budgeted hours accordingly. W hen they were required to 
investigate indicators regarding intent to misstate they realized that these indicators showed the client was 
not likely to have intentionally misstated the account and they reduced their budgets. I f  the results from my 
study can be generalized to some audits it appears that audit costs will not necessarily sky rocket because 
auditors assess fraud risk. In contrast, clients with a low risk o f fraud may be rewarded with lower costs 
and fees whereas presently these clients may be subsidizing the clients with a  higher risk o f fraud. 
However, the notion that overall audit hours will increase due to this standard cannot be refuted by this 
study and it appears that there may be some support for this as well.
Third, I believe that the discussion in the SAS on cues to look for and how to modify an audit when the risk 
o f fraud is high is important. I believe many auditors do not know how to detect fraud and we as a 
profession need to find better ways of doing so and educate each other on these methods. Again, I am 
relying on my research to support this claim as my dissertation results show that auditors had a hard time 
telling me which audit procedures were more effective at detecting fraud and even after they did so they did 
not modify their audit plans in accordance with their stated perceptions. I attribute this effect to an overall 
limited understanding o f how to modify an audit to detect fraud. Any additional, specific, guidance that the 
Board could include in the SAS on modifying the audit to detect fraud would be very beneficial.
My main concern with the SAS as it is now written is how to relate the fraud risk assessment task to  other 
standards. I believe that auditors may have problems implementing the SAS as they will not know how it 
fits in with current risk assessment guidelines, especially the audit risk model. Perhaps the Board's intent is 
to leave this up to individual practitioners to decide. I think this may lead to dissatisfaction among 
practitioners as they feel that the standards require inefficiencies due to a lack o f specification on 
implementation. For example, are auditors to use the audit risk model during planning and then assess 
fraud risk on top o f this? If  so, will this result in duplicate efforts and inefficient audit plans? A 
conceivable interpretation of the SAS is that in addition to assessing inherent and control risk and 
modifying the audit based on these assessments auditors must also make a separate fraud risk assessment 
which in theory should already be incorporated in their inherent and control risk assessments.
One approach that the Board may want to consider is to specify implementation options in an appendix. 
One implementation option may be the approach mentioned above with the caveat that it is likely to be 
inefficient. Another option is to utilize two audit risk models: one for errors and one for fraud. I believe 
this option is more theoretically sound as the current audit risk model includes fraud risk in the risk o f 
misstatement which is problematic. Some researchers (see e.g. Shibano 1990 in The Accounting Review) 
have criticized the audit risk model for combining intentional risk with unintentional risk and they have 
recommended a separate model for errors and fraud on the grounds that combining them in one model is 
like trying to mix water with oil. I believe the standards warn o f the dangers o f combining these risks (see 
e.g. § 316.07). Combining fraud and error in the risk assessment process may effectively make it difficult 
for auditors to separately consider their audit procedures for both. The SAS addresses this problem to 
some extent but additional clarification as to how the SAS fits in with other risk assessment requirements 
would be beneficial and may prevent dissatisfaction or inefficiencies in practice.
I hope you find my comments useful. If I can provide any additional assistance, please feel free to contact 
me at the University o f Oklahoma.
Sincerely,
Mark F. Zimbelman, CPA, Ph.D. 
University of Oklahoma 






Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
The Association of Government Accountants (AGA), Financial 
Management Standards Committee (Committee) would like to provide 
the following comments on the Proposed Statement on Auditing 
Standards, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. 
The Committee, whose members are active accountants and auditors in 
Federal, state, and local government, reviews and responds to 
proposed standards and regulations of interest to the AGA 
membership. Local AGA chapters and individual members are also 
encouraged to comment separately.
The Committee supports and is in agreement with the overall 
provisions of this proposed standard. The Committee has the 
following recommendations, however, which it believes would further 
clarify and improve the proposed guidance:
1. Paragraph 15, on Page 18, lists three categories of risk 
factors that relate to fraudulent financial reporting: 
management characteristics, industry conditions, and operating 
characteristics and financial stability. Because of the 
dominance and influence of management characteristics, we 
suggest adding a sentence in Paragraph 15 (similar to the 
second sentence in Paragraph 17), such as "The auditor's 
consideration of the risk factors in categories b. and c. may 
be influenced by the nature and extent to which the risk 
factors in category a. are present."
2. In Paragraph 24, on Page 24, the first two examples of 
problematic or unusual relationships between the auditor and 
the client are "Denied access to records or facilities" and 
"Denied access to certain employees, customers, vendors, or 
others- from whom audit evidence might be sought." If the
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auditor is denied access to material information, the 
limitation on the scope of the audit may require the auditor 
to qualify his/her opinion or to disclaim an opinion. We 
suggest the Board include a footnote to Paragraph 24 in the 
final document reminding the auditor of the potential scope 
limitation if the denied access involves material information.
3. In Paragraph 27, on Page 25, there is a discussion on 
modifications to the nature, timing and extent of procedures 
based on the fraud risk assessment. We believe the guidance 
could be improved by providing additional examples on when the 
nature, timing and extent of procedures may need to be 
modified.
4. Paragraph 34, on Pages 28 and 29, lists four actions the 
auditor should take if he/she has determined a material 
misstatement is, or may be, the result of fraud. The fourth 
action is "If appropriate, suggest that the client consult 
with legal counsel.” We suggest the Board expand Paragraph 34 
d. to include examples of circumstances in which it would be 
appropriate for the auditor to suggest that the client consult 
with legal counsel.
5. We suggest that Paragraph 41 in Appendix C be expanded to 
include as a third sentence, the following "Early application 
of the amendments is permissible.” This would make it 
consistent with Paragraph 41, on Page 31, as well as the last 
sentence in the explanatory paragraph on Page 37.
The Committee appreciates the opportunity to comment on this 
Proposed Statement and should you have any questions or need 
additional information, please contact me at (334) 242-9200.
Sincerely,
Sharon R. Russell, CPA, Chair
AGA Financial Management Standards
Committee
cc: Mr. Mitch Laine, CGFM, President 
AGA
EXPOSURE DRAFT
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August 8, 1996
Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Response Prepared by: Accounting and Auditing Standards Committee 
Society of Louisiana CPAs
Response Submitted by: John D. Cameron, Member
General Comments:
We have reviewed the exposure draft and generally support its issuance with some 
modifications. One member, however, was not in concurrence with the issuance of this 
exposure draft because it extends the auditor’s level of responsibility for the detection of fraud. 
Current standards require the auditor to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable 
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether it 
be from errors or irregularities.
The layout o f this exposure draft could be improved. Specifically, in paragraphs 11 through 
31, where it appears that operational guidance on the consideration of fraud jumps from 
procedures performed in field work to procedures performed in the planning stage. This 
exposure draft would better serve the user if it was structured the same way an auditor 
performs his engagement, (i.e., assessing the risk in planning the engagement, then gathering 
evidence during field work). For example, paragraphs 13 and 21 state general issues which 
should be addressed as part of the planning stage, however, in between these two paragraphs 
are various examples and commentary which make the document difficult to follow and 
repetitious. On page 22, c. - Risk Factors Relating to Controls is before the commentary on 
SAS No. 78, Understanding the Accounting System, on page 23. The section, "Auditor’s 
Response to the Results of the Assessment", which includes planning considerations, is after 
the commentary on field work.




1. The second sentence states, "This statement provides guidance to auditors in 
discharging that responsibility, as it relates to fraud, in an audit conducted in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards."
The first definition of discharging in Webster’s Dictionary - to relieve or release from 
something. Is the purpose of this exposure draft to relieve the auditors responsibility 
as it relates to fraud? We believe that this exposure draft  was designed to provide 
guidance in meeting the objectives of the first sentence of this paragraph.
5. One respondent had a hard time believing material misappropriation of assets is 
committed most often by employees. Employees do misappropriate assets and, at 
times, it may be material, however, those in top management have more access and 
control over larger assets and the ability to misappropriate these assets. According to 
the Certified Fraud Examiners Manual, "Because of their positions, members of top 
management are able to pull off multimillion dollar crimes that may loot an entire 
organization. Lower level employees do not have the power to cause this kind of 
damage." This proposed SAS should do a better job distinguishing between 
management fraud and employee fraud.
8. The proposed SAS discussed possible collusion among management, employees, or 
third parties. A  risk factor as part of employee relationships or pressure should include 
significant personal relationships with management, suppliers, vendors, creditors, etc. 
outside the normal course of business relationships.
10. The concept of reasonable assurance is referenced. A footnote similar to the one found 
on page 38, #1 should be placed at the end of the paragraph to inform the reader that 
a further discussion of reasonable assurance can be located in SAS No. 1.
12. The last sentence of this paragraph states, "The auditor should use professional 
judgment when assessing the significance of the risk factors and determining the 
appropriate audit response. The last word "response" may be misleading. One 
respondent suggested to word this sentence as follows: The auditor should use 
professional judgement when assessing the significance of the risk factors and 
determining the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures. The first sentence of 





16. On page 19, fourth sentence from bottom of the page, the term "opinion shopping", 
appears to discredit our profession. This should be removed from the exposure draft. 
We believe this issue is covered in the next sentence referring to placing unreasonable 
demands on the auditor.
18. Section c. item number 3 - Accounting system in disarray. We believe the exposure 
draft could be more specific. For example, the accounting system does not consistently 
record transactions for the preparation of financial statements.
21. The third sentence begins, "The auditor also would consider what steps have been taken 
to enforce a formal code of conduct". We believe the exposure draft should be more 
specific, with regard to what is a formal code of conduct.
22. If SAS No. 55 is amended by SAS No. 78, then it is less confusing to just include SAS 
No. 78.
Is the last sentence necessary? The sentence prior appears to cover the general 
understanding.
23. This paragraph does not seem necessary. If the entity has established a program that 
includes proactive steps to prevent, deter, and detect fraud, the auditor should obtain 
an understanding of this program as part of the consideration of the internal control 
structure.
24. Under problematic or unusual relationships between the auditor and client - tips or 
complaints to the auditor about fraud; does the author mean external or internal tips or 
complaints?
One recommendation may be: Complaints or notification by external sources of 
unethical business practices.
33. If the auditor determines the effect of the misstatement is not material to the financial 
statements, why should any further work be performed? This sentence now forces the 






The last sentence says, "The auditor has no responsibility to plan and perform the audit 
to obtain reasonable assurance that errors or fraud that are not material to the financial 
statements are not detected." Several other sentences in this exposure draft indicate the 
auditor is attempting to obtain reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that material 
misstatements are detected. By indicating that any further work should be performed 
regarding misstatements not material to the financial statements and not caused by 
fraud, paragraph 33 appears to be in direct conflict with these statements.
Appendix C
Paragraph 2
The words "that state that" should be replaced with "which states" to make the sentence 
clearer.
Questions Raised by the Exposure Draft
Page 11, Paragraph 3 - The AICPA is planning to help the auditor implement this 
standard. Will this help be available to the auditor prior to the effective date for 
implementation? How will auditors become aware that this help is available? Also, is 
the AICPA planning to develop any practice aids such as an audit program to help in 
the application of the new standard? Also, the sample non-authoritative audit 
engagement letters should be available for auditors’ use at least one year prior to the 
effective date.
Page 37, Paragraph 2 - Does this mean that the standard audit report language will be 
revised to address directly the concept of fraud detection? If so, the new standard 
should address this matter if only to reference the needed change. If the language is 
not to be changed, how will the public be informed of the auditor’s responsibilities in 
regard to fraud? Have any surveys been conducted to analyze how'the general public 
will perceive the proposed standard?
Jane M. Mancino 
Page 5
August 8, 1996
On behalf of the Accounting and Auditing Standards Committee of the Society of 
Louisiana CPA’s, I thank you for considering our comments and suggestions.
Respectfully,







Member of Private 
Companies Practice Sectior
August 9, 1996
Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager
Audit & Attest Standards, File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
I am strongly opposed to the issuance of the exposure draft entitled "Consideration 
of Fraud in the Financial Statement Audit" as presently written. We, as auditors, won 
a great victory when on December 22, 1995, the most sweeping and comprehensive 
reform of the Federal security laws was enacted by congress over a presidential veto. 
As a result of this to rt reform, auditors now face proportionate rather than joint and 
several liability for fraud cases brought against them under the Securities Act of 1934.
In any legal action, fulfilling our professional standards, is the minimum requirement 
to prove compliance that the necessary standard of care has occurred in the audit 
engagement. Auditing standards and their application to certain facts are subject to 
interpretation by expert witnesses and others.
The issuance of this exposure draft, as written, includes too many terms which are 
not clearly defined and thus would be subject to various interpretations. The 
ambiguity of the terminology in this proposed professional standard would make 
compliance difficult.
Paragraph 10 of the exposure draft states "An auditor cannot obtain absolute 
assurance that material misstatements in the financial statements will be detected 
....even a properly planned and performed audit may not detect the material 
misstatement resulting from fraud." I wholeheartedly concur with that statement. 
Any auditor who, to the best of his ability, performs or designs his audit program to 
minimize the potential of a material misstatement could still not uncover a significant 
fraud.
Ms. Jane M. Mancino 
August 9, 1996 
Page Two
Paragraph 12 states that "The auditor should specifically assess the risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud and should consider that 
assessment in designing the audit procedures to be performed. In making this 
assessment, the auditor should consider fraud risk factors that relate to fraudulent 
financial reporting and misappropriation of assets in each of the related categories 
presented in paragraphs 15 and 17."
It is the listing of these risk factors that is my greatest concern. Experienced auditors 
should already be aware of the risk factors based on their inquiries with management 
and the understanding of the client's internal control structure. To specifically 
describe detailed risk factors, is similar to constructing a rope to hang ourselves with. 
Paragraphs 15 through 17, in my opinion should be deleted in their entirety.
My reasons for this is based on the wording involved. Examples of these wording 
problems are as follows:
Paragraph No. Current terminology along with our comments
16A "A failure by management to display and communicate an
appropriate attitude regarding internal control and the 
financial reporting process."
How can we as auditors determine what an "appropriate 
attitude" is?
16A "An ineffective means of communicating and supporting
the entity's values or ethics."
"How can we determine whether the entity's values or 
ethics are appropriate? What does ineffective mean?
16A "Domination of management by a single person".
Isn't that always the case in a closely held corporation? 
This is not necessarily an indicator of fraud.
Ms. Jane M. Mancino 





Current terminology along with our comments
"Management setting unduly aggressive financial targets and 
expectations for operating personnel."
In a closely held corporation, the owners are always 
wanting to be as profitable as possible. Isn't that a normal 
part of the free enterprise system? So what does "unduly 
aggressive" mean?
"Ineffective accounting staff".
Just because accounting personnel may not be very 
experienced, does not mean that is indicative of a 
fraudulent situation. A dishonest person commits fraud not 
an honest inexperienced, "ineffective" accounting 
employee. In other words, how do you define 
"ineffective"?
18B "Anticipated future employee layoffs that are known to the 
work force".
18B
This implies that we, as auditors need to randomly 
interview employees to determine whether future layoffs 
exist. Besides creating bad will with management, this 
step should be outside the scope of our work as auditors.
"Employees with access to assets susceptible to 
misappropriation who are known to be dissatisfied".
How are we to know that they are dissatisfied? Are we 
required to conduct interviews of all employees? How else 
would we know this?
Ms. Jane M. Mancino 
August 9, 1996 
Page Four
Paragraph No. Current terminology along with our comments
18B "Unexplained unusual and observable changes in behavior
of employees with access to assets susceptible to 
misappropriation."
Even if we see an employee with a large diamond ring or a 
nice car, how do we not know that their spouse earns a 
high enough wage to be able to afford such items. Yes, 
our professional skepticism needs to exist, but this again 
should be beyond the scope of what we do as auditors.
18B "Known and observable personal financial pressures
affecting employees with access to assets susceptible to 
misappropriation".
Again, how are we to know what financial problems the 
employees are having. The question concerning the term 
"Known", is known to whom? The employee and their 
spouse may know about their personal financial pressures 
and other employees in the organization may know, but 
management and us as auditor's probably won't know. 
Again, are you saying we need to interview the employees 
to evaluate this risk factor?
The above are only selected examples of unclear terminology. Several other such 
items exist in the exposure draft. I think you can see that this standard, if enacted 
in fact, will cause auditors significant difficulties in complying with it. The 
identification of the risk factors is giving the legal profession way too much rope. 
Although, the intent of the standard is good and is helpful in describing fraud and our 
responses to it, it goes way beyond what should be included in a professional 
standard. The exposure draft needs to be rewritten or reworded to get rid of the 
many ambiguous and undefined terms.
Ms. Jane M. Mancino 
August 9, 1996 
Page Five
As the audit and accounting principal in a local C.P.A. firm and as the chairman of the 
audit and accounting committee of the Alaska Society of CPAs, I strongly urge you 
to consider the above matters, and change or delete wording before this statement 
is issued in final form.
Very truly yours,
F. M. STRAND & ASSOCIATES, P. C.
 





I have reviewed the exposure draft for the Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards 
concerning the “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.” I was very impressed 
with the quality and realize a tremendous amount of work must have been involved in developing 
this document.
I only have a couple of comments. I believe the wording o f the last sentence o f Paragraph 
#21 on pages 21& 22 may be sending the wrong message. It has been my experience that small 
entities are just as susceptible to fraud if not more so than larger enterprises due in many instances 
to the limited number o f  employees among which to divide the duties (see risk factor c. 4 above). 
The often informal method o f conducting business and the temptation o f  the owner to  mingle 
personal and company business transactions would lead this type organization to be at least as 
open to other o f  the mentioned risk factors (c. 1 & c. 5-7) as larger companies.
Also, Paragraph #33 on page 28 may be somewhat misleading. I understand the concept 
that the misappropriation o f a small imprest fund is self-limiting and may not be financially 
significant, but in many instances an individual that is perpetrating this misdeed will also be 
simultaneously using other methods to improperly remove funds from the organization. It may 
also be that the person was transferred from another job in the organization where longtime 
undetected embezzlement was occurring, and turned to the petty cash fund because this was the 
only opportunity provided by the new position to continue perpetrating fraud.
I may be misreading the intent, but I do not feel that the limiting language in either o f 
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DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR COMPTROLLER OPERATIONS 
O ffic e  OF THE BUDGET
August 14, 1996
Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Office of the Budget has reviewed the 
A,CPA's Exposure Draft (ED) entitled Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards - 
Consideration Of Fraud in A Financial Statement Audit And Amendments to 
Statements on Auditing Standards No. 1, Codification Of Auditing Standards And 
Procedures and No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting An Audit. We 
support the proposed statement on the consideration of fraud and the amendment 
to SAS numbers 1 and 47.
Our only comment is whether factors related to electronic data processing, 
networking and communications should be added to the following lists: (1) Risk 
Factors Relating to Operating Characteristics and Financial Stability (Page 20), (2) 
Risk Factors Relating to Controls (Page 22) and (3) Conflicting or Missing Evidential 
Matter (Page 23). We make this suggestion because more and more entities are 
moving toward a paperless transaction and electronic approval operating 
environment. Therefore, material misstatements in financial statements resulting 
from fraud may be more difficult to detect in this environment than in a traditional 
paper environment. Also, there may be some unique risks and control factors 
associated with a paperless operating environment.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 717- 787-6496.
Eckert
cc: Honorable Robert A. Bittenbender 
Staff
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The Auditing Standards Board
c/o Jane M. Mancino CPA, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2690
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Exposure Draft of Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, Consideration 
of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit and Amendments to Statements on 
Auditing Standards No. 1, Codification o f Auditing Standards and 
Procedures, and No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting An Audit
Lady and Gentlemen:
This letter summarizes the comments and position of Baird, Kurtz & Dobson on 
the exposure draft identified above which we are pleased to provide to the 
Auditing Standards Board.
Document Is Fatally Flawed
Baird, Kurtz & Dobson opposes issuance of the exposed document as a Statement 
on Auditing Standards. We believe adoption would result in an increase in 
auditor liability far exceeding any improvement in auditor performance that might 
occur. In our view, the document is fatally flawed by its failure to:
* Indicate that management is primarily responsible for prevention and 
detection of fraud as a result of its duty to establish and maintain 
effective internal control (as detailed in COSO and SAS #78).
* Describe the impact and potential limitations management’s carrying out 
of its responsibilities has on an auditor’s ability to detect fraud in general, 
and fraud involving misappropriation of assets in particular.
* Address unrealistic expectations regarding an auditor and fraud held by 
much of the public and the user community by enhancement of their 
understanding of the scope and limitations of the auditor’s fraud detection 
capabilities and responsibilities and by other means.
Mernoer of 
Moores Rowland
The Auditing Standards Board 
August 13, 1996
Page 2
Comments Regarding Specific Provisions
In addition to and not in contravention of our overall view, we offer the following 
specific comments on the document.
1. Appendix A of the exposure draft amends AU 110, paragraph 2 to state the 
auditor’s affirmative responsibility with regard to fraud, incorporate the 
concept of reasonable assurance and state what the auditor is not responsible 
for. Paragraph 1 of the proposed new SAS quotes the portion of AU 110, 
paragraph 2 that describes only the auditor’s affirmative responsibility. This 
quotation takes on a different meaning when read in isolation instead of in the 
context of the entire paragraph of AU 110. We suggest quoting the entire 
text of AU 110, paragraph 2 in paragraph 1 of the proposed SAS. This 
would ensure that readers of the proposed SAS focus on the extent and 
limitations of the auditor’s responsibility in the proper context and establish 
an appropriate mindset for understanding the remainder of the document.
2. Paragraph 4 of the proposed SAS indicates that misuse of assets is included 
within misappropriation of assets, a type of fraud relevant to the auditor. No 
other guidance regarding the definition, perspective, relevant risk factors or 
audit response for the concept of misuse is contained in the exposure draft. 
Unless the audited entity has established an explicit policy defining limitations 
on use, no reasonably objective criteria exists for determining what constitutes 
misuse and assessing its effects. Absent reasonably objective criteria, the 
auditor will be unable to obtain reasonable assurance. We suggest that either 
(1) the term be deleted from the definition of misappropriation of assets, (2) 
the auditor’s responsibility extend to misuse only when the entity has defined 
reasonably objective criteria or (3) the document be revised to provide criteria 
and guidance regarding definition, perspective, relevant risk factors and audit 
responses.
3. Paragraph 13 of the proposed SAS requires that the auditor inquire of 
management regarding the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. Risk 
of material misstatement is an auditing concept that lacks meaning or context 
to a financial statement preparer. Accordingly, this provision is likely to be 
ineffective in eliciting information of use to the auditor in making the risk 
assessment. It may also result in the auditor becoming aware o f any number 
of immaterial actual or suspected frauds which must be evaluated and possibly 
communicated. The requirement should be restated to focus on the auditor’s 
information objective and describe the specific relevant inquiries to be made.
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4. The auditor’s specific responses to risk of fraud contained in paragraphs 28 
to 31 of the proposed SAS deal almost exclusively with fraudulent financial 
reporting. Additional guidance relative to specific responses to risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud related to misappropriation of assets 
should be provided. We suggest that this be done by including detailed 
guidance for specific responses to both types of fraud in the standard.
5. The documentation requirement contained in paragraph 36 of the proposed 
SAS is internally inconsistent. The documentation specified with respect to 
risk assessment during audit planning omits any requirement to document the 
actual assessment. However, when during the audit the auditor comes to 
believe the risk has increased, the specified documentation includes the actual 
changed assessment. We suggest that documentation relative to a changed 
assessment occurring during performance of the audit be consistent with that 
resulting from planning and omit any requirement to document the actual risk 
assessment.
6. Paragraph 17 of the proposed SAS requires consideration of risk factors in the 
category of employee relationships or pressures. The ability of the auditor 
to obtain sufficient evidence regarding this category using audit procedures 
normally available is limited to matters known to the entity or observable by 
the auditor as implied in some of the examples in paragraph 18. We suggest 
that these concepts be included in the description of the category in paragraph 
17 so the actual requirement is placed in appropriate perspective.
7. Pages 11 and 12 of the exposure draft indicate that the ASB and AICPA will 
undertake an initiative to assist auditors in understanding and implementing 
the new standard. However, the timing of the availability of this 
comprehensive implementation guidance is not indicated and we understand 
that definite plans to ensure its availability concurrent with issuance of the 
standard have not been made. We also understand that there is currently no 
plan to have the Audit Issues Task Force or other representatives of the ASB 
review the implementation guidance for consistency with the new standard. 
In our opinion, provision of consistent implementation guidance concurrent 
with issuance of the standard is absolutely necessary. If such guidance is not 
available in this manner, the effective date of the new standard should be 
deferred until approximately one year after such guidance becomes available. 
The ASB should exercise appropriate oversight and review responsibility for 
the implementation guidance before it gives final approval for issuance of the 
proposed statement.
The Auditing Standards Board
August 12, 1996
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TO: Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690
FROM: Mary Ellen Oliverio
SUBJECT: CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT:
Some comments
Comments re some of the significant issues identified on pages 9 - 
11:
Auditor's Detection Responsibilities
I would say that SAS No. 53 does articulate the auditor's 
responsibility. (SAS No. 53 is far clearer than the earlier 
guidance —  but we are well beyond that point!)
316.05 is clear and fully understandable. Possibly a little more 
needs to be said about safeguarding assets. Paragraph 316.03 does 
identify "misappropriation of assets," but there is virtually no 
elaboration re this type of irregularity. Therefore, what is 
being proposed in this Exposure Draft in paragraphs 17 and 18 might 
be included as an amendment to the present guidance. (There is a 
further comment later. . . )
Separate Standard on Fraud
I would vote with those who feel there should not be a separate 
statement on fraud. (Isn't what is being proposed a statement and 
not a standard as stated on page 9 under this topic?).
First, isn't there a tradition that a fraud audit is a far more 
detailed audit than an audit of the financial statements, taken as 
a whole. I realize that there is a difference between a statement 
about auditor responsibility for fraud and a fraud audit. However, 
won't it be difficult to communicate that the auditor is not doing 
a fraud audit, but merely "considering fraud. . . "
In the auditing classes I teach, students are stunned at the 
deficiencies which they find difficult to believe. Is it true, 
would you say, that Larry Baker (ZBest case) didn't have sufficient 
guidance when he accepted only photocopies of documents?
Was it insufficient guidance that led the auditors to adhere to 
Barry's schedule of viewing a restoration project on Sunday?
Was it insufficient guidance that led the auditors in the PharMor 
case to observe inventory in only a limited number of locations 
that were known to the client? was inadequate guidance the reason 
for the deficiencies in the U. s .  Surgical case and the Saxon 
Industries case?
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Inexperienced students understand professional due care and 
adequacy of evidence to raise serious questions about the good 
faith efforts of practitioners. Maybe, there should be more 
specific guidance on ’’due professional care.”
Second, it seems to me that viewing errors and irregularities 
together as is now done in SAS No. 53 makes good sense. Auditors 
find ’’something wrong," which is the first step. Additional 
considerations are required to determine whether,what is discovered 
is an error or an irregularity. . . this two-step strategy seems 
reasonable and realistic.
Characteristics and Description of Fraud
Some amendment to SAS 53 which deals more directly with 
misappropriations of assets is a good idea. Amending SAS 53 to 
include paragraph 4 (page 16) might be considered.
Imperative to Assess the Risk of Misstatement Due to Fraud
No, I don't believe that the auditor should be required to 
specifically assess the risk of material misstatement of the 
financial statements due to fraud. At some level, the user of 
financial statements is interested in fair presentation. • . 
therefore, the strategy for the auditor should continue to be 
exactly what 316.05 states. . .
Documentation of the Assessment
No more documentation than that now required for identifying risks 
should be sufficient.
SOME GENERAL COMMENTS
This statement reminds me of the response of the profession to 
learning that partners in at least one major firm had large loans 
from a bank they audited —  and the funds were invested in shopping 
malls —  as I recall. Shortly thereafter there was a realization 
that the guidance re independence was inadequate. I recall at the 
time, using the information re the partners in a discussion of 
independence in an auditing class. Without exception, no student 
felt that it was not clear that borrowing large sums from a client 
would be an impairment of independence.
Yet, representatives of the AICPA made pronouncements about the 
need for new guidance, the fact that new guidance was being
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
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developed, etc. It was not strange to me that even those outside 
the profession felt that the strategy taken in that instance was 
merely a way to draw attention from what was unprofessional 
behavior that practitioners should have understood to be a 
violation of the professional code of conduct.
And, now we have a proposed statement that seems to be implying 
that the problems to date reflect inadequate guidance. Really, is 
that true?
What is the evidence that the reason auditors have failed to find 
fraud is inadequate guidance?
Now, it may be possible that the Auditing Standards Board has clear 
evidence to support the contention that inadequate guidance is the 
reason for alleged audit deficiencies. Unless there is clear, 
unequivocal evidence that the present guidance is insufficient and, 
therefore, leads to failure to find fraud, I believe a separate 
statement on fraud does not make good sense.
A SUGGESTION FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION
Would it be reasonable to add to an exposure draft the references 
used to support the new guidance. In this instance, I would have 
found it helpful to know the research that supports the inadequacy 
of guidance as the source of audit deficiencies.
FINAL COMMENT
I think the guidance that has been developed over the years by the 
Auditing Standard Board is excellent. I realize how difficult it 
is to state guidance that is at one and the same time both general 
and specific. Best wishes in your fine work.
Mary Ellen Oliverio 
Department of Accounting 
Pace University 
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1211 Avenue o f the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Subject: Exposure Draft - Proposal
Statement on Auditing Standards
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
To the AICPA Auditing Standards Board:
W e strongly believe the issuance of this proposed SAS would be a serious mistake for 
our industry. This proposed SAS is intended to provide guidance to auditors, but it is 
too far-reaching and unrealistic in its objectives.
Because of significant ambiguities in this statement, it would be impossible for an 
auditor to meet compliance with the standard. Consequently, as auditors, we would 
open ourselves up to even more litigation and costly defense efforts.
Ambiguities appear throughout the SAS. Words like “ineffective means”, “domination” 
of management, “unduly aggressive” are all open to interpretation. In conducting an 
audit, we must use our best judgment. But, in a court of law, our judgment is subject to 
interpretation by others. It would be impossible to prove compliance with this entire 
SAS no matter how diligent we are. We are being asked to find or detect fraud, which 
by nature is hidden, through assessment and inquiry of management, who may be 
perpetrating the fraud, and assessing legality even though we are not lawyers. We 
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Even more important, the standard would promote a false sense of security among 
clients, and place unrealistic expectations on financial statement auditors. The specific 
undertaking of fraud detection is beyond the scope of a financial statement audit. 
Fraud detection should be a separate and distinct engagement with standards and 
procedures appropriately designed for this discipline.
PAULSEN, MEGAARD & COMPANY, PS
C:\MSWORD\FIRM\SASOtsagree.doc 
08/05/96 12:41 PM
STATE OF NEW YORK 
BANKING DEPARTMENT 
2 RECTOR STREET 




Ms. Jane M. Mancino 
Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards 
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: File 2690
Dear Ms. Mancino:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed Statement on Auditing 
Standards, “Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.”
The Department believes this Exposure Draft (ED) represents a positive step by explicitly 
addressing fraud in independent auditing literature. We believe further progress can be 
attained by implementing our recommendations. We have divided our comments into 
three categories. First, our most significant concerns focus on providing independent 
auditors with a mechanism for notifying regulators when they discover fraud. The second 
category contains additional comments on the ED. Third, the Department recommends 
that the AICPA develop new guidance permitting auditors to perform special reviews which 
would focus on identifying the existence of fraud.
Notifying Regulators of Fraud
The Department is troubled by the ED continuing to provide guidance which prevents 
independent auditors from notifying appropriate federal and state regulators of fraud 
unless required by statute or regulation. This approach appears at odds with ongoing 
efforts to improve communications between regulators and independent auditors. Our
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strong preference would be for paragraph 38 to be modified by adding “and to the 
appropriate industry regulators” to the end of the third sentence. This would enable 
regulators to promptly determine appropriate action, and allow regulators and independent 
auditors to combine resources when necessary to undertake a thorough investigation of 
the evidence uncovered by the independent auditor.
Should the AICPA not modify paragraph 38 as noted above, we suggest the AICPA:
*
• Revise paragraph 38 to require independent auditors who discover fraud that causes 
a material misstatement to recommend to senior management, the audit committee, 
and the Board of Directors that they promptly notify the appropriate industry regulators; 
and
• Revise paragraph 40 to permit independent auditors to notify appropriate industry 
regulators when they discover fraud. We acknowledge that this would occur on a case- 
by-case basis and would require the advice of the independent auditor’s legal counsel. 
However, this would: allow independent auditors to fully share their findings with 
regulators; serve the public interest when a depository institution’s existence is 
threatened; and follow the spirit of auditor-regulator dialogue encouraged by your 
Statement of Position 90-5.
Additional Comments
• The Department agrees with the requirement in paragraph 36 that independent 
auditors maintain specific documentation supporting their risk assessment. This should 
become an important aspect of the peer reviews performed within the public accounting 
profession. Regulators would also benefit when reviewing workpapers as permitted 
under the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991.
• The Department agrees with the need to expand on the discussion analyzing the 
potential fo r fraud within the specialized industry audit guides issued by the AICPA. 
The current bank guide provides useful but limited information on characteristics 
indicating increased risks of material misstatement. This section should be highlighted 
in future AICPA Audit Risk Alerts and expanded in future audit guides to emphasize the 
potential significance of fraud.
• In paragraph 16 (section a, first bullet point, last dashed item) the Department 
recommends revising the phrase to “Ineffective accounting o r internal auditing staff.”
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• The ED could be enhanced by sprinkling examples of the characteristics of various risk 
factors listed (e.g., using gambling and drug problems as examples resulting in 
personal financial pressures [last bullet point to section b of paragraph 18]). 
Additionally, detailed actual anonymous examples could be included to illustrate how 
auditors’ failure to exercise skepticism and increase the strength of audit evidence 
under changing circumstances allowed fraud to remain undetected.
• The Department applauds the ED’s guidance in paragraph 33, which requires follow-up 
even where potential fraud has not resulted in a material change to the financial 
statements.
New Guidance Needed
The ED quotes from the March 1993 Public Oversight Board report: the public has “the 
widespread belief that auditors have a responsibility for detecting management fraud which 
they are now not meeting.” While the ED squarely addresses the need to consider fraud, 
it seems unlikely the ED will significantly close this expectation gap. The ability to change 
auditors’ attitudes via additional literature appears optimistic, especially as the ED does 
not change the auditor’s responsibility for detecting material fraud. And, as paragraph 10 
states, “[E]ven a properly planned and performed audit may not detect a material 
misstatement resulting from fraud."
Existing literature often does not provide interested parties with a report which satisfies 
their objectives. For example, large CPA firms have established “forensic audit” teams, but 
current literature does not define a forensic audit. Further, firms differ in how they provide 
such services (e.g., under a consulting engagement or an agreed-upon procedures report). 
The AICPA should take a more aggressive approach in addressing such gaps between 
current demand and existing guidance. The Department suggests the AICPA develop 
guidance to allow independent auditors to issue an opinion expressing the results of a 
review undertaken to actively look for fraud.
A key concern for auditors in developing this new report would be litigation exposure. 
W hile we recognize auditors’ concerns, the Department believes the need to meet the 
public demand and serve the public interest should override auditors’ desire to avoid 
potentially risky work. As SEC Enforcement Division Chief Accountant George Diacont 
stated in the June 1996 CPA Journal. “The credibility o f the profession will depend on its 
ability to reduce the number o f audits that fail to detect fraud.” Armed with a new report, 
auditors will be able to offer this service to clients concerned with identifying fraud before 
amounts become material enough to distort financial results. Regulators would be able 
to target banks with this tool in a more focused manner than is available under current 
literature.
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Independent auditors should also be able to employ experts (e.g., to verify documents’ 
authenticity) in performing a review for fraud. As noted in paragraph 7, auditors untrained 
in authentication techniques are less likely to detect ongoing fraud.
Please feel free to call Chief of Regulatory Accounting John McEnerney at 





Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2690
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
Members of the Auditing Standards Committee (the 
Committee) of the Maryland Association of Certified Public 
Accountants have reviewed and discussed the Exposure Draft of the 
proposed Statement on Auditing Standards titled "Consideration of 
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit" and have the following 
comments.
In our opinion, the issuance of a new Statement on 
Auditing Standards (SAS) is not the best way to address the 
concerns over fraud detection. The Summary of the exposure draft 
states that this SAS would "provide expanded operational guidance", 
"clarify the auditor's present responsibility", and "provide added 
guidance on the standard of due professional care" [emphasis 
added]. Even the Background Questions and Answers issued April 3, 
1996 acknowledge that the auditor's responsibility for the 
detection of material fraud will not change. If no new 
responsibility is being accepted by the profession, we need no new 
standard. If guidance is needed by the profession, it should be in 
a more appropriate form, e.g. an audit guide.
During the AICPA National Conference on Fraud held on 
CompuServe, Mr. Noonan stated that the "ASB perceives that the 
public expects auditors to detect fraud". The issuance of a new 
SAS on fraud will do nothing but exacerbate that public 
misconception. The visibility and tone of the proposed Standard 
will lead the public to believe we have accepted the responsibility 
to audit for fraud. Again, the profession is not accepting any new 
responsibility and issuing a new SAS gives the impression that we 
are.
Also, we feel the Standard is redundant. In our opinion, 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 55, "Consideration of Internal 
Control in a Financial Statement Audit", more than adequately 
directs the auditor's attention to areas of risk -- whether arising 
from error or irregularity.
M aryland Association o f  
Certified Public Accountants, Inc.
1300 York Road, Suite 10 
PO Box 4417
Lutherville, MD 21094-4417
Phone (410) 296-6250 
1-800-782-2036
Fax (410) 296-8713
Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards 
File 2690
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Additionally, the Committee feels the proposed SAS is too 
detailed. While the Standard mentions auditors' professional 
judgment, it has included so many procedures within the Standard 
that it has supplanted professional judgment with a giant 
checklist. By including the “checklist" into this Standard, the 
auditor will be required to justify, in his or her working papers, 
the omission of any of these risk factors or procedures that in the 
auditors' judgment are not relevant or necessary. While keeping in 
mind the arguments on both sides of the issue of providing general 
versus specific guidance, we feel that, with respect to SAS', 
excessive, detailed guidance should not be included in a Standard; 
however, it would be appropriate in an audit guide.
Finally, in the Committee's opinion, this proposed 
Standard would increase the exposure for all firms by overly 
focusing the public's attention on fraud. Again, the profession is 
not accepting any additional responsibility for the detection of 
material fraud. And this concern is shared by more than the 
Committee members. In fact, the speaker on accountant's legal 
liability at the recent NAAATS conference made some strong comments 
against the proposed SAS. In particular, she was very concerned 
over the inclusion of the fraud risk factors required to be 
considered (i.e., the "red flags”). At a minimum, the Committee 
would strongly suggest that you review the NAAATS conference 
speakers comments and discuss with her these concerns before making 
the proposed SAS final.
In conclusion, it is the opinion of the Committee that 
the proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, "Consideration of 
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit" should not be issued.
Respectfully submitted,
Daniel R. Sandstrom, CPA
Chairman, Auditing Standards Committee
Author: MIME: normang@cwu.edu (Dr .Norman J. Gierlasinski) at INTERNET
Date: 8/14/96 6:22 PM
Priority: Normal
TO: -:jmancino@aicpa.org at INTERNET
TO: Jane Mancino at AICPA3
Subject: exposure draft (sas 53 revision)
---------------------------  Message Contents -----------------------------
Please accept this as my comments to "Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit." I would like to commend those who worked on the 
exposure draft for the extensive work done. As a CPA and Certified Fraud 
Examiner, I feel
that auditors must address the pervasive fraud problem. The public 
perceives auditors currently address the issue. The only critical comments 
I have are the
following:
(1) Paragraph 16a needs to be more definitive. CPA's are not trained 
to
evaluate
risks associated with management characteristics, and therefore be
legally
liable for auditing and giving an opinion encompassing them;
(2) A recommendation should be made by the auditor advising the client 
that
fraud prevention is the client's responsibility.
Sincerely,
Dr. Norman J. Gierlasinski, CPA, CIA, CFE 
Professor of Accounting 
Central Washington University 
P.O. Box 69288
SeaTac, WA 98188-9288
Author: PC:GALBPLB@aol.com at INTERNET
Date: 8/14/96 10:03 AM 
Priority: Normal
TO: -:JMANCINO@aicpa.org at INTERNET
CC: -:David.L .Landsittel@aa.CompuServe.com at INTERNET
TO: Jane Mancino at AICPA3
Subject: Exposure Draft - Fraud
---------------------------  Message Contents ----------------------------
Although I am in favor of the Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards - 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, I have the following 
specific comments:
Page 16, Paragraph 7:
The example that "...employees who misappropriate cash might try to 
conceal their thefts by forging signature on checks" does not seem to be a 
very good example. It seems to me that in those cases the forgery is the 
means of defalcation - not the cover up. Forgery of signatures on 
approvals or authorizations is a "cover up" of the forgery on the check. 
Page 18, Paragraph 16 a:
The first two risk factors may be hard to assess in a small, 
Closely-held entity. In the first case, the risk factor should be 
something like: "Management exhibits a disregard of business ethics and/or 
moral values." They can communicate those factors effectively in writing 
or in codes of ethics but demonstrate the opposite by their actions.
In the second risk factor, you will typically have this risk in a 
small,
closely-held entity. But I would not consider that an increased risk 
factor for fraud.
Page 21, Paragraph 18 a:
The risk factors relating to susceptibility of assets to 
misappropriation are treated as separate and apart from the risk factors 
relating to fraudulent financial reporting. However, it seems to me that 
some of the factors in Paragraph 16 should be considered in addition to 
these. Certainly the risk factors relating to management characteristics 
listed in Paragraph 16 a should be considered since they kind of "set the 
tone" under which defalcations would or would not be more likely. Somehow, 
then, there should not be an implication that the risk factors relating to 
susceptibility of assets to misappropriation are completely separate.
Pages 21 - 22, Paragraph 18 b:
The standard is silent as to how you would determine the risk factors 
relating to employee relationships or pressures. Perhaps a footnote about 
how you determine if these risk factors exist would help. Such a s ,  " 
Typically, this information would be developed through discussions with 
management and employees or by observation during the course of field 
work."
Otherwise, how can the auditor support an assessment that these risk 
factors
do or do not exist? The fifth bullet in Paragraph 28 suggests the proper 
procedure but is not related to Paragraph 18 b.
Page 2 6, Paragraph 28:
Bullet 1 on Page 26 and Bullet 2 in Paragraph 29: The surprise
observation of inventory is one of those old Tom Kelly ideas that is really 
not practicable. It just takes too much coordination with entity personnel 
and management (such as location, when counts will be done, etc.) to be 
either a secret or a surprise. The second bullet in Paragraph 29 (except 
for the second sentence regarding surprise counts) is much more workable 
guidance (all counts on same day, etc.).
Bullet 3: Encouragement of direct oral contact with 
customers/suppliers
is poor guidance. It can raise unwanted questions regarding a client's 
ethics that may be damaging to the client. Find a better example for this 
bullet. And, if you wish, add this suggestion regarding direct oral 
contact to the first bullet on Paragraph 29 "when there is reason for 
concern".
Bullet 5: Conduct interviews regarding what? The weather, sports, 
politics? Be specific, i.e., interviews regarding unusual events, 
transactions, other employees.
Page 28, Paragraph 31:
The last line refers to "counting securities". How many people 
actually
have physical custody of securities in these days of book entry securities? 
Page 28, Paragraph 32:
What are the documentation requirements of the auditor's consideration 
of the accumulated results of audit procedures and other observations?
Paragraph 36 requires documentation if there is belief that the risk of 
fraud has increased. But how does the auditor demonstrate consideration 
when he or she deems the risk of fraud has not increased? I think there 
should at least be a requirement that the auditor document that the audit 
procedures and other observations have not indicated a change in the 
assessment of risk of fraud made when planning the audit. This could be a 
simple requirement that the auditor indicate that audit procedures and 
other observation during the course of the examination have not indicated 
an increased risk of fraud.
Kind of like the statement regarding assessment of control risk at 
maximum.
Page 29, Paragraph 34 d:
Why should the auditor suggest that the client consult legal counsel?
Seems to me the auditor may be the one that needs legal counsel. The 
reason
for the auditor making this suggestion to the client escapes me, and I 
think this paragraph should be deleted.
Page 29, Paragraph 37:
The first two sentences imply that there is an important communication 
requirement even when the auditor has assessed the risk of fraud as low and 
has found no evidence or suspicion of fraud in the audit examination. I 
don't think that this is intended; if it is, no guidance is given. The 
first sentence should be revised to make clear this applies when the 
auditor has assessed risk of fraud.as high (internal control implications) 
or has detected fraud or developed evidence that would increase suspicion
or fraud.
Page 34, Paragraph 2:
Why is the last sentence of the existing standard deleted? The rest 
of
the changes imply review is a part of due care, but this sentence 
explicitly and succinctly stated it.
Page 43, Paragraph 27 a:
The second sentence does not seem to make any sense in the COSO 
control
environment. Should not this sentence read: "That risk is a function of 
the effectiveness of the design and operation of control activities in 
reducing risks to achieving the entity's broad objectives relevant to 
preparation of the entity's financial statements."
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Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Atest Standards
File 2690, AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re:  Exposure Draft
Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
Kristine T, Bruxttin, C.P.A. 
Patricia W. Kely, C.P.A. 
Robert O. Harris, CP A,
R. Craig Grantham, C.P.A. 
L. Angela Wils, C.P.A, 
Frazer K. Loomis, C.P.A.
Dear Ms. Mancino:
The Georgia Society of Certified Public Accountant’s Accounting and Auditing Commitee is 
pleased to submit its response to the exposure draft on the Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit. We have organized our response in a manner that folows the 
significant issues considered by the ASB.
Our response folows:
Auditor’s Detection Responsibilities
We agree with your elimination of SAS No. 53 and the clarification of the auditor’s 
responsibility in other standards. By focusing on the concept of reasonable assurance and 
folowing the description of the auditors responsibility contained in the auditor’s standard 
opinion, the expectation gap should narrow. The ASB may want to consider revising the 
auditor's standard report to clarify reasonable assurance and material misstatement.
Separate Standard on Fraud
The need for a separate standard devoted to fraud does not appear to be needed. The 
amendments to existing standards should be suficient to guide auditors. The guidance 
detailed in this proposed SAS should be included in an audit and accounting guide to 
supplement existing standards, similar to the guide that supplemented SAS No. 55.
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Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards 
Page Two
A ugust 15, 1996
Characteristics and Description of Fraud
Both fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets can obviously result in a 
material misstatement, however, the experience of our committee is that the possibility of 
auditors detecting instances of misappropriation of assets is much greater than the 
possibility of detecting instances of fraudulent financial reporting. Fraudulent financial 
reporting is very hard to detect due to potential management collusion or falsification of 
documents. The cost of obtaining reasonable assurance that fraudulent financial reporting is 
not present is much more costly than that of misappropriation of assets. Therefore, the 
auditors responsibility to detect these two different types of fraud should be different and 
cannot be adequately addressed in the same standard.
imperative to Assess the Risk of Misstatement Due to Fraud
The proposed requirement for auditors to specifically assess the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud is needed. The consideration of fraud risk factors in designing 
audit procedures should add assurance that an auditors responsibility for detection of 
material fraud is adequately addressed. However, it will be very difficult for auditors to 
design audit procedures to minimize the risk of material misstatement from fraudulent 
financial reporting if those types of risk factors exist. To identify risk factors relating to 
fraudulent financial reporting without a specifically identifiable audit response will appear to 
be a lack of due professional care should a material misstatement from fraudulent financial 
reporting be discovered after the fact. Additional guidance should be provided to design 
audit procedures to reduce this risk.
Risk Factors
The fraud risk factors identified in the proposed standard related to misappropriation of 
assets might be helpful in designing audit procedures to reduce that risk. As for fraudulent 
financial reporting, the risk factors identified in the proposal appear to our committee to not 
be as important as the evaluation of management's integrity. If auditors properly evaluate 
the continuance and acceptance of their audit clients, the risk of fraudulent financial 
reporting should be relatively low or the engagement should not be accepted.
The Auditor’s Response to Fraud Risk
We believe the ASB’s approach in this area is appropriate.
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We believe the proposed standard should give examples of documentation of this 
assessment. In addition, most of the fraud risk factors identified in the proposed standard 
would also be inherent risk or control risk factors. We believe the assessment of control risk 
should include fraud risk.
Communication to Management and Others
The existing communication requirements are appropriate and should not be changed.
Costs and benefits
Most smaller entities do not have adequate segregation of duties and therefore do not have 
adequate internal controls. This type of audit engagement is performed primarily on a 
substantive test basis w ith little or no reliance on internal controls. The cost o f performing a 
separate assessment o f fraud risks and probably a separate and specific audit response may 
exceed the potential benefits, unless the professional standards provide specific guidance 
on how to respond to a perceived management fraud.
We appreciate the opportunity to offer this response. If you have any questions regarding 
this response, please feel free to contact Jim Stokes at (706) 324-5435.
Sincerely,
Accounting and Auditing Committee
By Jim F. Stokes, Jr., Committee Member
DAVID H. G R U M E R
C ertified  P ublic  A ccoun tan t
271 MADISON AVENUE  
SUITE 9 0 8
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10016




Audit and Attest Standards 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: File 2690
Exposure draft dated May 1, 1996 
Consideration of fraud in a financial statement audit
Dear Ms. Mancino:
Thank you in advance for taking the time to read my comments. Generally I 
have had confidence in the AICPA as a standard setting body for my profession. 
I haven’t written comments before about exposure drafts because I felt the 
AICPA was making due deliberation on what is the right thing to do. I appreciate 
those efforts today, however, my opinion is that I don’t like this proposed 
standard. Nevertheless, it’s ironic that the draft includes many considerations 
and procedures that I have been trained to do in the past. So my comments 
about the text of your exposure draft are minor.
My concern, however, is that my AICPA misses the boat. The exposure,draft 
would make a fine audit risk alert. A terrific piece of information would be a 
Monday morning quarterback’s view of fifty recent frauds and what signals the 
auditors missed.
What do I mean by missing the boat? This exposure draft and new AICPA logos 
will not enhance our image to the public or change the public’s perception about 
what we do.
Ms. Jane M. Mancino August 14, 1996
First, my comments about the exposure draft:
1. Fraudulent financial reporting:
As a standard, much of what is written is moot.. That fraudulent financial 
reporting is a risk to be addressed is a point painfully brought home by 
our judicial system. Such a standard, if necessary at all, is woefully late. 
I believe it is unnecessary. The worst case result of fraudulent financial 
reporting is obviously material misstatement.. Whoever isn’t trained for 
that shouldn’t be auditing.
By setting this standard and using this wording in our reports you offer 
false comfort to the auditor that a misstatement that is not error or fraud 
is risk free. The users of the financial statements shall continue to 
attack materially misstated financial statements for reasons that you and 
I can’t anticipate. I suspect the expectation gap will grow as the public 
considers failure to identify risk and estimate issues covered by SOP 94- 
6, new control and accuracy issues offered by the rapidly installed 
newest computers and programs, etc. Don’t try to cover every base.
2. Misappropriation of assets: Page 18, paragraph 13:
“...obtain the client’s view regarding the risk of material misstatement 
due to fraud...” . Does this mean that a discussion with an executive who 
has a view that all asset misappropriations are material should be a 
quantifiable factor (guideline) in our assessment of materiality?
3. Quantifying error and fraud (Appendix C, Evaluating Audit Findings):
Page 45, paragraph 35: “The aggregation of misstatements should 
include the auditor’s best estimate of the total misstatements in the 
account balances or classes of transactions that he has examined... not 
just the amount of misstatements he specifically identifies.”
Page 47, paragraph 40: “ In aggregating known and likely misstatements 
that the entity has not corrected, pursuant to paragraphs 34 and 35, the 
auditor may designate an amount below which misstatements need not 
be accumulated. This amount would be set so that any misstatements, 
either individually or when aggregated with other such misstatements, 
would not be material to the financial statements, after giving 
consideration to the possibility of further undetected misstatements.”
Ms. Jane M. Mancino August 14, 1996
Since I know that misstatements comes from error or fraud I suppose I 
should be projecting the impact of fraud to determine whether the frauds 
(all frauds) represent a material misstatement to the financial 
statements. You have indicated that fraud is concealed, and I would 
submit that any auditor that believes there is no fraud (since he didn’t 
find fraud in his procedures) should not be auditing.
Please don’t make me think that I must project errors that are of frauds 
in my recorded and waived adjustments.
Second, my proposals about bridging the expectation gap. This is not about 
what’s in the exposure draft:
Proposal 1. Continuation and acceptance of clients:
The notion that auditors should be expected to consider all risks and 
possibilities related to misappropriation of assets is most damaging to 
the relationship between the small business and the practitioner. An 
entity that is built on trust and/or have limited internal controls may itself 
offer the greatest exposure to such risk.
Therefore, before undertaking an audit client the auditor should 
ascertain the client has, at minimum, the following segregated positions 
of management who are responsible for supervision, rather than 
execution of transactions: a chief financial manager, an inventory 
manager, a sales manager, and a board of at least three directors
I note that the regulators of the gaming and casino industry exclude 
those who have unacceptable backgrounds; the NASD only allows 
brokers to conduct business in specific areas for which they have 
acceptably qualified managers; prospective clients evaluate me in terms 
of me and my firm’s capabilities; insurance companies consider the level 
of risk of those applying for coverage.
Objective: Our profession should reject those situations that pose to 
much risk. I feel that we continue to play roulette with our careers as 
frauds continue unabated. The public can expect detection of fraud if 
they wish, but we should communicate the costs associated with this 
expectation. I am not speaking of fees as a cost, but the appropriate 
response the auditing profession must undertake to limit its exposure .
Ms. Jane M. Mancino August 14, 1996
Acceptance of clients failing such a standard should be a violation of 
professional standards.
Proposal 2. Evaluation of eligibility before acceptance:
A  prospective client that has experienced fraud and that has made a 
claim against an auditor should not qualify as eligible for audit services 
for a period of two years following settlement or final decision in the 
matter. Such time period should be extended if managers with 
responsibility for detection of the fraud (CEO, CFO, internal audit 
committee) remain in place.
The fact is that the auditor may very well have missed the signs of a 
problem and may deservedly suffer loss. However, given that the 
auditing profession has accepted a client with the capability to monitor 
their operations 365 days per year, that such client had the ability do so 
and then makes claim against the auditors poses to much risk to the 
profession.
Acceptance or continuance of clients failing such a standard should be 
an act discreditable to the profession.
The objective is the same as that of my first proposal.
MY CONCLUSION
The exposure draft adds little new or protective standard setting for the auditor. 
Most auditors understand that our profession is brought in to court because we 
are presumed to have deep pockets and that we lose in some way before 
evidence is even presented.
I am happy to let the bad auditors continue to lose their cases, but I believe that 
we as a profession should say that we will not encourage society to assign to us 
the detection of fraud and continue business as usual. We should deliver our 
high expectations that the public be proactive in structuring their businesses to 
prevent fraud and take responsibility for its failures.
Ms. Jane M. Mancino August 14, 1996
I’m sure that my recommendations are unacceptable to people like bankers, 
regulators and “rainmakers”. I doubt I will be taken seriously. But your new 
logos, advertisements and moot standards give me no comfort.
Very truly yours,
David H. Grumer
tate u itor of issouri
Jeffer on City, Mi o ri 65102
Margabet Kelly, CPA 
STATE AUDITOR August 9, 1996 (314) 751-4824
Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager
Audit and Atest Standards, File 2690
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
Enclosed are our comments on the proposed Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) titled 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit and the related amendments to SAS No. 1, 
Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures, and SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality 
in Conducting an Audit.
If you have any questions regarding our comments, please contact Myrana Gibler, Audit 
Manager, of my ofice at (573) 751-4213.
Sincerely,





COMMENTS - CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN  
A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT
The Office of Missouri State Auditor appreciates the opportunity to comment on the 
proposed Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) titled Consideration o f  Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit and the related amendments to SAS No. 1, Codification o f Auditing Standards and 
Procedures, and SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit. In our comments 
we first address the significant issues identified on pages 9-11 of the exposure draft and then identify 
specific items that we believe should or could be changed to improve the document.
SIGNIFICANT ISSUES
As a state audit organization, we are highly aware of the public’s sensitivity to loss or misuse 
of governmental resources through fraud, even when small dollar amounts are involved. Over the 
years we have detected and investigated many frauds in connection with our audits and, as a result 
of these experiences and our knowledge of the public’s perception of fraud, have developed a 
heightened awareness of the potential for fraud. Although we certainly recognize the importance of 
fraud in today’s audit environment, however, we are not convinced that this new SAS on the 
auditor’s consideration of fraud in a financial statement audit is needed, as we further discuss below.
* Does SAS No. 53 clearly articulate the auditor’s responsibility to detect and report 
errors and irregularities?
We believe that SAS No. 53 (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
[AICPA], Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316) does adequately articulate the 
auditor’s responsibility to detect and report errors and irregularities. The SAS:
1. Defines errors and irregularities and indicates that irregularities include both 
fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets.
2. Clearly explains that the auditor should (1) assess the risk that errors and 
irregularities may cause the financial statements to contain a material misstatement 
and (2) based on that assessment, design the audit to provide reasonable assurance 
of detecting errors and irregularities that are material to the financial statements.
In the exposure draft the auditor’s detection and reporting responsibilities for such matters 
remain the same, although the term “irregularities” has been replaced with “fraud” and the 
location of the guidance for errors has been moved from SAS No. 53 to SAS No. 47 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312).
Should the auditing standards contain a separate standard on fraud or continue with 
a standard that encompasses both fraud (i.e., irregularities) and error?
Although a separate standard may give more prominence to the issue of fraud, we are 
not convinced of the need for a separate standard. Since the auditor’s detection 
responsibilities regarding fraud and errors are the same, discussing both types of acts in one 
SAS (as in SAS No. 53) seems logical to us. Indeed, moving the guidance on errors to SAS 
No. 47 has resulted in repetition of certain information between that SAS and the proposed 
SAS regarding fraud. While we agree that the auditor’s response to errors and fraud is not 
the same, we do not believe this difference necessarily justifies a separate SAS on fraud; SAS 
No. 53 already recognizes the differing responses (e.g., AU secs. 316.18-.20 and 316.22-.25).
Should a new standard on fraud encompass both fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriations of assets?
In our work we encounter primarily the second type of fraud, since few of the entities 
that we audit prepare financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles. However, we agree with the Auditing Standards Board’s (ASB’s) conclusion that 
because either type of fraud can result in materially misstated financial statements, the 
proposed SAS should address both types.
Should the auditor, in a financial statement audit, be required to specifically assess the 
risk of material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud?
Is there a need to document the fraud risk assessment, and if so, what should be 
documented?
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We do not favor a specific risk assessment for fraud because we believe that existing 
standards already provide an adequate framework within which to assess the risk of such 
occurrences. For example, SAS No. 47 requires the auditor to consider audit risk and 
materiality in planning the audit and evaluating the results of audit work and discusses the 
concepts of risk at the financial statements level and risk at the account-balance or class-of- 
transactions level (i.e., inherent risk, control risk, and detection risk). In addition, SAS No. 
55, as amended by SAS No. 78 (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), 
identifies the components of internal control and directs the auditor to obtain an 
understanding of internal control sufficient to plan the audit and to assess control risk for the 
assertions embodied in the account balance, transaction class, and disclosure components of 
the financial statements. Finally, SAS No. 53:
1. Defines the auditor’s responsibilities regarding detection of errors and irregularities 
that are material to the financial statements.
2. Provides guidance on assessing the risk of material misstatements at the financial
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statements level and at the account-balance or class-of-transactions level, maintaining 
an attitude of professional skepticism, and evaluating audit test results.
3. Concludes with an appendix discussing characteristics of errors and irregularities that 
may impact the auditor’s ability to detect such occurrences.
Therefore, we believe that if the auditor understands and properly applies the existing 
guidance in the three SASs, he or she already should be identifying factors that may indicate 
an increased risk of fraud and using that information in planning and performing the audit.
If  the ASB proceeds with the issuance of the new standards, the requirements to 
specifically assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud and to document the 
assessment are likely to result in at least some changes to standard internal control forms and 
other planning documents used by audit organizations. Since the proposed SAS’s related 
guidance in footnote 5 on pages 17 and 18 and paragraph 36 on page 29 is very general, we 
strongly suggest that examples of appropriate documentation methods for the risk 
assessments be provided through audit guides, practice tools such as the AICPA Audit and 
Accounting Manual, and training packages.
Should the proposed standard contain categories of risk factors that the auditor should 
consider, specific risk factors, both, or neither?
Paragraph 12 on page 17 states, “In making this assessment, the auditor should 
consider fraud risk factors that relate to fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation 
of assets in each of the related categories presented in paragraphs 15 and 17.” Paragraph 15 
identifies the three categories for fraudulent financial reporting as management characteristics, 
industry conditions, and operating characteristics and financial stability. For misappropriation 
of assets the three categories identified in paragraph 17 are susceptibility of assets to 
misappropriation, employee relationships or pressures, and controls. Paragraphs 16 
(fraudulent financial reporting) and 18 (misappropriation of assets) provide examples of risk 
factors for the various categories. Footnote 5 on page 17 also clarifies that the auditor may 
use different categories of risk factors “as long as the assessment embodies the substance of 
each of the risk categories described in paragraphs 15 and 17.”
Because of the flexibility provided by footnote 5, we can accept the SAS’s approach 
regarding risk categories and factors. However, as we reviewed paragraph 16, we noted that 
many of the factors listed do not apply to the governmental entities audited by us. If the ASB 
proceeds with the issuance of the new standards, we strongly suggest that risk factors specific 
to certain industries or entities be identified and made available to auditors through audit 
guides, the annual Audit Risk Alerts, or other practice tools.
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How should the auditor respond to the risk assessment?
We agree with the conclusion in paragraph 25 on page 24 that the auditor’s 
assessment o f the risk of material misstatement due to fraud may indicate a need for an overall 
response; one that is specific to a particular account balance, class o f transactions, or 
assertion; or both.
Should the  aud ito r’s communication responsibilities to m anagem ent, the  audit 
committee, and  others change with the proposed standard?
We agree with the ASB’s conclusion that the communication responsibilities 
expressed in SAS No. 53 continue to be appropriate for the proposed SAS. We also believe 
that paragraph 40 on pages 30 and 31 adequately addresses additional communication 
responsibilities that may apply to our audits o f governmental entities.
In  developing guidance, the ASB considers the relationship between the costs imposed 
and the benefits reasonably expected to  be derived from  financial statem ent audits. I t  
also considers the differences the aud ito r may encounter in the  aud it of the financial 
statements of smaller entities and, when appropriate, makes special provisions to meet 
those needs. The ASB believes that, based on inform ation gathered by its F raud  Task 
Force coupled w ith extensive deliberations, the proposals appropriately  balance costs 
and benefits.
As a state audit organization, we question whether the benefits to  be derived from the 
proposed standards will exceed the costs. The new standards will require us to make time- 
consuming and costly changes to our office audit manuals and training packages. Considering 
the pervasiveness of discussions related to errors, irregularities, and audit risk throughout 
AICPA literature and other published guidance, these types o f changes would appear to be 
costly for the profession as a whole. For example, we expect the new standards to require 
conforming changes to Government Auditing Standards, which was just issued in 1994 after 
a lengthy revision process.
In our case, we do not believe the new standards will improve our auditors’ fraud 
awareness or fraud detection efforts. Rather, the standards will impose additional risk 
assessment and documentation requirements on us, when we believe that the work we already 
perform is sufficient to alert us to potential frauds. We expect that at least some additional 
time will be used on each audit to meet the new requirements, a factor that also increases 
audit costs.
We perceive the proposed standards primarily as an attempt by the profession to 
protect itself against allegations o f inadequate work regarding fraud. The requirements to 
perform and document a specific fraud risk assessment will perhaps more clearly indicate to 
nonauditors that the auditor did indeed consider the potential for fraud when planning the
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audit. However, we do not believe the new standards will alter the perception of many 
nonauditors that auditors should detect fraud, since few nonauditors with whom we deal 
either read Or understand auditing standards. Also, even with a specific fraud risk assessment, 
we expect auditors’ work to continue to be criticized—for example, the specific risk factors 
considered and the conclusions reached, particularly if fraud is exposed after an audit.
SPECIFIC COMMENTS
PROPOSED SAS, CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD INA FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT
DESCRIPTION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF FRAUD
paragraphs 2-10 - We find this section to be unnecessarily lengthy and repetitive. For instance, we 
believe:
1. Either “embezzling receipts” or “stealing or misusing assets” could be omitted in the second 
sentence of paragraph 4 since the former is encompassed by the latter.
2. The last sentence of paragraph 4 could be omitted because it states what should be obvious— 
that assets are misappropriated by people—and because paragraphs 7 and 8 discuss 
concealment of fraud through falsified documentation and collusion.
3. The examples in paragraphs 6-9 could be omitted without detracting from the auditor’s 
understanding of the concepts. Also, some of those examples appear later in the SAS’s 
discussion of fraud risk factors.
ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK OF MATERIAL MISSTATEMENT DUE TO FRAUD
Risk Factors Relating to Fraudulent Financial Reporting
paragraph 16.a. - The last item listed under the first bullet, “ineffective accounting staff,” seems 
inconsistent with the bullet’s preceding items, which focus on management characteristics. We 
suggest the item be changed to “Failure to ensure effective accounting staff are hired.” or a similar 
phrase.
paragraph 16.c. - We suggest the phrase “close to year end” be omitted from the fourth bullet. 
Transactions posing difficult “substance over form” questions would be a risk factor regardless of 
when they occur, although those occurring close to year end likely would be the most suspect.
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Risk Factors Relating to Misappropriation of Assets
paragraph 18.a. - We suggest “or lack of ownership identification” be omitted from the fourth bullet 
if the phrase is intended to refer to failure to apply numbered tags to assets. That situation seems to 
be primarily an internal control problem rather than a characteristic that makes an asset susceptible 
to misappropriation.
paragraph 18.c. - For clarification, we suggest the concluding phrase of the fourth bullet be changed 
to “independent checks on performance” (as used in AU sec. 319A.11) or “performance reviews” 
(as used in AU sec. 319.32).
Consideration of Risk Factors in Assessing the Risk of Material Misstatement Due to Fraud
paragraph 19 - The phrase “and whether there are specific controls that mitigate the risk” could be 
omitted from the last sentence since paragraph 22 also refers to mitigating controls.
THE AUDITOR’S RESPONSE TO THE RESULTS OF THE ASSESSMENT
Specific Responses—Fraudulent Financial Reporting - paragraph 29
Specific Responses—Misappropriations of Assets - paragraph 30
We believe these paragraphs could be omitted without detracting from the guidance. In some 
instances, they merely state what should be obvious (e.g., paragraph 30’s statement that differing 
circumstances relating to the risk of asset misappropriation necessitate different responses). In other 
instances, the paragraphs discuss auditing procedures already summarized in paragraph 28 (e.g., 
performing surprise counts of assets or counting assets at or close to year end). If  the ASB continues 
to believe that examples of specific responses are important, then we suggest that paragraph 29 be 
expanded to discuss financial statement areas other than revenues and inventories.
APPENDIX B - PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SAS NO. 1, CODIFICATION OF 
AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, “DUE PROFESSIONAL CARE IN THE 
PERFORMANCE OF WORK”
paragraph 2 - In the second sentence the word after “each” was changed from “person” to 
“professional.” Although the latter word is perhaps clearer than the former, we believe the use of 
“professional” within the context of the sentence still may be confusing. Although audit organizations 
may employ professionals other than auditors (e.g., attorneys), it would appear that only auditors are 
responsible for observing the standards of field work and reporting under generally accepted auditing 
standards.
APPENDIX C - PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SAS NO. 47, AUDIT RISK AND 
MATERIALITY IN  CONDUCTING AN AUDIT
paragraph 5 - We suggest the first sentence be deleted and the second sentence be combined with one 
of the preceding paragraphs. Based on paragraphs 1-4, 12, and 20, the auditor’s concern, while 
planning and performing the audit, with matters that could be material to the financial statements 
should be evident.
PLANNING THE AUDIT
Considerations at the Financial Statement Level
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paragraph 17 - We suggest the end of the first sentence be changed to read “and requiring 
appropriate levels of supervision”; use of “of” seems to indicate the auditor has a choice. However, 
if the auditor concludes that a significant risk of material misstatement exists, we believe he or she 
should consider this conclusion when performing all three tasks listed in the sentence.
EDITORIAL COMMENTS
Overall we found the proposed standards to be repetitive and wordy. On the enclosed draft 
we have marked several suggested editorial changes to correct grammatical errors; to improve 
consistency in punctuation, terminology, formats for authoritative references, and other similar items; 
and to make certain phrases less repetitious or more concise. Also, we suggest that the use of 
punctuation at the end of listed items be reviewed for consistency (paragraphs 1, 3, 15-18, 24, 28, 
34, and 40 on pages 15-30). For example, the items listed in both paragraphs 18 and 24 are phrases 
rather than complete sentences. However, the items in paragraph 24 end with a period, while those 
in paragraph 18 do not.
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PROPOSED STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS 
CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT
INTRODUCTION
1. Section 110 o f Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1, Codification o f Auditing
Standards and Procedures, as amended (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 110, 
"Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor"), states that "The auditor has a 
responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the 
financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud."1 This 
Statement provides guidance to auditors in discharging that responsibility, as it relates to fraud, 
in an audit conducted in accordance w ith generally accepted auditing standards. Specifically, the 
Statement — 
• Describes fraud and its characteristics (see paragraphs 2 -10).
• Requires the auditor to specifically assess the risk o f material misstatement due to  fraud 
and provides categories of fraud risk factors that should be considered in the auditor's 
assessment (see paragraphs 11 -24 ).
• Provides guidance on how the auditor should respond to the results of the assessment 
(see paragraphs 25-31 ).
• Provides guidance on the evaluation of audit test results as they relate to  the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud (see paragraphs 32 -35 ).
• Describes related documentation requirements (see paragraph 36).
• Provides guidance regarding the auditor's communication about fraud to management, the 
audit committee, and others (see paragraphs 37 -40 ).
DESCRIPTION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF FRAUD
2. Although fraud is a broad legal concept, the auditor's interest specifically relates to  fraudulent 
acts that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. The primary factor that 
distinguishes fraud from error is whether the underlying action that results in the misstatement in 
financial statements is intentional or unintentional. 2 Two types of fraud are relevant to the
1 The auditor's responsibility for detecting misstatements resulting from illegal acts is defined in SAS No. 
54, Illegal Acts By Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 317). For those illegal acts that are 
defined in that Statement as having a direct and material effect on the determination of financial statement 
amounts, the auditor's responsibility to detect such illegal acts is the same as that for errors (see SAS No. 47, 
Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312]) or fraud.
2 Intent is often difficult to determine, particularly in matters involving accounting estimates and the 
application of accounting principles. For example, unreasonable accounting estimates may be unintentional or may 
be the result of an intentional attempt to misstate the financial statements. Although the auditor has no 
responsibility to determine intent, the auditor's responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable 
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement is relevant in either case.
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auditor's consideration in a financial statement audit — fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets.3 These tw o types of fraud are described in the following paragraphs.
3. Fraudulent financial reporting refers to intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or 
disclosures in financial statements. Fraudulent financial reporting may involve acts such as the 
following:
• Manipulation, falsification, or alteration of accounting records or supporting documents 
from which financial statements are prepared
• Misrepresentation in, or intentional omission from, the financial statements of events, 
transactions, or other significant information
• Intentional misapplication o f accounting principles relating to amounts, classification, 
manner o f presentation, or disclosure
4. Misappropriation of assets (sometimes referred to  as defalcation) involves the the ft o f an 
entity 's assets. Misappropriation can be accomplished in various ways, including embezzling 
receipts, stealing or misusing assets, or causing an entity to pay for goods or services not 
received. Misappropriation of assets may be accompanied by false or misleading records or 
documents and may involve one or more individuals among management, employees, or third 
parties.
5. Fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation o f assets differ in that fraudulent financial 
reporting is committed, usually by management, to  deceive financial statement users while 
misappropriation of assets is committed against an entity, most often by employees. Both types 
of fraud can but do not necessarily result in material misstatements o f an entity 's financial 
statements.
6. Fraud frequently involves the following: (a) a pressure or an incentive to commit fraud and 
(b) a perceived opportunity to do so. Although specific pressures and opportunities for fraudulent 
financial reporting may differ from those for misappropriation of assets, these tw o conditions 
usually are present for both types o f fraud. For example, fraudulent financial reporting may be 
committed because management is under pressure to  achieve an unrealistic earnings target. 
Misappropriation of assets may be committed because employees are living beyond their means. 
A perceived opportunity may exist in either situation because of deficiencies in internal control.
7. Fraud may be concealed through falsified documentation,4 including forgery. For example, 
management that engages in fraudulent financial reporting might attempt to conceal misstatements 
by creating fictitious invoices, while employees who misappropriate cash might try  to conceal their 
thefts by forging signatures on checks. An audit conducted in accordance w ith generally accepted 
auditing standards rarely involves authentication of documentation, nor are auditors trained as
3 Unauthorized transactions also are relevant to the auditor when they could cause a misstatement in 
financial statements. When such transactions are intentional and result in material misstatement of the financial 
statements, they would fall into one of the two types of fraud discussed in this Statement. Also see the guidance 
in SA'S No. 54.
* Documentation may be in either written or electronic form.
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experts in such authentication.
8. Fraud also may be concealed through collusion among management, employees, or third parties. 
For example, through collusion, false evidence that control activities have been performed 
effectively may be presented to the auditor. As another example, the auditor may receive a false 
confirmation from a third party who is in collusion with management. Collusion may cause the 
auditor to believe that evidence is persuasive when it is, in fact, false.
9. Although fraud usually is concealed, the presence of risk factors or other conditions may alert 
the auditor to  its possible existence. With misappropriation of assets, for example, a document 
may be missing, a general ledger may be out of balance, or an analytical relationship may not make 
sense. However, these conditions may be the result of circumstances other than fraud. 
Documents may have been legitimately lost; the general ledger may be out o f balance because of 
an unintentional accounting error; and unexpected analytical relationships may be the result of 
unrecognized changes in underlying economic factors. Even reports of alleged fraud may not 
always be reliable, because an employee or outsider may be mistaken or may be motivated to 
make a false allegation.
10. An auditor cannot obtain absolute assurance that material misstatements in the financial 
statements w ill be detected. Because of (a) the concealment aspects o f fraudulent activity, 
including the fact that fraud often involves collusion or falsified documentation, and (b) the need 
to  apply professional judgment in the identification and evaluation of fraud risk factors and other 
conditions, even a properly planned and performed audit may not detect a material misstatement 
resulting from fraud. Accordingly, because of the above characteristics o f fraud and the nature of 
audit evidence as discussed in section 230 of SAS No. 1 (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, 
AU sec. 230, 'Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work"), the auditor is able to obtain 
only reasonable assurance that material misstatements in the financial statements are detected.
ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK OF MATERIAL MISSTATEMENT DUE TO FRAUD
11. SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 311), 
provides guidance as to the level of knowledge of the entity's business that will enable the auditor 
to plan and perform an audit of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards. SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an A ud it (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312), provides that determination of the scope of the auditing 
procedures is directly related to  the consideration of audit risk and indicates that the risk of 
material misstatement o f the financial statements due to fraud is part of audit risk.
12. The auditor should specifically assess the risk of material misstatement of the  financial 
statements due to fraud and should consider that assessment in designing the audit procedures 
to  be performed. In making this assessment, the auditor should consider fraud risk factors that 
relate to fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets in each of the related 
categories presented in paragraphs 15 and 17.5 While such risk factors do not necessarily indicate
5 The auditor should assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud regardless of whether the 
auditor otherwise plans to assess inherent or control risk at the maximum (see SAS No. 47, paragraphs 29 and 30). 
An auditor may meet this requirement using different categories of risk factors as long as the assessment embodies 
the substance of each of the risk categories described in paragraphs 15 and 17. Also, since these risk categories 
encompass both inherent and control risk attributes, the specific assessment of the risk of material misstatement
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the existence of fraud, they often have been observed in circumstances where frauds have 
occurred. The auditor should use professional judgment when assessing the significance of the 
risk factors and determining the appropriate audit response.
13. The auditor also should inquire of management to obtain the client's view regarding the risk 
of material misstatement due to fraud. Information from that inquiry could identify fraud risk 
factors that may affect the auditor's assessment and related response. Some examples of matters 
that might be discussed as part of the inquiry are (a) whether there are particular subsidiary 
locations, business segments, types of transactions, account balances, or financial statement 
categories where fraud risk factors exist or may be more likely to  exist and (b) how management 
may be addressing such risks.
14. Because of the many variations of the two types o f fraud relevant to  the financial statement 
audit and variations in the particular industry environments in which different entities operate, the 
fraud risk factors described below are only examples.
Risk Factors Relating to Fraudulent Financial Reporting
15. Risk factors that relate to fraudulent financial reporting may be grouped in the following three 
categories:
a. Management Characteristics. These pertain to  management’s abilities, pressures, style, 
and attitude relating to internal control and the financial reporting process.
b. Industry Conditions. These involve the economic and regulatory environment in which the 
entity operates.
c. Operating Characteristics and Financial Stability. These pertain to  the nature and 
complexity of the entity and its transactions, the entity ’s financial condition, and its 
profitability.
16. The following are examples of risk factors relating to fraudulent financial reporting for each 
of th e  th re e  a ove-described)categories;
a. Risk Factors Relating to Management Characteristics
• A failure by management to display and communicate an appropriate attitude
regarding internal control and the financial reporting process. Specific indicators 
might include —
— An ineffective means of communicating and supporting the entity's values 
or ethics.
— Domination of management by a single person or small group w ithout 
compensating controls such as effective oversight by the board of directors
due to fraud may be performed in conjunction with the assessment of audit risk required by SAS No. 47, 
paragraphs 13-33, and SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial 
Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), paragraphs 27-38. Furthermore, any 
assessment of audit risk may identify the presence of other fraud risk factors that the auditor should consider.
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or audit committee.
Inadequate monitoring of significant controls. 
F
m a n a g ement failure to correct known reportable conditions on a timely
 basis
Management  setting  unduly aggressive financial targets and expectations  
for operating personnel. 
M anagement
Management displaying 
significant disregard for regulatory authorities.
— Ineffective accounting staff.
A  significant portion of management's compensation represented by bonuses, stock 
options, or other incentives, the value of which is contingent upon the entity 
achieving unduly aggressive targets for operating results or financial position
An excessive interest in maintaining or increasing the en tity 's  stock price or 
earnings trend through the use of unusually aggressive accounting practices
Nonfinancial management's excessive participation in, or preoccupation w ith, the 
selection of accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates
A practice by management of committing to analysts, creditors, and other third 
parties to  achieve what appear to be unduly aggressive or unrealistic forecasts 
High turnover of senior management, counsel, or board members
Known history of securities law violations or claims against the entity or its senior 
management alleging fraud or violations of securities laws
Strained relationship between management and the current or predecessor auditor. 
Specific indicators might include —
— Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting,
constraints regarding the completion of the 
auditor's reports.
Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that Inappropriately lim it his 
or her access to people or information or his or her ability to  communicate 
effectively w ith the board of directors or the audit committee.
Domineering management behavior in dealing w ith the auditor.
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b. Risk Factors Relating to Industry Conditions
• New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements that could impair the
financial stability or profitability of the entity
Declining industry w ith increasing business failures
High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins
Rapid changes in the industry, such as significant declines in customer-demand,rap i t , r , 
high vulnerability to rapidly changing technology, or rapid product obsolescence \
c. Risk Factors Relating to Operating Characteristics and Financial Stability 
• Significant pressure to obtain additional capital necessary to stay competitive 
considering the financial position of the entity — including need for funds to finance 
major research and development or capital expenditures
• Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve 
unusually subjective judgments or uncertainties, or that are subject to potential 
significant change in the near term in a manner that may have a financially 
disruptive effect on the entity, such as ultimate collectibility of receivables, timing 
o f revenue recognition, realizability of financial instruments based on the highly 
subjective valuation of collateral or difficult-to-assess repayment sources, or 
significant deferral of costs
• Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or w ith 
related entities not audited or audited by another firm
• Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions close to  year end that pose 
d ifficu lt "substance over form" questions
• Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in tax-haven 
jurisdictions for which there appears to be no clear business justification
• Overly complex organizational structure involving numerous or unusual legal 
entities, managerial lines of authority, or contractual arrangements w ithout apparent 
business purpose
• D ifficu lty in determining the organization or individual(s) that control(s) the entity
Unusually rapid growth or profitability, especially compared w ith  that of other
( comapnies in t he sam e  i n d u s t r y
Especially high vulnerability to changes in interest rates
Unusually high dependence on debt or marginal ability to  meet debt repayment 
requirements; debt covenants that are difficu lt to maintain
Unrealistically aggressive sales or profitability incentive programs
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• Threat o f imminent bankruptcy or foreclosure
• Adverse consequences on significant pending transactions, such as a business 
combination or contract award, if poor financial results are reported
• Poor or deteriorating financial position when management has personally 
guaranteed significant debts of the entity
• Inability to  generate cash flows from operations while reporting earnings and 
earnings growth
Risk Factors Relating to  Misappropriation of Assets
17. Risk factors that relate to misappropriation of assets may be grouped in the three categories 
below. The extent o f the auditor's consideration of the risk factors in categories b. and c. is 
influenced by the degree to which risk factors in category a. are present.
a. Susceptibility o f Assets to  Misappropriation. These pertain to the nature of an entity ’s 
assets and the degree to which they are subject t h e f t   ,
Employee Relationships or Pressures; These pertain to the extent of financial stress among
ols designed to  preventc.  Controls. These i nvolve 
misappropriation of asets
18. following are examples of risk factors relating to misappropriation o f assets fo r each of 
the three above-described categoriesthe th ree above-described categories
a. Risk Factors Relating to Susceptibility of Assets to Misappropriation
Large amounts of cash on hand or processed
b.
• Inventory characteristics, such as small size, high value, or high demand
• Easily convertible assets, such as bearer bonds, diamonds, or computer chips
• Fixed asset characteristics, such as small size, marketability, or lack of ownership 
identification
Risk-Factors. Relating to Employee Relationships or Pressures
• Anticipated future employee layoffs that are known to the work force
Employees (with access to assets susceptible to  misappropriation who are known 
to be dissatisfied
Unexplained unusual and observable changes in behavior of employees w ith  access 
to  assets susceptible to misappropriation 
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c.
Known and observable personal financial pressures affecting employees 
access to assets susceptible to misappropriation
Risk Factors Relating to Controls
• Lack of appropriate management oversight (for example, inadequate supervision or 
monitoring of remote locations)
Lack o f job applicant screening procedures relating to employees w ith  access to 
assets susceptible to misappropriation
Accounting system in disarray
Lack of appropriate segregation of duties or independent checks 
Lack o f appropriate system of authorization and approval of transactions (for 
example, in purchasing 
Poor physical safeguards over cash, investments, inventory, or fixed assets
Lack of timely and appropriate documentation for trans 
for merchandise returns)
ions (for example, credits
Lack o f a mandatory vacation policy fo r  employees performing key control functions
Consideration of Risk Factors in Assessing the Risk of Material Misstatement Due to  Fraud
19. Fraud risk factors cannot easily be ranked in order o f importance or combined into effective 
predictive models. The significance of risk factors varies widely. Some o f these factors w ill be 
present in entities where the specific conditions do not present a risk o f material misstatement. 
Accordingly, the auditor should exercise professional judgment when considering risk factors 
individually or in combination and whether there are specific controls tha t mitigate the risk.
20. For example, an entity may not screen newly hired employees having access to  assets 
susceptible to theft. This factor, by itself, might not significantly affect the assessment of the risk 
of material misstatement due to fraud. However, if it were coupled w ith  a lack o f appropriate 
management oversight and a lack of physical safeguards over such assets as readily marketable 
inventory or fixed assets, the combined effect of these related factors might be significant to that 
assessment.
21,  The size, complexity, and ownership characteristics of the entity (have a signif ic a n t influence 
on the identification of relevant risk factors. For example, in the case of a large entity, the auditor 
would ordinarily consider factors that generally constrain improper conduct by senior management, 
such as the effectiveness of the board of directors, the audit committee or others w ith  equivalent 
authority and responsibility, and the internal audit function. The auditor also would consider what 
steps had been taken to enforce a formal code of conduct and the effectiveness of the budgeting 
or reporting system. Furthermore, risk factors evaluated at a country-specific or business segment 
operating level may provide different insights than the evaluation at an entity-wide level.6 In the
6 SAS No. 47, paragraph 18, provides guidance on the auditor's consideration of the extent to which 
auditing procedures should be performed at selected locations or components.
22
case of a small entity, some or all of these considerations might be inapplicable or less important.
22. SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, Consideration o f Internal Control in a Financial 
Statement A ud it (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), requires the auditor to 
obtain a sufficient understanding of the entity's controls to  plan the audit and notes that such 
knowledge should be used to identify types of potential misstatements, consider factors that affect 
the risk of material misstatement, and design substantive tests. This understanding often will 
a ffect the auditor's consideration of the significance of fraud risk factors. In addition, when 
considering the significance of fraud risk factors, the auditor may wish to assess whether there 
are specific controls that mitigate the risk.7
23. If the entity has established a program that includes proactive steps to  prevent, deter, and 
detect fraud, the auditor may consider its effectiveness. The auditor also should inquire o f those 
persons overseeing such programs as to whether the program has identified any fraud risk factors.
24. Fraud risk factors may come to the auditor's attention while perform ing procedures relating 
to acceptance or continuance of clients and engagements du ring  engagem en t p lann ing  or
obtai ning aunderstanding of an entity's internal control, o r w hile  conducting fie ld  w ork.9 
Accord ing ly, the assessment of the risk o f material misstatement due to  fraud is a  cumulative 
process that includes a consideration of risk factors in combination. Also, the assessment is an 
ongoing process as work is performed because other conditions may be identified during field work
that change or support a judgment regarding the assessment-  for example, the following:
Discrepancies in the Accounting Records z
• Transactions not recorded in a complete or timely manner or improperly recorded as to 
amount, accounting period, classification, or entity policy.
• Unsupported or unauthorized balances or transactions.
• Last-minute adjustments by the entity that significantly affect financial results.
Conflicting or Missing Evidential Matter
• Missing documents.
Unavailability of other than photocopied documents when documents in original form are 
expected to exist. 
Significant unexplained items on reconciliations.
7 SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, paragraph 47, states/that assessing control risk at below the 
maximum level involves identifying specific controls that are likely to prevent or detect material misstatements in 
those assertions, and performing tests of controls to evaluate their effectiveness.
8 See Statement on Quality Control Standards, System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm's Accounting 
and Auditing Practice (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 2, QC sec. 10), paragraphs 14-16.
9 The auditor also is required to obtain written representations from management concerning the absence 
of irregularities involving management and employees that could have a material effect on the financial statements 
(see SAS No. 19, Client Representations [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 333D.
Inconsistent, vague, or implausible responses from management or employees arising from 
inquiries or analytical procedures.
Unusual discrepancies between the entity's records and confirmation replies.
Missing inventory or physical assets of significant magnitude.
Problematic or Unusual Relationships Between the Auditor and Client
Denied access to records or facilities.
Denied access to certain employees, customers, vendors, or others from whom audit 
evidence might be sought.
Undue time pressures imposed by management to  resolve complex or contentious issues.
Unusual delays by the entity in providing requested information.
Tips or complaints to the auditor about fraud.
THE AUDITOR'S RESPONSE TO THE RESULTS OF THE ASSESSMENT-
25. A risk o f material m is s ta te m e n t d u e  to  fra u d  is always present to some degree. 
Consequently, the auditor's response is influenced by the degree of risk assessed. The auditor 
should consider whether the assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud indicates 
a need for an d e r a i l  response; one that is specific to  a particular account balance, class of 
or both . In some cases, even though some o f the fraud risk factors are 
present, the auditor's judgment may be that audit procedures otherwise planned are sufficient to  
respond to the risk factors In other circumstances, the auditor may conclude that the conditions 
indicate a need to/modify  procedures.10 The auditor also may conclude that it is not practicable 
to modify the procedures that are planned for the audit of the financial statements sufficiently to 
address the risk , in which case withdrawal from the engagement w ith  communication to the 
appropriate  parties may be an appropriate course of action (see paragraph 35)
O v e r a l l  c o n s id e r a t io n s - —
due to fraud may affect  the audit  in t h e26. Judgments about the risk of material misstateme n t
following ways: 
Professional Skepticism. Due professional care requires the auditor to  exercise professional 
skepticism — that is, an attitude that includes a questioning mind and critical assessment 
of  audit evidence see SAS No. 1, AU sectio n  230, "Due Professional Care in the 
Performance of W ork,'  paragraphs 7-9). Some examples demonstrating the application of 
professional skepticism in response to the auditor's assessment o f the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud include (a) increased sensitivity in the selection o f the nature 
and extent of documentation to be examined in support of material transactions, and (b) 
increased recognition of the need to corroborate management explanations or 
Representations concerning material matters—such as further analytical procedures,
\
professional10 SAS No. 47. requires the auditor to limit audit 
judgment, appropriate for issuing an opinion on the financial statements.
examination o f documentation, or discussion w ith others w ithin or outside the entity.
Assignment o f Personnel. The knowledge, skill, and ability of personnel assigned 
significant engagement responsibilities should be assessed so they are commensurate with 
the identified risk of the engagement (see SAS No. 1 [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 
1, AU sec. 210, "Training and Proficiency of the Independent Auditor," paragraph 3]). In 
addition, the extent of supervision should recognize the risk of material misstatement due 
to fraud and the qualifications of persons performing the work (see SAS No. 22, paragraph 
11).
Accounting Principles and Policies. The auditor may conclude that there is a risk o f ' 
fraudulent financial reporting that requires the auditor to consider further management's 
selection and application of significant accounting policies, particularly those related to 
revenue recognition, asset valuation, or capitalizing versus expensing. In this respect, the 
auditor may have a greater concern about w hether the accounting principles selected and  
policies adopted are being applied in  a n  inappropriate  m anner to create a material 
misstatement o f the financial statements.
Controls. When a risk of material misstatement due to  fraud relates to  r is k  factors that 
have control implications, the auditor's ability to assess control risk below the maximum
27.
may be reduced. However this does not eliminate the need for the auditor to obtain an  
understanding o f the components of the entity's internal control sufficient to plan the audit  
(see SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78). In fact, such an understanding may be of 
particular importance in further understanding and considering any controls (or lack thereof) 
the entity has in place to  address the identified fraud risk factors. However, this 
consideration also would need to include an added sensitivity to  management's ability to 
override such controls.
The nature, timing and extent of procedures may need to be modified in The following w a y s :
The nature of audit procedures performed may need to be changed to obtain evidence that 
is more reliable or obtain additional corroborative information. For example, more evidential 
matter may be needed from independent sources outside the entity. Also, physical 
observation or inspection of certain assets may become more important. (See SAS No. 31, 
Evidential M atter {AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1. AU sec. 326], paragraphs 1 9 -  
22.) 
The timing o f substantive tests may need to be altered to be closer to or at year end. For 
example, if there are unusual incentives for management to engage in fraudulent financial 
reporting, the auditor might conclude that substantive testing should be performed near or 
at year end because it would not otherwise be possible to control the incremental audit risk 
associated w ith  that risk factor. (See SAS No. 45, Substantive Tests Prior to the Balance- 
Sheet Date [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 313], paragraph 6.)
The extent of the procedures applied should reflect the assessment o f the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud. For example, increased sample sizes or more extensive 
analytical procedures may be appropriate. (See SAS No. 39, A ud it Sampling [AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 350 ], paragraph 23, and SAS No. 56 , Analytical 
Procedures [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 3291).
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Considerations at the Account Balance, Class Of Transactions, and Assertion Level
28. Specific responses to the auditor’s assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud wil vary depending upon the types or combinations of fraud risk factors or conditions 
identified and the account balances, classes of transactions, and assertions they may afect. If 
these factors or conditions indicate a particular risk applicable to specific account balances or 
types of transactions, audit procedures addressing these specific areas should be considered that 
il, in the auditor's judgment, limit audit risk to an appropriate level in light of the risk factors or
conditions identified . n determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit work to be performe d
in response to the risk of material misstatement due to fraud identified with respect to specific 
account balances, classes of transactions, and assertions,/the folowing are specific examples of testing approaches that might be applied? 
Visit locations or perform certain tests on a surprise basis — for example, observing 
inventory at locations not previously announced or counting cash or securities at a 
particular date on a surprise basis.
Request that inventories be counted at a date closer to year end.
Alter the audit approach in the current year — for example, contacting major customers 
and suppliers oraly in addition to writen confirmation.
Perform a detailed review of the entity's quarter-end or year-end closing entries and 
investigate any that appear unusual as to nature or amount.
For significant and unusual transactions, particularly those occurring at or near year end, 
investigate (a) the possibility of related parties and (b) the sources of financial resources 
supporting the transactions.e transaction
Conduct interviews of personnel involved inin areas in which a concern about the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud is present.
When the auditor intends to use the work and reports of other independent auditors who 
are auditing the financial statements of one or more subsidiaries, divisions, or branches 
included in the financial statements presented, consider discussing with the other auditors 
the extent of work necessary to be performed to ensure that the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud resulting from transactions and activities among these components is adequately addressed .  
If the work of certain specialists becomes particularly significant with respect to its 
potential impact on the financial statements, perform additional procedures with respect 
to some or al of the specialist's assumptions, methods, or findings to determine that the 
findings are not unreasonable,or engage another specialist for that purpose (see SAS No. 
73, Using the Work of a Specialist (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 3361,
paragraph
Specific Responses — Fraudulent Financial Reporting
X
29. Some examples of responses to the auditor's assessment of the risk 
“eporting are:
fraudulent financial
Revenue Recognition. If there is a risk of material misstatement due to  fraud th a t may 
involve or result in improper revenue recognition, it may be appropriate to confirm with 
customers certain relevant contract terms and the absence of side agreements — in as much 
as the appropriate accounting is often influenced by such terms or agreements.11 For 
example, acceptance criteria, delivery and payment terms and the absence of future or
continuing vendor obligations, the right to  return the product, guaranteed resale amounts, 
cancellation or refund provisions often are relevant in such circumstances,
Inventory Quantities, If a risk of material misstatement due to fra u d  exists 
quantities, reviewing the client's inventory records may help to identify locations, areas
items for specific attention during or after the physical inventory count. Such a review 
may lead to a decision to observe inventory counts at certain locations on a surprise basis 
(see paragraph 28). In addition, where the auditor has a concern about the risk of materia l  
misstatement due to  fraud in the inventory are it may be particularly important that the 
client counts are conducted at all locations subject to count on the same date.
Furthermore, it  also may be appropriate for the auditor to  apply additional procedures 
 during the observation of the count — for example, examining more rigorously the contents 
 of boxed items the manner in which the goods are stacked (for example, hollow squares) 
o r  labeled; and the quality (that is, purity, grade,or concentration) of liquid substances such 
as perfumes or specialty chemicals. Finally, additional testing o f count sheets, tags,or 
other records, or the retention of copies may be  warranted to  minimize the of 
subsequent alteration or inappropriate c o m p i la t io n
Responses M is a p p ro p ria tio n  o f Assets
30. The auditor may have identified a risk of material misstatement due to  fraud relating to the 
potential for misappropriation of assets. For example, the auditor may conclude that such a risk 
of asset misappropriation at a particular operating location is significant. This may be the case 
when a specific type o f asset is particularly susceptible to such a risk of misappropriation — for 
example, a large amount of easily accessible cash, or inventory items such as jewelry, that can 
be easily moved and sold. Control risk may be evaluated differently in each o f these situations. 
Thus, differing circumstances necessarily would dictate different responses
11 SAS No. 67, The Confirmation Process (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,/AU sec. 330), provides 
guidance about the confirmation process in audits performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards. Among other considerations, that guidance discusses the types of 
confirmations may be requested, and what the auditor should consider if information
respondents from whom 
‘•about the respondent's
competence, knowledge, motivation ability or willingness to respond, or about the respondent's objectivity andespondent's
freedom from bias with respect to the audited entity comes to his or her attention (AU sec. 330.27). It also 
provides that the auditor maintain control over the confirmation requests and responses in order to minimize the 
possibility that the results will be biased because of interception and alteration of the confirmation requests or 
responses (AU sec. 330.28). Further, when confirmation responses are other than in written communications 
mailed to the auditor, additional evidence, such as verifying the source and contents of a facsimile response in a 
telephone call to the purported sender, may be required to support their validity (AU sec. 330.29).
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31. Usually a risk of material misstatement due to fraud related to misappropriation of assets will 
affect certain account balances and classes of transactions. Although some of the audit responses 
noted in paragraph 29 may apply in such circumstances, the scope of the work should be linked 
to the specific information about the misappropriation risk that has been identified. For example, 
where a particular asset is highly susceptible to misappropriation potentially material to the 
financial statements, obtaining an understanding of control activities related to the prevention and 
detection of such misappropriation and testing the operating effectiveness of such controls may 
be warranted. In addition, physical inspection of such assets (for example, counting cash or 
securities) at or near year end may be appropriate.
EVALUATION OF AUDIT TEST RESULTS
r i s k  o f  misstatement due
ongoing throughout the audit. Prior to  the
32. As indicated in paragraph 24, the assessment 
fraud is a cumulative one and one that should be
completion o f the audit, the auditor should consider whether the accumulated results o f audit 
procedures and other observations (for example conditions noted in paragraph 24) affect the 
assessment of the risk o f material misstatement due to fraud made when planning the audit. This 
accumulation is primarily a qualitative matter based on the auditor's judgment. Such an 
accumulation may provide further insight into the risk of material misstatement due to  fraud and 
suggest the need fo r additional or different audit procedures to be performed.
in  the33. When audit test results identify a misstatement Id the financial statements, the auditor should
consider whether such misstatement may be indicative of possible fraud.12 When the auditor has 
determined that a misstatement is or may be the result of fraud, but the effect of the misstatement 
is pot material to  the financial statements, the auditor nevertheless should evaluate the 
implications, especially those dealing w ith the organizational position of the employee(s) involved. 
For example, fraud involving misappropriations o f cash from a small imprest fund normally would 
be of little significance because both the manner of operating the fund and its size would tend to 
establish a lim it on the amount o f potential loss and the custodianship o f such funds is normally 
entrusted to a relatively low-level employee. Conversely, when the matter involves higher- level
management, even though the amount itself is not material to  the financial statements, it may be
indicative of a more pervasive problem. In such circumstances, the auditor should reevaluate the 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud and its resulting impact on (a) the 
nature, tim ing, and extent of the tests of balances or transactions, (b) the assessment o f the 
effectiveness of controls if control risk was assessed below the maximum, and (c) the assignment 
of personnel that may be appropriate in the circumstances,__
 
34. If the auditor has determined that t he misstateme n t is, or may be, the result of fraud, and 
either has determined that the effect could be material to  the financial statements or has been 
unable to evaluate whether the effect is material, the auditor should —
a. Consider the implications for other aspects of the audit (see previous paragraph).
b. Discuss the matter and the approach to further investigation w ith  an appropriate level of 
management that is at least one level above those involved and w ith  senior management.
c. A ttem pt to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to determine whether, in fact,
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material fraud exists, and, if so, its efect.
d. If appropriate, suggest that the client consult with legal counsel.
35. The auditor's consideration of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud and the results 
of audit tests may indicate such a significant risk of fraud that the auditor should consider 
withdrawing from the engagement and communicating the reasons for withdrawal to the audit 
commitee or others with equivalent authority and responsibility (hereafter referred to as the audit 
commitee).13 14  Whether the auditor concludes that withdrawal from the engagement is 
appropriate may depend on the diligence and cooperation of senior management or the board of 
directors in investigating the circumstances and taking appropriate action. Because of the variety 
of circumstances that may arise, it is not possible to describe definitively when withdrawal is 
appropriate. The auditor may wish to consult with legal counsel when considering withdrawal 
from an engagement.
DOCUMENTATION OF THE AudIT S RISK ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE
36. In planning the audit, The auditor should document in the working papers evidence the  
performance of the assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud (see paragraphs
11-24), including how fraud risk factors were considered. The documentation should include any 
fraud risk factors that the auditor believes, individualy or in combination, significantly impact the 
risk of material misstatement together with the auditor's response to those risk factors (see 
paragraphs 25-31). In addition, if during the performance of the audit, fraud risk factors and other 
conditions are identified that cause the auditor to believe that the risk of material misstatement due 
to fraud has increased (see paragraphs 24 and 32), the changed assessment, and any further 
response that the auditor concluded was appropriate also should be documented,
co m m unications anaement the AUDIT COMMITTEE.'AND OTHERS”
37. Communication regarding the results of the auditor's consideration of fraud is an important 
part of the conduct of a financial statement audit in accordance with generaly accepted auditing 
standards. Such communication may involve senior management, the audit commitee^6 and,
13 For entities that do not have audit committees, comparable communications would be directed to the 
board of directors, the board of trustees, or the owner in owner-managed entities, as appropriate.
14 In addition, if the auditor, subsequent to the date of the report on the audited financial statements, 
becomes aware that facts existed at that date which might have afected the report had the auditor then been 
aware of such facts, the auditor should refer to section 561 of SAS No. 1 (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 
1, AU sec. 561, "Subsequent Discovery of Facts Existing at the Date of the Auditor's Report"), for guidance. Furthermore, as specified in paragraph 10 of SAS No. 7, Communications Between Predecessor and Successor
A^uditors (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 315)there may be communication to the predecessor 
auditor.
15 The requirements to communicate noted in this section extend to any intentional misstatement of 
financial statements (see paragraph 2). However, the communication may utilize terms other than fraud — for
example, irregularity, intentional misstatement, misappropriation, defalcation — if there is 
a legal definition of fraud or other reason to prefer alternative terms.
ible confusion with
when appropriate (see paragraph 40), others outside the entity.
o / -
38. Whenever the auditor has determined that th e re  is  evidence th a t  a  fraud may ex ist that 
matter should be brought to the attention of an appropriate level o f management. This is generally 
appropriate even if the matter might be considered inconsequential, such as a minor) defalcation 
by an employee at a low level in the entity’s organization. Fraud involving senior management and 
fraud (whether caused by senior management or other employees) that causes a material 
misstatement of the financial statements should be reported directly to the audit committee. In 
addition, the auditor should reach an understanding w ith  the audit committee regarding the 
expected nature and extent of communications about misappropriations perpetrated by lower level 
employees that are not otherw ise disclosed to  the audit, com m ittee  by m an ag em en t.
39. When the auditor, as a result of the assessment of the risk o f material m isstatem ent due to 
fraud, has identified risk factors that have continuing control implications (whether or not 
transactions or adjustments that could be the result of fraud have been detected), the auditor 
should consider whether these risk factors represent reportable conditions relating to  the entity 's 
internal control that should be communicated to senior management and the audit committee17 18
(see SAS No. 60, Communication o f Internal Control Related Matters Noted in an A ud it [AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 325]). The auditor also may wish to  communicate other 
risk factors identified when actions can be reasonably taken by the entity to address the risk.
40. The disclosure of fraud to  parties other than th e (jclienys senior management and its audit 
committee ordinarily is not part of the auditor's responsibility and ordinarily would be precluded 
by the auditor's ethical or legal obligations of confidentiality unless the matter is reflected in the 
auditor’s report. The auditor should recognize, howeydr, that in the following circumstances a
duty to disclose outside the entity may exist:
To comply w ith  certain legal and regulatory requirements 
b. To a successor auditor when the successor makes inquiries in accordance w ith  SAS No. 
7, Communications Between Predecessor and Successor Auditors (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 315)19
c. In response to a subpoena
d. To a funding agency or other specified agency in accordance w ith  requirements for the 
audits of entities that receive governmental financial assistance
17 Alternatively, the auditor may decide to communicate solely with the audit committee.
18 These requirements include reports in connection with the termination of the engagement, such as when 
the entity reports an auditor change under the appropriate securities law on Form 8-K and the fraud or related risk 
factors constitute a "reportable event" or is the source of a "disagreement," as these terms are defined in Item 304  
of Regulation S-K. These requirements also include reports that may be required, under certain circumstances, 
pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (codified in section 10A(b)1 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934) relating to an illegal act that has a material effect on the financial statements.
19 In accordance with SAS No. 7, communication between predecessor and successor auditors requires 
the specific permission of the client.
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Because potential conflicts with the auditor's ethical and legal obligations for confidentiality may 
complex, the auditor may wish to consult w ith legal counsel before discussing matters covered 
this section w ith parties outside the c l ie n t
EFFECTIVE DATE
41. This Statement is effective for audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after 
December 15, 1997. Early application of the provisions of this Statement is permissible.
31
APPENDIX A
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS (SAS) NO. 1, 
CODIFICATION OF AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES 
"RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR"
(Amends Statement on Auditing Standards No.1, AICPA, Professional Standards, 
vol.1, AU sec. 110, to  add a new paragraph 2 and to renumber the existing paragraphs 2-9)
[Explanation]
This amendment includes a statement of the auditor's responsibility, in an audit conducted in 
accordance w ith generally accepted auditing standards, for the detection of material misstatement 
in the financial statements due to fraud. The ASB believes that the revised description o f that 
presently existing responsibility is more understandable because its structure parallels the 
description of the auditor's responsibility contained in the auditor's standard report. The ASB also 
believes that inclusion o f this statement in the general standards would heighten the auditor's 
awareness o f the extent of the current responsibility in an audit for the detection o f material 
misstatement due to fraud. New language is shown in boldface. The amendment is effective for 
audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after December 15, 1997. Early application 
of the provisions of this Statement is permissible.
[ Text o f proposed change]
2. The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance 
about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error 
or fraud.1 Because of the nature of audit evidence and the characteristics o f fraud, the auditor is 
' able to obtain reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that material misstatements are detected.*2
The auditor has no responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance t hat 
Errors or fraud that are not material to the financial statements a re detected.
See SAS No. 47 , Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 
1, AU sec. 312) and SAS No. XX, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316). The auditor's responsibility for detecting misstatements resulting from illegal acts 
is defined in SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts By Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 317). For those 
illegal acts that are defined in that Statement as having a direct and material effect on the determination of financial 
statement amounts, the auditor's responsibility to detect such illegal acts is the same as that for errors or fraud.
2 See SAS No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 
1, AU sec. 230, "Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work, " paragraphs 10-13).
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APPENDIX B
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS (SAS) No ,  1, 
CODIFICATION OF AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES 
DUE PROFESSIONAL CARE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF WORK"
(Amends Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1,
AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230)
This amendment includes an expanded discussion o f due professional care and reasonable 
assurance. The objective of these revisions is to heighten the auditor's awareness of the need for 
professional skepticism throughout the conduct of the audit as well as clearly articulate the 
concept of reasonable assurance. New language is show in boldface; deleted language is shown 
by strike-through.  The amendment is effective for audits of financial statements for periods ending 
on or after December 15, 1997 . Early application of the provisions of this Statement is 
permissible. 
P
[Text of Proposed Change ]
1. The third general standard is:
Due professional care is to be exercised in the planning and performance of the audit and 
the preparation of the report.1
2. This standard requires the independent auditor to plan and perform his or her work w ith  due 
professional care. Due professional care imposes a responsibility upon each pers o n  professional 
within an independent auditor's organization to observe the standards of field work and reporting.
3- on Torts, a legal treatise.o f te n  c i te d
due care merits quotation here describes the obligation for due care as follows:
Every man who offers his services to  another and is employed assumes the duty to 
exercise in the employment such skill as he possesses w ith reasonable care and diligence. 
In all these employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services, he is 
understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the degree of skill commonly 
possessed by others in the same employment, and if his pretentions are unfounded, he 
commits a species of fraud upon every man who employs him in reliance on his public 
profession. But no man, whether skilled or unskilled, undertakes that the task he assumes 
shall be performed successfully, and without fault or error; he undertakes for good faith 
and integrity, but not for infallibility, and he is liable to  his employer for negligence, bad
1 This amendment revises the third general standard of the ten generally accepted auditing standards.
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faith, or dishonesty, but not for losses consequent upon pure errors o f judgment.2
4. The matter of due professional care concerns what the independent auditor does and how well 
he or she does it. The quotation from Cooley on Torts provides a source from which an auditor's 
responsibility for conducting an audit w ith  due professional care can be derived. The remainder 
o f the Statement discusses the auditor's responsibility in the context of an audit.
5. An auditor should possess "the degree of skill commonly possessed" by other auditors and 
should exercise it w ith  "reasonable care and diligence* (that is, w ith  due professional care).
6. Auditors should be assigned to tasks and supervised commensurate w ith  their level of. 
knowledge, skill, and ability so that they can evaluate the audit evidence they are examining. The 
auditor w ith  final responsibility for the engagement should know, at a minimum, the relevant 
professional accounting and auditing standards and should be knowledgeable about the client.3 
The auditor with final responsibility is responsible for the assignment o f tasks to , and supervision 
o f assistants.4
PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM
7. Due professional care requires the auditor to exercise professional skepticism. Professional
skepticism is  an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment o f audit 
evidence. The auditor uses the knowledge, skill, and ability called for by the profession o f public 
accounting to diligently perform, in good faith and w ith integrity, the gathering and objective 
evaluation o f evidence. 
8. Gathering and objectively evaluating audit evidence requires  th e  auditor to consider t h e  
competency and sufficiency of the evidence. Since evidence is gathered and evaluated throughout 
the audit, professional skepticism should be exercised throughout the audit process.
9. The auditor neither assumes that management is dishonest nor assumes unquestioned honesty. 
In exercising professional skepticism, the auditor should not be satisfied w ith less than persuasive 
evidence because o f a belief that management is honest.
REASONABLE ASSURANCE
10. The exercise o f due professional care allows the auditor to obtain reasonable assurance that 
the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. 
Absolute assurance is not attainable because of the nature of audit evidence and the 
characteristics o f fraud. Therefore, an audit conducted in accordance w ith  generally accepted 
auditing standards may not detect a material misstatement.
11. The independent auditor's objective is to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to
2 D. Haggard, Cooley on Torts, 472 (4th ed., 1932).
3 See SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 311), 
paragraph 7.
* See SAS No. 22, paragraph 11.
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provide him or her w ith a reasonable basis for forming an opinion. In the great majority of cases, 
the auditor finds it necessary to rely on evidence that is persuasive rather than convincing.5 The 
nature of most evidence derives, in part, from the concept of selective testing of the data being 
audited, which involves judgment regarding both the areas to be tested and the nature, timing, and 
extent of the tests to be performed. In addition, judgment is required in interpreting the results 
of audit testing and evaluating audit evidence. Even w ith  good faith and integrity, mistakes and 
errors in judgment can be made. Furthermore, accounting presentations contain accounting 
estimates, the measurement of which is inherently uncertain and depends on the outcome of 
future events. The auditor exercises professional judgment in evaluating the reasonableness of 
accounting estimates based on information that could reasonably be expected to be available prior 
to the completion o f field work.’  
12. Because of the characteristics of fraud, particularly those involving concealment and falsified
documentation (including forgery), a properly planned and performfed audit may not detect a 
material misstatement. For example, an audit conducted in accordance w ith  generally accepted 
auditing standards rarely involves authentication of documentation, nor are auditors trained to do 
so. Also, audit procedures that are effective for detecting a misstatement that is u n in te n t io n a l 
may be ineffective for a  misstatement that is intentional and is  concealed through collusion among 
client personnel and third parties or among managemen t  employees of t h e  c l i e n t
13. Since the auditors opinion on the financial statements is based on the concept of obtaining 
reasonable assurance, the auditor is not an insurer and his or her report does not constitute a 
guarantee. Therefore, the subsequent discovery that a material misstatement, whether from error 
or fraud, exists in the financial statements does not, in and of itself, evidence (1) failure to obtain 
reasonable assurance, (2) inadequate planning, performance, or judgment, (3) the absence of due 
professional care, or (4) a failure to comply w ith generally accepted auditing standards.
5 See SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 326)




PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS (SAS) NO. 47, 
AUDIT RISK AND MATERIALITY IN CONDUCTING AN AUDIT
(Amends Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47,
AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312)
[Explanation]
This amendment revises SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit, to  provide 
a foundation within the audit risk model for the consideration of fraud and to  incorporate guidance 
on errors that was formerly included in SAS No. 53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and 
Report Errors and Irregularities (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), which is 
proposed to be superseded. The revisions also (1) elaborate on factors an auditor should consider 
for an entity w ith  multiple locations or components and (2) include changes to  conform to  the 
definition and description of internal control contained in SAS No. 78, Consideration o f Internal 
Control in a Financial Statement Audit: An Amendment to SAS No. 55  (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319). New language is shown in boldface; deleted language is shown 
by strike-through and shading. The amendment is effective for audits of financial statements for 
periods ending on or after December 15, 1997. Early application o f the provisions of this 
Statement is permissible.
[Text o f proposed change]
1. This Statement provides guidance on the auditor's consideration of audit risk and materiality 
when planning and performing an audit of financial statements in accordance w ith  generally 
accepted auditing standards. Audit risk and materiality affect the application o f generally accepted 
auditing standards, especially the standards of field work and reporting, and are reflected in the 
auditor's standard report. Audit risk and materiality, among other matters, need to be considered 
together in determining the nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures and in evaluating the 
results of those procedures.
2. The existence o f audit risk is recognized by the statem ent
in the description of the responsibilities and functions o f the independent 
auditor that states that "Because of the nature of audit evidence and the characteristics o f fraud.
the auditor is able to  obtain reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that material misstatements
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are detected;" 1 Audit risk2 is the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately 
modify his opinion on financial statements that are materially misstated.3
3. The concept of materiality recognizes that some matters, either individually or in the aggregate, 
are important for fair presentation of financial statements in conformity w ith generally accepted 
accounting principles,4 while other matters are not important. The phrase in the auditor's standard 
report "present fairly, in all material respects, in conformity w ith generally accepted accounting 
principles" indicates the auditor's belief that the financial statements taken as a whole are not 
materially misstated.
4. Financial statements are materially misstated when they contain misstatements whose effect, 
individually or in the aggregate, is important enough to cause them not to  be presented fairly, in 
all material respects, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.^
omisions of necesary information Misstatements can result from errors or fraud.5
5. In planning the audit, the auditor is concerned w ith matters that could be material to the 
financial statements. An audit conducted in accordance w ith generally accepted auditing 
standards is not intended to detect misstatements that are not material to  the financial statements.
6. The term errors refers to unintentional misstatements or omissions o f amounts or disclosures
assurance.
Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 110, 
V  "Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor"), and SAS No. 1, (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 
AU sec. 230, "Due Professional Care in the performance of Work"), for a further discussion of reasonable
2 In addition to audit risk, the auditor is also exposed to loss or injury to his professional practice from 
litigation, adverse publicity, or other events arising in connection with financial statements that he has audited and 
reported on. This exposure is present even though the auditor has performed his audit in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards and has reported appropriately on those financial statements. Even if an auditor 
assesses this exposure as low, he should not perform less extensive  procedures than would otherwise be 
appropriate under generally accepted auditing standards.
3 This definition of audit risk does not include the risk that th e  auditor might erroneously conclude that 
the financial statements are materially misstated. In such a situation, he would ordinarily reconsider or extend his a
uditing procedures and request that the client perform specific tasks to reevaluate the appropriateness of the 
financial statements. These steps would ordinarily lead the auditor to the correct conclusion. This definition also 
excludes the risk of an inappropriate reporting decision unrelated to the detection and evaluation of misstatements 
in the financial statements, such as an inappropriate decision regarding the form of the auditor's report because 
of an uncertainty or limitation on the scope of the au d it.
 The concepts of audit risk and materiality are also applicable to financial statements presented in 
conformity with a comprehensive basis of accounting other than generally accepted accounting principles; 
references in this Statement to financial statements presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles also include those presentations.
5 The auditor's responsibility for detecting misstatements resulting from illegal acts is defined in SAS No. 
54, Illegal Acts By Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 317). For those illegal acts that are 
defined in that Statement as having a direct and material effect on the determination of financial statement 
amounts, the auditor's responsibility to detect such illegal acts is the same as that for errors or fraud.
38
in financial statements. Errors may involve -
Mistakes in gathering or processing data from which financial statements are prepared.
Unreasonable accounting estimates arising from oversight or misinterpretation of facts.
Mistakes in the application of accounting principles relating to amount, classification, 
manner o f presentation, or disclosure. *
Although f r a u d  is a broad legal concept, the auditor's interest specifically relates to acts that 
cause a misstatement of financial statements. Two types of fraud are relevant to  the auditor's, 
consideration in a financial statement audit - fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation 
o f  assets. These tw o types of fraud are further described in SAS No. XX, C o n s id e ra t io n  o f  F ra u d  , 
in  a  F in a n c ia l S ta te m e n t A u d i t  (AICPA, P ro fe s s io n a l S ta n d a rd s , vol. 1, AU sec. 316). The primary 
factor that distinguishes fraud a nd e rror is whether the underlying action tha t results in the 
misstatement in financial statememt  is intentional or unintentional.
8. When considering the auditor's responsibility to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial 
statements are free from material misstatement, there is no important distinction between errors 
and fraud. There is a distinction, however, in the auditor's response to detected misstatements. 
Generally, an isolated, immaterial error in processing accounting data or applying accounting 
principles is not significant to the audit. In contrast, when fraud is detected, the auditor should 
consider the implications for the integrity of management or employees and the possible effect on 
other aspects o f the audit. Also, the auditor may not detect material misstatements that result 
from a nonrecurring breakdown of a specific control because a circumstance permitted by 
temporary conditions may not be detected in the performance of analytical or other procedures.
_______
|9. When reaching a concluion as to whether the effect o r  misstatements, individually or in the
aggregate, is material, an auditor ordinarily should consider their nature and amount in relation to 
the nature and amount of items in the financial statements under audit. For example, an amount 
that is material to the financial statements of one entity may not be material to  the financial 
statements o f another entity of a different size or nature. Also, what is material to the financial
statements of a particular entity migh t  change from one period to another
m atte r of professional judgment and isThe aud itors consideration o frn a t
influenced by his perception of the needs of a reasonable person who w ill rely on the financial 
statements. The perceived needs of a reasonable person are recognized in the discussion of 
materiality in Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts 
No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics o f Accounting Information, which defines materiality as "the 
magnitude of an omission or misstatement of accounting information that, in the light of 
surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying on 
the information would have been changed or influenced by the omission or m isstatement." That 
discussion recognizes that materiality judgments are made in light of surrounding circumstances 
and necessarily involve both quantitative and qualitative considerations.
6 Errors do not include the effect of accounting processes employed for convenience, such as maintaining 
accounting records on the cash basis or the tax basis and periodically adjusting those records to prepare financial 
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
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 11- As a result of the interaction of quantitative and qualitative considerations in materiality 
judgments, misstatements of relatively small amounts that come to the auditor's attention could 
have a material effect on the financial statements. For example, an illegal payment of an 
otherwise immaterial amount could be material if there is a reasonable possibility that it could lead 
to a material contingent liability or a material loss of revenue.7 8
PLANNING THE AUDIT
 12. The auditor should consider audit risk and materiality both in (a) planning the audit and 
designing auditing procedures and (b) evaluating whether the financial statements taken as a whole 
are presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity w ith  generally accepted accounting 
principles. The auditor should consider audit risk and materiality in the firs t circumstance to 
obtain sufficient competent evidential matter on which to properly evaluate the financial 
statements in the second circumstance. 
Considerations at the Financial Statements Level 
13 The auditor should plan the audit so that audit risk w ill be limited to  a low level that is, in
his professional judgment, appropriate for issuing an opinion on the financial statements. Audit 
risk may be assessed in quantitative or nonquantitative t e r m s .
14. SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision {AICPA, professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec.
11), requires the auditor, in planning the audit, to take into  considera t io n  among other matters, 
his preliminary judgment about materiality levels for audit purposes.9 That judgment may or may 
not be quantified. 
15. According to SAS No. 22, the nature,  t iming, and extent of planning and thus of the 
considerations of audit risk and materiality vary w ith the size and complexity o f the entity, the
auditor's experience w ith the entity, and his knowledge of the entity 's business. Certain entity- 
related factors also affect the nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures w ith  respect to 
/  specific account balances and classes of transactions and related assertions. (See paragraphs
24 through 2 6  33.)
16. An assessment of the risk of material misstatements  whether caused by error or fraud, 
should be made during planning. The auditor's understanding of internal control may heighten or 
mitigate the auditor's concern about the risk of material misstatements 10 In considering audit risk,
the auditor should specifically assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements
7 Th e  auditor’s responsibility for-illegal acts is-discussed in See SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts By Clients.
9 This Statement amends SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision, paragraph 3e, by substituting the words 
"Preliminary judgment about materiality levels" in place of the words "Preliminary estimates of materiality levels."
10 See SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial Statement 
Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319).
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due to fraud.11 The auditor should consider the effect o f these assessments on the overall audit 
strategy and the expected conduct and scope of the audit.
17. Whenever the auditor has reached c o n c lu s io n  th a t there is significant risk of material 
misstatement o f the financial statements, the auditor should consider this conclusion in 
determining the nature, tim ing, or extent of procedures; assigning staff; or requiring appropriate 
levels o f supervision. The knowledge, skill, and ability of personnel assigned significant 
engagement responsibilities should be commensurate w ith  the auditor's assessment of the level 
of risk for the engagement. Ordinarily, higher risk requires more experienced personnel or more 
extensive supervision by the auditor with final responsibility for the engagement during both the 
planning and the conduct of the engagement. Higher risk may cause t he auditor to  expand the 
extent o f procedures applied; apply procedures closer to  or as of ( the balance-sheet date
Icularly in critical audit areas;  or modify the nature o f procedures t o  obtain m ore persuasive 
evidence.
18. In an audit of an entity  w i th  o p e r a t io n s
, the auditor
2-6 ■>
consider the extent to  which auditing procedures should be performed at selected locations or 
components. The factors an auditor should consider regarding the selection of a particular location 
or component include (a) the nature and amount of assets and transactions executed at the 
location or component, (b) the degree of centralization o f records or information processing, (c) 
the effectiveness o f the control environment, particularly w ith  respect to  management's direct 
control over the exercise of authority delegated to others and its ability to  effectively supervise 
activities at the location or component, (d) the frequency, timing, and scope of monitoring 
activities by the entity or others at the location or component, and (e) judgments about materiality- 
of the location or component. . 
19. In planning t he audit, the auditor should use his judgment as to the appropriately low level 
of audit risk and his'preliminary judgment about materiality levels in a manner that can be expected 
to provide him w ith in  the inherent limitations o f the auditing process, w ith  sufficient evidential 
matter to  obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement. Materiality levels include an overall level for each statement; however, because the 
statements are interrelated, and for reasons of efficiency, the auditor ordinarily considers 
materiality for planning purposes in terms of the smallest aggregate level o f misstatements that 
could be considered material to any one of the financial statements. For example, if he believes 
that misstatements aggregating approximately $ 100,000 would have a material effect on income 
but that such misstatements would have to aggregate approximately $200,000 to materially affect 
financial position, it would not be appropriate for him to design auditing procedures that would be 
expected to detect misstatements only if they aggregate approximately $200,000.
 20. The auditor plans the audit to obtain reasonable assurance of detecting misstatements 
that he b elieves could be large enough, individually or in the aggregate, to be quantitatively 
material to  the financial statements. Although the auditor should be alert for misstatements that 
could be qualitatively material, it ordinarily is not practical to  design procedures to detect them.
SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 326), states that 
an auditor typically works within economic limits; h is  op inion, to be economically useful, must 
be formed w ithin a reasonable length of time and at reasonable cost."  
See SAS No. XX, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.
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21. In some situations, the auditor considers materiality  for planning purposes before the 
financial statements to be audited are prepared. In other situations h is  planning takes place after 
the financial statements under audit have been prepared, but he may be aware that they require 
significant modification. In both types of situations, the auditor's preliminary judgm ent about 
materiality might be based on the entity's annualized interim financial statemen ts  or financial 
statements of one or more prior annual periods, as long as he gives recognition to the effects of 
major changes in the entity's circumstances (for example, a  significant merger and relevant 
changes in the economy as a whole or the industry in which the entity operates. A
theoretically, that the auditor's judgm ent about materiality at the planning22. Assuming, t l ' judg
stage was based on the same information available to him at the evaluation stage, materiality for 
planning and evaluation purposes would be the same. However, it ordinarily is not feasible for the 
auditor, when planning an audit, to anticipate all of the circumstances that may ultimately 
influence his judgment about materiality in evaluating the audit findings at the completion o f the 
audit. Thus, h is  preliminary judgment about materiality ordinarily w ill d iffer from his judgment 
about materiality used in evaluating the audit findings. If significantly lower materiality levels 
become appropriate in evaluating his audit findings, the auditor should reevaluate the sufficiency 
of the auditing procedures he has performed. 
 23. In planning auditing procedures, the auditor should also consider the nature, cause (if 
known), and amount o f misstatements that he is aware of from the audit of the prior period's 
financial statements.
Considerations at the Individual Account-Balance or Class-of-Transactions Level
 24. The auditor recognizes that there is an inverse relationship between audit risk  and 
materiality considerations. For example, the risk that a particular account balance or class of 
transactions and related assertions could be misstated by an extremely large amount might be very 
low, but the risk tha t it could be misstated by an extremely small amount might be very high. 
Holding other planning considerations equal, either a decrease in the level of audit risk that the 
be appropriate in an account balance or c lass of transactions or a decrease in the 
misstatements i n the balance or class that he believes could be material would require 
the auditor to do one or more of the following: (a) select a more effective auditing procedure, (b) 
perform auditing procedures closer to the  balance-sheet d a t e  (c) increase the extent of 
particular auditing procedure.
laning 
 auditor judges to 
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25. In determining the nature, timing, and extent of  auditing procedures to be applied to a
specific account balance or class of transactions, the auditor should design procedures to  obtain 
reasonable assurance o f detecting misstatements that he believes, based on his preliminary 
judgment about materiality, could be material, when aggregated w ith  misstatements in other 
balances or classes, to  the financial statements taken as a whole. Auditors use various methods 
to design procedures to detect such misstatements. In some cases, auditors explicitly estimate, 
for planning purposes, the maximum amount of misstatements in the balance or class that, when 
combined w ith  misstatements in other balances or classes, could exist w ithout causing the 
financial statements to  be materially misstated. In other cases, auditors relate their preliminary 
judgment about materiality to a specific account balance or class of transactions w ithout explicitly 
estimating such misstatements.
26. The auditor needs to consider audit risk at the individual account-balance or class-of-
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transactions level because such consideration directly assists him in determining the scope of V  
auditing procedures for the balance or class and related assertions. The auditor should seek to 
restrict audit risk at the individual balance or class level in such a way that w ill enable him at the 
completion of his examination, to express an opinion on the financial statements taken as a whole 
at an appropriately  low  level of audit risk. Auditors use various approaches to  accomplish tha t 
objective.
 27. A t the account-balance or class-of-transactions level, audit risk consists o f (a) the risk 
(consisting o f inherent risk and control risk) that the balance or class and related assertions contain 
misstatements (whether caused by error or fraud) that could be material to the financial statements 
when aggregated w ith misstatements in other balances or classes and (b) the risk (detection risk) 
that the auditor will not detect such misstatements. The discussion that fo llows describes audit 
•risk in terms of three component risks.12 The way the auditor considers these component risks and 
combines them involves professional judgment and depends on his audit approach.
a. Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an assertion to a material misstatement, assuming that 
there are no related internal controls structure, policies or procedures The risk o f such
misstatement is greater for some assertions and related balances or classes than for others.
For example, complex calculations are more likely to be misstated than simple calculations.
Cash is more susceptible to theft than an inventory of coal. Accounts consisting of 
amounts derived from accounting estimates pose greater risks than do accounts consisting 
of relatively routine, factual data. External factors also influence inherent risk. For 
example, technological developments might make a particular product obsolete, thereby
causing inventory to  be more susceptible to overstatement. In addition to those factors  
that are peculiar to  a specific assertion for an account balance or c lass o f t ransactions, 
factors that relate to several or all of the balances or classes may influence the inherent 
risk related to an assertion for a specific balance or class. These latter factors include, for 
example, a lack o f sufficient working capital to continue operations or a declining industry 
characterized by a large number of business failures.
b. Control risk is the risk that a material misstatement tha t could occur in an assertion w ill not 
be prevented or detected on a timely basis by the entity's internal control structure policies
That risk is a function of the effectiveness of the design and operation of 
internal control structure policies or procedures in achieving the entity 's broad internal
control structure objectives relevant to an audit of the entity's financial statements. Some 
control risk w ill always exist because of the inherent limitations o f any internal control
c. Detection risk is the risk that the auditor will not detect a material misstatement that exists 
in an assertion. Detection risk is a function of the effectiveness o f an auditing procedure 
and of its application by the auditor. It arises partly from uncertainties that exist when the 
auditor does not examine 100 percent of an account balance or. class of transactions and
12 The formula in the appendix (paragraph 48) to SAS No. 39, Audit Sampling (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 3 5 describes audit risk in terms of four component risks. Detection risk is presented 
in terms of two components: the risk that analytical procedures and other relevant substantive tests would fail to 
detect misstatements equal to tolerable misstatement, and the allowable risk of incorrect acceptance for the 
substantive test of details. 
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partly because of other uncertainties that exist even if he were to examine 100 percent of 
the balance or class. Such other uncertainties arise because an auditor might select a 
inappropriate auditing procedure, misapply an appropriate procedure, or misinterpret th 
audit results. These other uncertainties can be reduced to a negligible level through 
adequate planning and supervision and conduct of a firm 's audit practice in accordance 
w ith  appropriate quality control standards.
28. Inherent risk and control risk differ from detection risk in that they exist independently 
of the audit of financial statements, whereas detection risk relates to the auditor's procedures and 
can be changed at his discretion. Detection risk should bear an inverse relationship to inherent and 
c ontrol risk. The less the inherent and control risk the auditor believes exists, the greater the 
detection risk he can accept. Conversely, the greater the inherent and control risk the auditor 
believes exists, the less the detection risk he can accept. These components of audit risk may be 
assessed in quantitative terms such as percentages or in nonquantitative terms that range, for 
example, from a minimum to a maximum.
When the auditor assesses inherent risk for an assertion related to an account balance 
of transactions, he evaluates numerous factors that involve professional judgment. Inor
doing so, he considers not only factors peculiar to the related assertion, but also, other factors 
pervasive to the financial statements taken as a whole that may also influence inherent risk related 
to  the  assertion. If an auditor concludes that the effort required to  assess inherent risk for an 
assertion would exceed the potential reduction in the extent of his auditing procedures derived 
from such an assessment, he should assess inherent risk as being at the maximum when designing 
auditing procedures.
30. The auditor also uses professional judgment in assessing control risk fo r an assertion 
related to  the account balance or class of transactions. The auditor's assessment o f control risk 
is based on the sufficiency of evidential matter obtained to support the effectiveness of internal 
control structure policies or procedures in preventing or detecting misstatements in financial
 statement assertions. If the auditor believes controls are unlikely
to pertain to  an assertion or are unlikely to  be effective, or if he believes that evaluating their 
effectiveness would be inefficient, he would assess control risk for that assertion at the maximum.
31. The auditor might make separate or combined assessments o f inherent risk and control 
risk. If he c onsiders inherent risk or control risk, separately or in combination, to be less than the 
maximum, he should have an appropriate basis for his assessments. This basis may be obtained, 
for example, through the use of questionnaires, checklists, instructions, or similar generalized 
materials and, in the case of control risk, his understanding of the  internal control structure and 
his  performance o f suitable tests of controls. However professional judgment is required in 
interpreting, adapting, or expanding such generalized material as appropriate in the circumstances.
32. The detection risk that the auditor can accept in the design o f auditing procedures is 
based on the level to which he seeks to restrict audit risk related to  the account balance or class 
of transactions and on his assessment of inherent and control risks. As the auditor's assessment
of inherent risk and control risk decreases, the detection risk that he can accept increases. It is 
not appropriate, however, for an auditor to rely completely on his  assessments of inherent risk and 
Control risk to the exclusion of performing substantive tests o f  account balances and classes of 
transactions where misstatements could exist that might be (material when aggregated w ith
misstatements in other balances or classes.
aggregated 
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33. An audit o f financial statements  is  a cumulative process; as the auditor performs planned 
auditing procedures, the evidence he obtains may cause him to modify the nature, t iming, and 
extent of other planned procedures information may come to the auditor's attention as a result
o f  performing auditing procedures or from other sources during the audit that differs significantly 
from  the  in fo rm ation  on which h is  au d it p lan  was based. For example, the extent of 
m is s tatements^h€>detects may alter his judgment about the levels of inherent and control risks, 
and other information he obtains about the  financial statements may alter his preliminary judgment 
about materiality. Insuch cases, he may need to reevaluate the auditing procedures he plans to 
apply, based on his  revised consideration of audit risk and materiality for all or certain of the 
account balances or classes of transaction; and related assertions. 
 34. In evaluating whether the financial statements are presented fairl y  in all material 
respects, in conformity w ith  generally accepted accounting principles, the auditor should aggregate 
misstatements that the entity has not corrected in a way that enables him to  consider whether, 
in relation to  individual amounts, subtotals, or totals in the financial statements, they materially 
misstate the financial statements taken as a whole. Qualitative considerations also influence an 
auditor in reaching a conclusion as to  whether misstatements are material
3 5 .  T h e  aggregation of misstatements should include tne auditor s best estimates of the  total 
 misstatements in the account balances or classes of transactions that he has examined (hereafter 
 referred to as likely misstatement13), not just the amount of misstatements he specifically identifie 
(hereafter referred to as known misstatement).14 When the auditor tests an account balance or class 
of transactions and related assertions by an analytical procedure, he ordinarily would no 
s pecifically identify misstatements but would only obtain an indication o f whether misstatement 
m ig h t  exist in the balance or class and possibly its approximate magnitude. If the analytical 
procedure indicates that a misstatement might exist, but not its approximate amount, the auditor 
ordinarily would have to  employ other procedures to enable him to estimate the likely misstatement 
in the balance or class. When an auditor uses audit sampling to test an assertion for an accoun 
balance or class of transactions, he projects the amount of known misstatements he identified in
^BF^ample to the items in the balance or class from which his sample was selected. That projectei
m is s ta te m e n t  a lo n g  w i t h  th e  re s u lts  o f  o th e r  s u b s ta n tiv e  te s ts   c o n tr ib u te s  t o  th e  a u d ito r '
assessment of likely misstatement in the balance or class
3 6. The risk of material misstatement of the financial statements is generally greater when 
account balances and classes of transactions include accounting estimates rather than essentially 
factual data because of the inherent subjectivity in estimating future events. Estimates, such as 
those for inventory obsolescence, uncollectible receivables, and warranty obligations, are subject
the result of fraud.
13 See SAS No. xx.
Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, paragraphs  33-35, for a further discussion of the 
auditor's consideration of differences between the accounting records and the underlying facts and circumstances. 
This section provides specific guidance on the auditor's consideration of an audit adjustment that is. or may be.
if the auditor were to examine all of the Items in a balance or class, the likely misstatement applicable 
to recorded transactions in the balance or class would be the amount of known misstatements specifically 
identified.
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not only to the unpredictability of future events but also to misstatements that may arise from 
using inadequate or inappropriate data or misapplying appropriate data. Since no one accounting 
estimate can be considered accurate w ith certainty, the  auditor recognizes that a difference 
between an estimated amount best supported by the audit evidence and the estimated amount 
included in the financial statements may be reasonable, and such difference would not be 
considered to be a likely misstatement. However, if the auditor believes the estimated amount 
included in the financial statements is unreasonable, he should treat the difference between that 
estimate and the closest reasonable estimate as a likely misstatement and aggregate it w ith  other 
likely misstatements. The auditor should also consider whether the difference between estimates 
best supported by the audit evidence and the estimates included in the financial statements, which 
are individually reasonable, indicate possible bias on the part of the entity 's management. For 
example, if each accounting estimate included in the financial statements was individually 
reasonable, but the effect of the difference between each estimate and the estimate best 
supported by the audit evidence was to increase income, the auditor should reconsider the 
estimates taken as a whole.
3 7. In prior periods, likely misstatements may not have been corrected by the entity because 
they did not cause the financial statements for those periods to be materially misstated. Those 
misstatements might also affect the current period's financial statements.15 If the auditor believes 
that there is an unacceptably high risk that the current period's financial statements may be 
materially misstated when those prior-period likely misstatements that affect the current period's 
financial statements are considered along w ith likely misstatements arising in the current period, 
h e  should include in aggregate likely misstatement the effect on the current  period's financial 
statements of those prior-period likely misstatements. 
based on his accumulation o f sufficient evidential m atte r tha t 
ents causes the financial statements to be materially misstated, 
to eliminate the material misstatement. If the material 
misstatement is not eliminated he should issue a qualified or a d v e rs e  opinion on the financial 
statements. Material misstatements may be eliminated by, for example, application of appropriate 
accounting principles, other adjustments in amounts, or the addition of appropriate disclosure of 
inadequately disclosed matters. Even though the aggregate effect of likely misstatements on the 
financial statements may be immaterial, the auditor should recognize that an accumulation of 
immaterial misstatements in the balance sheet could c o n tribute to material misstatements of future 
If the auditor concludes 
the aggregation of likely misstate 
' h e  should request management 
m is s t a t e m e n t  is not e lim ina ted
financial statements.
39. If the auditor concludes that the aggregation 
financial statements to be materially misstated 
due t o  further misstatemnt
misstatement increases, the risk that the financial statements may be materially misstated also 
increases. A u d ito rs  g enerally reduce this risfc of material misstatement in planning the audit by 
restricting the extent of detection risk they are willing to accept for an assertion related to an
account balance or  class of transactions. Auditoi<£>-t5an also reduce this risk of material 
misstatement by modifying the nature, timing,an d  e x te nt of planned auditing procedures 
c o n t inuous basis in performing the audit. (See paragraph 2 6  33.) Nevertheless, if the auditor 
believes that such risk  is unacceptably high, he should perform additional auditing procedures
15 The measurement of the effect, if any, on the current period's financial statements of misstatements 
uncorrected in prior periods involves accounting considerations and is therefore not addressed in this Statement.
ation of likely misstatements does not cause the 
he should recognize that they could still be 
ent remaining undetected. As aggregate likely
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that thesatisfy himself that the entity has adjusted the financial statements to  reduce the risk of  material
40. In aggregating known and likely misstatements that the e n t i t y  h a s  n o t  c o r r e c te d  p u r s u a n t  t o  
misstatement to an acceptable level.
paragraphs 34 and 35, the auditor may designate an amount below which misstatements need not 
be accumulated. This amount would be set so that any such misstatements, either individually 
when aggregated w ith  other s u c h  misstatements. would not be material to  the financial 
statements, after giving consideration to  the possibility o f further undetected misstatements
EFFECTIVE DATE
41. This Statement is effective for audits of financial statements for periods beginning after 
June 30, 1984. The amendments are effective for audits of financial statements for periods 
ending on or after December 15, 1997.
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August 12, 1996
Jane M. Mancino,Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards, AICPA 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
The Auditor of Public Accounts is pleased to respond to the AICPA Exposure Draft on Consideration o f  
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. Our office supports the changes contained in the exposure draft.
We agree with the need for a separate standard highlighting the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud 
and providing operational guidance. A separate standard will further clarify the auditor’s responsibilities with 
respect to fraud. Auditors need guidance on the concept of “reasonable assurance” and the procedures used to 
obtain that assurance. Also, risk factors for fraud and errors often differ, and are best addressed in separate 
documents.
We believe that the new standard on fraud should encompass both fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. It should also contain both the categories of risk factors and the specific risk factors. 
This will provide expanded operational guidance to assist auditors with satisfying their fraud detection 
responsibilities.
We believe the auditor should be required to specifically assess the risk of material misstatement of the 
financial statements due to fraud. This will ensure that risk is appropriately addressed in the audit and that the 
audit procedures are designed to reflect that level of risk. However, the standard should make it clear that the 
auditor may combine his risk assessment with the assessment of risk due to material errors.
There are several standards addressing the need to assess risk on audits. It would be beneficial if a 
technical practice aid could be developed discussing the various types of risks and how they interrelate.
If you have any questions about our response, please contact Pam Ward or myself at (804) 225-3350.
WJK/dad
V. L. AULD & ASSOCIATES
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
112 FOUNTAIN BEND DRIVE - P.O. BOX 30407
LAFAYETTE, LOUISIANA 70593
V. L. Auld, C.P.A.
Van L. Auld, C.P.A.
Telephone (318) 984-9717 
Fax (318) 984-5544
August 8, 1996
Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
RE: Comments to the Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards,
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
Comments follow the respective paragraph numbers in the exposure draft.
4 -18. This is an excellent discussion defining fraud for the auditor, especially paragraphs 15
through 18. They enumerate the risk factors in a clear and precise style. This style should 
be used more often. Nevertheless, many sentences are swollen with difficulty. For 
example, paragraph 10, the second sentence:
Because of (a) the concealment aspects of fraudulent activity, and including the fact 
that fraud often involves collusion or falsified documentation, and (b) the need to apply 
professional judgment in the identification and evaluation of the fraud risk factors and 
other conditions, even a properly planned and performed audit may not detect a 
material misstatement resulting from fraud.
This paragraph has a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level of 30. It is fifty-eight words long and 
consists of one sentence.
23. First sentence, the use of proactive. What does "proactive" mean? It joins "pro"
meaning "favoring or supporting" and "active" meaning "characterized by action rather than 
by contemplation." Therefore, the Board supports action without contemplation?
One definition is: relating to, caused by, or being interference between previous learning 
and the recall or performance of later learning. This sounds lack a technical term, probably 
for the psychiatrist.
Proactive, as used, is a trendy word meaning the futurity of action. Only recently has it 
appeared in the dictionary, Webster's Tenth Collegiate, but is not in the Ninth or Webster's 
Unabridged (1994). However, when you use "proactive" you sound hip. It's cool. It is 
inside the belt-way talk.
MEMBER AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
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The sentence means the same with plain old active. In fact, the phase "that includes 
proactive steps" can be deleted altogether. After all, "planning" implies future action.
We cannot converse without imposing an assumed structure suggested by the formalities 
of our language. This has greater importance when writing regulations. Therefore, it is 
best to stay with simple and standard language.
25. Last sentence, as written:
The auditor also may conclude that is not practicable to modify the procedures that 
are planned for the audit of the financial statements sufficiently to address the risk, in 
which case withdrawal from the engagement with communication to the appropriate 
parties may be an appropriate course of action.
This paragraph has a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level of 24. It is forty-eight words long and 
consists of one sentence.
Re-written:
Also, the auditor may conclude it impracticable to modify the procedures planned to 
meet the risk. Therefore, withdrawal from the engagement including informing the 
appropriate parties may be a proper act.
This paragraph has a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level of 13. It is thirty-one words long and 
consists of two sentences.
26. Under heading, Accounting Principles and Policies. First sentence. Another heavy weight 
sentence.
The auditor may conclude that there is a risk of fraudulent financial reporting that 
requires the auditor to consider further management's selection and application of 
significant accounting policies, particularly those related to revenue recognition, asset 
valuation, or capitalizing versus expensing.
This paragraph has a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level of 27. It is forty words long and consists 
of one sentence.
27. The words nature and extent.
For nature, use the less ambiguous quality. Nature has different meanings; it is a good 
word. Nevertheless, it is the quality of corroborative information that is important.
For extent, use size or amount. Extent is neither plain nor simple.
Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
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28. Item number seven. As written:
When (the auditor1)(intends1 2) to use the work and reports of other independent 
auditors who are auditing (the financial statements3)(of one or more subsidiaries, 
divisions, or branches4)(included in the financial statements presented5), consider 
discussing with the other auditors the extent of work necessary to be performed to 
ensure that the risk of material misstatement due to fraud (resulting from transactions 
and activities6) among these components is adequately addressed.
• i
This paragraph has a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level of 35 (note, 19 years of postgraduate 
study). It is 70 words long and consists of one sentence.
Re-written:
When using the work and reports of other independent auditors who are auditing 
components included in the financial statements, consider discussing the amount of 
work to be done with the other auditors to ensure the risk of material misstatement 
due to fraud is considered.
This paragraph has a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level of 23. It is forty-four words long and 
consists of one sentence. It still needs work but is an improvement.
29. Item, Revenue Recognition. First sentence. Awkward and long.
33. Divide into paragraphs and the form of the last sentence can be improved.
36. The ideas presented limit the auditor to documenting negative acts. Is this always the 
case?
1At this point, it is understood who is taking action. Besides, the word auditor is being worked 
to death.
2Why be wishy-washy? Why is intention important? If you rely on other auditors, than consider 
their work. Let's be positive about it.
3Would you be asking questions (of other auditors) if the financial statements are not included 
and presented? It is understood inquires of other auditors are related to the financial statements 
presented.
4 "one or more subsidiaries, divisions, or branches" is unnecessary. It only adds more words, 
and besides components is later used in the sentence.
Understood. Would asking another independent auditor questions about fraud in financial 
statements "not" presented make sense?
6Excess verbiage.
Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
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RE: Appendix A, Comments to the Proposed Amendment to SAS No. 1.
"Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor"
2. As written:
The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable 
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, 
whether caused by error or fraud. Because of the nature of audit evidence and the 
characteristics of fraud, the auditor is able to obtain reasonable, but not absolute, 
assurance that material misstatements are detected. The auditor has no responsibility 
to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that errors or fraud that 
are not material to the financial statements are detected.
This paragraph has a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level of 18. It is 88 words long and consists 
of three sentences.
Re-written:
The auditor must plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance the 
financial statements are free of material misstatement by error or fraud. Because of 
the characteristics of audit evidence and fraud, the auditor is limited to obtaining 
reasonable, but not absolute, assurance material misstatements are detected. The 
auditor has no responsibility to plan and perform the audit to detect immaterial items.
This paragraph has a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level of 16. It is 63 words long and consists 
of three sentences.
It is better to be concrete about what is to be done than vague, therefore, the auditor "must 
plan and perform" rather than, the indirect, "has a responsibility to plan and perform."
RE: Appendix B, Comments to the Proposed Amendment to SAS No. 1.
"Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work"
2. First sentence. Adding "or her4' is unnecessarily wordy. If the Board is obsessed with
sexist words, then try "their4' instead of "his or her." However, change auditor to auditors to 
avoid incorrect grammar.
9. First sentence, try "or dishonest" instead of "nor assumes unquestioned honesty." This
avoids the euphemistic "unquestioned honesty" and gets directly to the point.
11. First sentence. The adding "or her." Similar to no. 2. but "him or her with" can be 
discarded without changing meaning.
July 31,1996
Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Services, File 2690
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
The Committee on Auditing Services of the Illinois CPA Society ("Committee") is pleased to 
have the opportunity to comment on the exposure draft of the Proposed Statement on 
Auditing Standards, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit ("Exposure Draft") 
of the AICPA Auditing Standards Board ("ASB"). The organization and operating procedures 
of the Committee is described in the appendix to this letter. These recommendations and 
comments represent the position of the Illinois CPA Society rather than any of the Committee 
and of the organizations with which they are associated.
The Committee supports the issuance of the statement ("SAS"), however, we do have some 
suggestions for revision that we hope you will consider seriously before issuance of the final 
statement Our com m ents and suggestions are presented in two categories. Comments 
relating to the overall exposure draft and comments relating to specific paragraphs in the 
exposure draft These comments are as follows:
OVERALL COM M ENTS
Management's Responsibility
The document discusses at great length the responsibilities of the auditor and the factors the 
auditor should consider, assess, and document Only in footnote 9 to paragraph 24 does the 
document even mention management acknowledging their responsibility for detection and 
prevention of fraud. By including appropriate wording within the new SAS as to 
management's responsibility for deterring and detecting fraud, it would better place the 
auditor's role in perspective. Without a discussion of management's responsibility, the 
profession is assuming the sole responsibility for the detection of fraud - a role it cannot 
realistically fill on a  consistent basis. This would ultimately increase our risk of litigation. We 
believe it is very important for the document to include Some discussion of management's 
responsibility for the financial statements and to design, implement and monitor an internal 
control structure that provides some level of assurance that fraud is detected.
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In addition, w e recommend that the Board specifically describe the importance of obtaining 
representation from management regarding the absence of fraud. A s a  minor point, the 
exposure draft specifically amends several other auditing standards in conjunction with this 
standard, however, it does not amend SAS 19. We recommend that the Board also change the 
word "irregularities" to "fraud" in SAS 19 as part of this proposed standard.
Increased Responsibility
Although the exposure draft indicates that its  primary changes are to increase the 
documentation requirements of existing standards, there are in fact m an y other changes that 
far exceed m ere documentation, as described in the specific examples elsewhere in our 
response.
Small Business Clients
The exposure draft makes very little reference to small business clients and, in fact, paragraph 
21 states "In the case of a  small entity, some or all of these considerations m ight be inapplicable 
or less important". If these are all inapplicable, how does an auditor document his/her 
assessment of risk of fraud as required in paragraph 36? Furthermore, one could argue that 
many of the characteristics in paragraph 16.a would apply to a small entity. For example:
• Many small businesses do not communicate the entity's values or ethics to its employees.
• Many sm all businesses are dominated by a single person without an  effective Board of 
Directors.
• Many small businesses have inadequate monitoring of significant controls.
• Many small businesses do not correct known reportable conditions because they don't 
have the personnel and they accept this risk.
• Many entrepreneurs of small businesses set aggressive targets.
• Many sm all businesses do not have a high opinion of regulatory authorities, such as the 
IRS.
• Many sm all businesses have ineffective accounting staffs.
Given all the above factors that would be answered negatively, we recom mend that some 
examples useful for small business be included.
Audit Risk
This exposure draft requires the auditor to assess the risk of fraud, yet how does this 
assessment relate to the overall audit risk model? Is the fraud assessment outside of the audit 
risk model or is it part of the risk model? If it is part of the model, w hich assertions will be 
affected? Can the assessment of the risk of fraud be applied to every assertion?
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For example, how do you apply the completeness assertion to the assessment of fraud- 
especially with respect to electronics transfer of data and more elaborate methods of 
committing fraud that have not been used in the past
SPECIFIC PARAGRAPH RESPONSES
Paragraph 1 7 —The risk factors relating to employee relationships or pressures appear to be 
beyond the skills of the auditor. We are concerned with the auditability of these areas. 
Further, is an auditor qualified to evaluate changes in a  given employee's behavior? We 
recommend that this specific section of the paragraph be deleted or, a t  a  minimum,  revised. 
The following describes our reasons for this conclusion.
• W hat type of behavioral changes would this encompass? How would an auditor observe 
such changes in employees of an audit client that he/she is physically a t for only 1-2 
weeks per year?
• How would an auditor know or observe personal financial pressures on employees? It 
seems highly unlikely that in most cases the auditor would know or observe these types 
of behavioral characteristics.
• The Exposure Draft uses words such as "known" and "observable". If the auditor doesn't 
know, or hasn't observed these particular characteristics, is he required to obtain such 
knowledge or perform procedures to observe such behavior? In m ost auditing 
standards, if the auditor does not have the knowledge of a required procedure, then he 
designs his tests to obtain such knowledge. It appears that this standard requires us to 
perform procedures to search for "observable" characteristics regarding employees.
Paragraph 2 6 —As described in AU Section 210, the personnel should be assigned to the 
engagement based on all the factors and risks identified. We believe that it is implied in this 
section of the auditing standards that given all engagement risks, including the risk of fraud, 
that appropriate personnel should be assigned. Therefore, we recommend that it is not 
necessary to describe this requirement again in this section and that it is more appropriately 
described in AU Section 210.
Paragraph 33 requires the auditor to consider whether every misstatement, even those not 
material, may be indicative of fraud. Again, for many small businesses, the auditors may 
propose many adjustments during the course of the audit It is not uncom m on on a small 
business engagement to make 20 to 30 audit adjusting entries. This paragraph appears to 
require the auditor to evaluate each and every adjusting entry as to whether it w as caused by 
fraud. We believe this places an undo burden on the auditor and recommend that the wording 
be modified or deleted.
Paragraph 36 requires the auditor to document the performance of his assessment of the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud. The paragraph further requires the auditor to document 
"how" fraud risk factors (which we assume are the risk factors described in paragraphs 16 to 
18) were considered. W e believe if the standard is requiring the auditor to docum ent "how"
3.
Ms. Jane M. Mancino 
July 31,1996  
Page 4
h e/ she performed this evaluation, then the standard should also provide examples of w hat is 
meant by "how". To further illustrate this point, a small business client could answer yes to 
many of the risk factors in paragraph 16a, as previously discussed. Given these yes answers, 
what does the auditor document?
Further, as described in paragraph 21, some or all of these risk factors might be inapplicable or  
less important to a  sm all business entity. Given that the risk factors are inapplicable "how", do  
you document the assessment of fraud? We recommend the following:
• Examples of how the auditor should document this assessment in both a  small and large 
business situation.
• Develop example risk factors for small business entities.
• The risk factors in paragraphs 16 to 18 should be described as examples that "may be" 
considered and that "other risk factors m ay be more appropriate in the circumstances".
• The risk factors should be described in an appendix rather than in the actual standard. 
Other Comments and Suggestions
The exposure draft refers to reasonable assurance throughout the docum ent Appendix B, 
which amends AU sec. 230, attempts to define reasonable assurance in paragraphs 10 -1 3 . The 
explanation included in the exposure draft describes the type of audit evidence obtained, that 
absolute assurance is not attainable and uses the words reasonable and reasonableness to 
define what reasonable assurance is. We recommend that this section be clarified to provide a  
clear definition of w hat reasonable assurance is.
Due to the nature of this document, we suggest that an audit guide be developed which could  
assist in implementing this proposed standard into practice. The audit guide should contain 
examples and illustrations for small, large, and public companies.
The exposure draft contains many references and examples for lawyers to use against 
accountants in a  court of law. Has this document been reviewed with legal counsel to  
determine how m uch it increases our risk as auditors?
Paragraph 7 of the m ain document and Paragraph 12 of Appendix B —In regard to the phrase 
"auditing standard rarely involves authentication of documentation", we recommend changing 
the word "rarely" to "does not".
Paragraph 35—We recommend the paragraph begin with the word "If' and in regard to the 
phrase "audit tests m ay indicate such a significant risk of fraud", we recommend the w ord  
"may" be deleted.
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Appendix C-We recommend an example be added to demonstrate the auditor's assessment for 
the risk of fraud.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Exposure D raft Should you have any 
questions regarding any of the above comments, please contact me at (630) 954-1400.
Very truly yours,
Sharon J. Gregor
Chair Auditing Services Committee, Illinois CPA Society
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APPENDIX A
ILLINOIS CPA SOCIETY 
AUDITING SERVICES COMMITTEE 
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATING PROCEDURES
1996 - 1997
The Auditing Services Committee of the Illinois CPA Society (the 
Committee) is composed of 18 technically qualified, experienced 
members appointed from industry, education and public accounting. 
These members have Committee service ranging from newly appointed 
to 15 years. The Committee is a senior technical committee of the 
Society and has been delegated the authority to issue written 
positions representing the Society on matters regarding the setting 
of auditing standards.
The Committee usually operates by assigning a subcommittee of its 
members to study and discuss fully exposure documents proposing 
additions to or revisions of auditing standards. The subcommittee 
ordinarily develops a proposed response which is considered, 
discussed and voted on by the full Committee. Support by the full 
Committee then results in the issuance of a formal response, which 
at times, includes a minority viewpoint.
T DePaul niveriy
Curtis C. Verachoor 
Ledger and Quil AlumniAugust 14, 1996 Research Professor
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Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Atest Standards, File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775 By fax 212 596-6213
Dear Ms. Mancino:
I appreciate the opportunity of commenting on the fraud exposure draft. I am aware through 
personal observation of the significant amount of dedicated efort which has gone into its 
preparation. To deal with the widespread perception that SAS No. 53 is broken and needs repair. 
If accompanied by a wel-writen audit guide, the new SAS wil benefit the profession by requiring 
more in-depth consideration by auditors of a broader spectrum of relevant factors.
However, it does not go far enough to cure the problems atendant to the expectation gap which 
SAS No. 53 was designed to solve, but which so far it has been unsuccessful in doing. Two 
factors merit additional consideration: the level of assurance provided by an audit in accordance 
with generaly accepted auditing standards and the clear communication of that assurance to 
investors and the general public.
Auditor provision of assurance which is only “reasonable" is insuficient for the needs of users of 
financial statements. It does not coincide with users or the public's expectations of what is being 
already provided, and does not represent a fair characterization of what auditors can, and in my 
opinion, should provide. "Reasonable" is a concept connoting average or moderate performance. 
As a profession, CPAs should strive for, and achieve, more than just average performance. This is 
not to say that auditors can or should provide absolute assurance. However, the gap between 
average and absolute is just too wide. Users have a right to expect more than just an average 
result from an audit. Clients have a right to expect more than just an average result, considering 
the effort auditors already put forth and the fees they pay. Use of the term "high assurance" rather 
than "reasonable assurance" would go a long way toward clarifying what auditors should set out 
to accomplish and what clients and the public should have a right to expect. It seems to this 
commentator that the courts have already assigned a higher performance standard to auditors than 
just reasonable or moderate, so no additional litigation costs should ensue from this change.
Communication of the auditors' responsibility to determine "whether the financial statements are 
free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud" as stated in SAS No. 1 would be
AICPA Page 2
meaningful clarification to clients, investors, and the general public. This is not a n  issue involving 
litigation risk, only clarification of practice as it already exist. It would also solidify the auditor's 
mission in the minds o f the profession. It seems incongruous that the portion o f  the standard audit 
report describing what an auditor does is not consistent with the language o f SAS No. 1 AV 110 
which states what an independent auditor's responsibility is.
The following comments about specific paragraphs is set forth for your consideration:
1. para 16a — The risk to auditors is not only from management’s failure to communicate and 
support the entity's values or ethics. A very large risk arises when management very effectively 
communicates the wrong ethical values.
2. para 16a ~  should add a risk factor dealing with understaffing or incompetency o f financial 
staff or management.
3. para 16a, 5th bullet and elsewhere -  the word "unrealistic" is used when "unattainable" is more 
accurate. While forecasts may truly be unrealistic, the risk to the auditor arises because they may 
not be attainable except through fraudulent means.
Yours very truly,
Curtis C. Verschoor
Ledger & Quill Alumni Research Professor
Wiliam L Eubank, Jr., CPA 
J. Frank Beers, CPA 
J. Thomas Vickers, CPA 
Stephen C, Hirn, CPA
ban  ett
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Ms. Jane M. Mancino 
Technical Manager 
Audit and Atest Standards 
File 2690
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
The proposed SAS, “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit," seems to 
be merely a restatement of responsibilities which have long been taught and adhered 
to by many professionals. Fraud is, in the overal sense, just another way the financial 
statements can be misstated. Audits have long been performed to obtain reasonable 
assurance that any material misstatement (including fraud) would be detected through 
the designed audit procedures for a particular engagement.
One of the items contained In the proposed SAS is a laundry list of things to look for 
that might cause the auditor to modify testing (i.e., the risk factors). The accounting 
profession is already subject to many lawsuits which atempt to link the victim's (e.g., 
the company, the investors, the banks, etc.) expectations to what is required by 
professional standards. Many of the items listed in paragraphs 15-24 are curently 
being used in legal circles to mandate steps the auditor should have taken to detect 
erors (including fraud) in the financial statements. However, many of these risk factors 
are pervasive in many smal to medium sized businesses, not because these 
businesses are fraught with fraudulent practices, but because smaler companies have 
more limited resources.
Paragraph 21 states that “The size, complexity and ownership characteristics of the 
entity have a significant influence on the identification of relevant risk factors..in the 
case of a smal entity, some or al of these considerations might be inapplicable or less 
important.* Although this appears to be a caveat for excluding smal businesses from 
these risk factors, its efect wil be to make the auditor justify why each item listed in the 
risk factors is not relevant to the business environment being audited.
Susan R. Walker, C.P.A. 
Eubank & Bets, PLLC 
Jackson, Mississippi
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August 1 4 , 1996
Jane Mancino, Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
RE: Exposure Draft on “Consideration o f Fraud in a  Financial Statement Audit”
After reading and studying the new exposure draft on the “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit” and discussing this with others in the profession. I am not convinced this will solve the 
problem that we as practicing accountants are facing with respect to government and public expectations. 
I think it would be safe to say that the public has about a 90% expectation that they expect CPAs to find 
any type o f  fraud when conducting an audited financial statement. However, our actual success rate is 
somewhere in the 5% area when you look at the two fraud surveys done by Peat Marwick in 1993 and . 
1994. The 90% public expectation is taken from a survey of jurors that was published in the Accounting 
Today magazine in May of 1995. These surveys were conducted well after the expectation gap standards 
that were issued in April of 1988 numbers 52 to 61. It is quite apparent these expectation gap standards 
did not reduce the “expectation gap” between the public and accounting profession from 1989 to 1994. 
The current exposure draft that is to replace SAS 53, is in my opinion, nothing more than a scaled up 
version of the old standard that does not address the underlying problem of why we as external auditors 
do not discover fraud.
There are three issues why I believe fraud is not being discovered by the external auditors. And they are 
as follows:
*Lack of Training
*Inexperience of Personnel Working the Engagement 
*Fees
Let me address each of these issues and then give you my opinion of what should be considered.
With regards to training, I think you could ask just about any practicing CPA whether or not they have 
ever had a class or training session In fraud auditing and over 90% will say they have not. This is of 
particular concern in our college curriculum where there is virtually nothing offered in this area. And 
when you consider that most of the larger firms send out their most inexperience individuals to perform 
most of the field work this becomes an important issue.
Concerning the inexperience of personnel working the engagements, part of my point is covered in the 
above paragraph. Until we address the issue of inexperience in who is working on the engagement the 
chances of discovering fraud with be minimal. Most CPAs, including myself when I first got into the 
profession, would not have recognized a fraud situation had we tripped over it. We simply do not have 
the experience or the training in this area. People with 3 to 4 years of auditing experience performing the 
field work alone is not sufficient, and yes, even with partner supervision, if  it is missed at the field work 
level, it will be missed at the manager or partner level, I can tell you this from experience.
The final problem is in the area of fees. As most of us know in the profession, audit fees have been 
extremely competitive over the past years. And while I consider our firm to be a quality firm, we have to 
compete with a number of firms who are not as concerned about quality. We could wait until they are all
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sued and perhaps forced out of business, but this is not a realistic option, and I am less convinced that 
peer review will solve the problem. Until accounting firms can get paid for what they are  required to do, 
firm s w ill continue to look for shortcuts to reduce the work-in-process. And this includes using lower 
level staff with lower billing rates, spending less time performing audit procedures, and perhaps not 
spending the time or resources to properly train their employees.
Well, since I  have indicated what the problems are, it would only be fair that I provide some sort of 
solution.
It is my understanding that when the profession first started performing audits at the turn o f the century,  
the primary purpose of the audit was io discover fraud. I have never read this, but have heard this from 
several sources. I think it would be important to research why the change took place. If  we started out as 
fraud auditors, and then went to financial statement auditors, and now we are suppose to be fraud and 
financial statement auditors, we need to know why and when this change took place. The public needs to 
be aware, as well as the profession itself if  they want fraud auditing they must be willing to pay for i t
As far as the concerns that were previously mentioned, it is my belief there should be a separate opinion 
issued on the financial statements regarding material misstatement caused by a GAAP problem, and a 
separate opinion on the financial statements providing reasonable assurance that a material error does not 
exist due to fraud. I could see where the opinion given on the financial statements regarding compliance 
with GAAP could be accompanied by a negative assurance statement on fraud, but not a  positive 
assurance statement. The auditors opinion regarding positive assurance on the financial statement being 
free from material misstatement due to fraud would be a separate engagement, and could only be provided 
if  a GAAP audit was done first. By splitting the financial statement audit and the fraud audit separate, we 
could address the three problems I mentioned earlier regarding, training, experience and foes. By having 
separate engagements we can assign people that are trained in the area of fraud working the engagement.
  The experience side would be handled by having a separate certification in this area such as the CFB 
certificate or a newly created certificate such as the AICPA has for personal financial planning with an 
experience requirement attached to the certificate. This would be required before a firm could issue a 
report providing an opinion with respect to fraud. By splitting the engagement it would allow accounting 
firms to charge a separate fee for tlus service and allow the individual company to determine if they want 
to pay for the service, I would expect most publicly held companies would want both engagements, but 
privately held companies could decide for themselves.
Y ou would be am azed, but then again perhaps not, how many practitioners today do not know their 
current obligations with respect to discovering fraud and the level of assurance they provide each time 
they issue an audited financial statement. In the surveys I have done of groups when giving presentations, 
most o f them do not know. If the professions is serious about trying to address the issue of reducing the 
expectation gap between the public and the profession, the outline I have given above, or something 
similar to it, appears to be a reasonable option. The current exposure draft will not reduce the gap 
because it is nothing more then added documentation requirements of current existing standards, and it is 
obvious the current standards are not working, it would seem this standard is doomed to fail before it gets 
out of th e starting block. I believe the intent of this new standard is to add many more procedures in the 
area of fraud auditing, but the reality' of it is, many companies will be assign a low fraud risk because the 
profession will not get paid for doing anything else, plus they will not have the experience or training to 
do anything else. I am acquainted will several individuals who work in the area of providing support to 
malpractice attorneys when it comes to lawsuits against accounting firms. They are smiling form ear to 
ear on this new exposure draft because they have been given a new weapon to help zero in on practicing 
CPA’s on malpractice claims. While their are som e that should be zeroed in on, their will be many 
innocents ones hurt in the process. My concern is, why give malpractice attorneys anymore ammunition, 
lets give them less, and at the same time improve our own performance by separating financial statement 
auditing and fraud auditing.
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I apologize for this not being the most well written, but I was under time constraints to get this off to the 
appropriate destination. I hope you will give these comments consideration during your upcoming 
meetings.
Best Regards,  
Bruce Richter CPA, CMA, CIA, CFE
P.O. Box 1937
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Audit and Attest Standards
File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Exposure Draft of a Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards: Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit, and Amendments to Statements on Auditing Standards No. 1, 
Codification o f Auditing Standards and Procedures, and No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in 
Conducting an Audit
Dear Ms. Mancino:
I commend the efforts of the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) and its Fraud Task Force in their goals of 
narrowing the “expectation gap" with regards to the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud, and enhancing 
the auditor's ability to actually detect fraud.
Many CPA’s I have spoken with would prefer not to be held accountable for detecting fraud in any level of 
attestation services due to a belief that the characteristics of fraud make it particularly difficult to uncover 
unless a “fraud audit” is specifically undertaken. In fact, studies I have read do indicate that fraud is seldom 
discovered by an entity’s outside auditors. At a recent Fraud Conference sponsored by the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, Joseph Wells, President of the Association, in his opening remarks on a 
session devoted to uncovering fraud through analysis of financial statements, apologized to the group for 
giving the impression that fraud can be discovered through such analysis. He indicated that, in his long 
experience, fraud is almost never discovered by this process.
Until issuance of this exposure draft, I believe that most CPA’s who were concerned about fraud relied on 
analytical procedures to provide themselves with comfort concerning the possible existence of material 
misstatements caused by fraud. Therefore, the inclusion of a requirement to assess the existence of 
specific risk factors, and examples of those risk factors, are significant additions to the current authoritative 
literature.
Those who would choose to minimize the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud run the risk of further 
reducing the public’s perception of the relevance of the auditor’s opinion resulting from the performance of 
an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing procedures (GAAS). Therefore, in. my opinion, we 
cannot continue to “duck” this issue, but rather attempt to provide reasonable assurance that material fraud 
will be discovered in our audits. The key is, given the difficulty of detecting many types of fraud, 
communicating to users of financial statements what "reasonable assurance" actually means.
I applaud the amendment of Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1, specifically the wording in 
proposed paragraphs Nos. 10, 12 and 13. This makes it clear that the auditor is not a “guarantor" - that 
material misstatement due to fraud might exist, and yet might not be discovered by the auditor. This is an 
appropriate attempt to reduce expectations to a level more consistent with the auditor’s actual ability to 
detect fraud in a financial statement audit.
I do, however, have certain significant concerns about the proposed new SAS. The most serious concern 
relates to the complete absence of the acknowledgment that management, through its attitude towards 
prevention of fraud, including its implementation and monitoring of controls, is the primary deterrent to 
material misstatement resulting from fraud. This responsibility should be spelled out in any new standard in
1
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such a way that the CPA does not bear sole responsibility when fraud is not detected in the course of the 
audit. In addition, the auditor’s standard opinion should emphasize both management’s responsibility for 
detecting fraud, and the fact that GAAS can only provide reasonable assurance that material fraud will be 
detected. While the standard auditor’s report does refer to the reasonable assurance concept, the public’s 
focus on fraud, and the resulting attention given fraud by the profession warrant specific language in the 
auditor’s report about the level of assurance contemplated by the auditor’s procedures as they relate to 
fraud.
One of the direct benefits of emphasizing management’s role in preventing and detecting fraud is likely to   
be the ability of the CPA to make clients aware that deficiencies resulting from management’s efforts or 
attitude will affect the cost of the audit. The proposed standard does not communicate to the client any 
direct relationship between management's efforts and the extent (read: cost) of the auditor’s procedures in 
this area. SAS No. 55 is a good example of the profession’s attempt to involve management in the process 
of reducing the cost of the audit. The summary preceding the proposed SAS refers to guidance on 
engagement letters to be provided at a later time. The inclusion within the proposed SAS of examples of 
engagement letters which alert clients to their responsibility would be beneficial.
The proposed standard does not provide guidance regarding to whom to communicate a finding, or 
suspicion, of fraud when the auditor believes that the owner of a small business with no truly independent 
Board of Directors or any audit committee is involved in the fraud. This situation is not uncommon when 
fraudulent financial reporting is the problem in small clients. When the auditor believes the owner is 
involved in the fraud, withdrawal from the engagement may be seen as the only appropriate action, but this 
may expose the auditor to legal liability if there was fraud and the owner was not involved, or if third parties 
are harmed by the fraud even if an auditor’s report was not issued. Some form of guidance should be 
provided in this standard.
Paragraph No. 33, concerning the evaluation of audit test results, appears to require the auditor to consider 
whether any misstatement discovered in the course of the audit may be indicative of possible fraud. In 
smaller clients, the audit process often results in the identification of accounting errors, and those errors are 
often numerous and, in many cases, immaterial. If each of these errors requires that the auditor consider 
that the error is indicative of fraud, and that such consideration and the resulting determination must be 
documented in the auditor’s workpapers, the cost of such audits will likely be increased beyond the benefits 
gained from such procedures. I believe that the first sentence of this paragraph should refer to material 
misstatements, as well as considering immaterial misstatements in the aggregate as to whether any trend 
in the misstatements appears to indicate that fraud may be involved.
I do question the ASB’s decision to include the guidance in the proposed SAS as a new SAS. I don’t 
believe that the guidance breaks new ground in this area, but rather it provides a significant enhancement 
in the information available to auditors in applying the standards of SAS No. 53. I think it would be 
preferable to put the guidance in a new Audit Guide. This might prevent the appearance that our prior 
standards were insufficient and that new standards were required. I would rather the profession portray 
itself as merely providing continuing guidance in this important area. This would also make it easier for the 
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APPENDIX A
Michael Pierce is the Managing Partner of Berger, Goldstein & Company, one of Chicago’s top 25 
accounting firms (Crain’s Chicago Business, 1996 rankings). He has served as Partner-in-Charge of his 
Firm’s Audit and Accounting Department, and its Quality Control Department. He is currently a member of 
the Board of Directors of the Illinois CPA Society, and was formerly the Chair of the Society’s Auditing 
Services Committee and its Illinois Accounting and Assurance Services Network Steering Sub-committee. 
The comments included in this response are not meant to represent the views of the Illinois CPA Society or 


















Audit and Attest Standards, File 2390
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit
Dear Ms Mancino:
Please find enclosed a comment letter on the above referenced exposure 
draft.
This comment letter is written by the Washington Society of Certified 
Public Accountants Accounting, Auditing and Review Standards 
Committee. The opinions expressed in this letter do not represent the 
entire constituency of the Society’s members but do represent a consensus 
of the Committee’s twenty members.
We have performed a critical review of the above referenced exposure 
draft in preparation of this comment letter. We would like to point out 
that a comment period of 107 days may seem long, however with delays 
in receipt of the documents and our monthly meeting schedule this 
becomes a relatively short period for analysis. We understand there has 
been criticism of standards taking too long for issuance but we feel 
strongly that a six month comment period should be considered for future 
controversial exposure drafts.
Very truly yours,


















Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit
Dear Ms Mancino:
The Accounting, Auditing and Review Standards Committee of the 
Washington Society of Certified Public Accountants supports the issuance 
of this exposure draft with the changes discussed in this letter. The 
Committee’s support principally comes from the viewpoint that although 
standards already exist which reuire an auditor to consider the 
occurrence of fraud in a financial statement audit, we believe the 
profession has been inconsistent in its compliance with these standards 
and society’s expectations.
The Committee feels very strongly that in the current day and age the 
practice of public accounting now has two obectives. The first, is to 
perform an audit in compliance with the standards of the profession; the 
second, is to perform and document our audit in a manner that would 
minimie the risk of a negative udgement in a court of law. This 
unfortunate second obective has become more and more important over 
the years. We cannot overemphasie to the standard setting bodies the 
prominence this plays in the practice of public auditing. nly recently 
has federal legislation been passed which begins to solve the udicial  
predicament CPA’s have faced for several years. You must not issue 
standards which contribute towards this problem.
The Committee believes the examples cited in the document should be 
eliminated from the document with the consideration of risk factors left to 
the udgment of the individual auditor. We attended Dan Guy’s 
presentation of the exposure draft at the NAATS recently held in Seattle. 
Mr. Guy stated the examples are ust that and should not add to the 
CPA’s exposure. From Committee members experience in litigation, he is 
mistaken. There are seventy-five 75 such examples or illustrations 
within the document. This leans towards an exhaustive list rather than 
examples. As such, there is no doubt in our minds that opposing counsel 
would utilie such examples to illustrate to a ury the auditor had not 
completed an effective audit. The following are ust a few of the many
examples listed in the exposure draft that would be almost impossible to 
plan for or document in an audit engagement:
ae  arara  a  is Factors elatin to anaement
Caracteristics
A failure  manaement to disla and communicate an a roriate 
attitude reardin internal control and te financial reortin rocess 
Secific indicators mi t include 
An effectie means of communicatin and su ortin te entits 
alues or etics
omination of manaement  a sinle erson or small rou 
itout comensatin controls suc as effectie oersi t  te oard of 
directors or audit committee
anaement settin undul a ressie financial tarets and 
e ectations for oeratin ersonnel
ae  arara    mloee elationsis or ressures
Anticiated future laoffs tat are non to te or force
ae   is Factors elatin to Controls
ac of a roriate manaement oersi t
ac of o a licant screenin rocedures relatin to emloees 
it access to assets suscetile to misa roriation
ac of a roriate sereation of duties or indeendent cecs
ach of these examples use wording that is extremely subective. Words 
such as unduly, effective, and appropriate create field days for opposing 
counsel. There are also problems with words like known. nown to 
who Some of these examples include difficult if not impossible scenarios 
for the auditor to become aware or know.
For these reasons, the detailed examples of risk factors should be 
removed. The document will stand on its own with the responsibilities, 
definitions, and general risks factors such as 15a, b, and c. Detailed 
considerations or procedures should be left to the auditor’s udgment. 
The Board may consider issuing these examples in a nonauthoritative 
document.
astly, we have heard the Board plans a modification of the auditor’s 
report related to this issue. We uestion why that aspect was not 
included within this exposure draft if the Board does plan such a change. 
With the comments noted above and our confusion surrounding the report
issue, we suggest the Board consider a reissuance of a modified exposure
draft.
Very truly yours,
Accounting, Auditing and Review Standards Committee 
Washington Society of Certified Public Accountants
Steven B. Bishop, CPA, Chair
Rick Foster, Auditing Standards Subcommittee Chair
Deloitte & 
Touche llp
& Ten Westport Road P.O. Box 820
Wilton, Connecticut 06897-0820
Telephone: (203) 761-3000 





Audit and Attest Standards
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: File 2690
Dear Ms. Mancino:
We are pleased to comment on the Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, Consideration 
o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit and proposed amendments to Statements on Auditing 
Standards No. 1, Codification of Accounting Standards and Procedures, and No. 47, Audit 
Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit.
We support efforts to improve the performance of the profession with respect to the detection 
of material misstatement of financial statements due to fraud. The proposed Statement and 
amendments appear to be such an effort, but we are skeptical that the proposed Statement and 
amendments will result in improved performance without serious efforts to improve auditors’ 
knowledge, skills, tools and techniques related to fraud and fraud detection. Although we 
believe that the existing auditing standards adequately address the subject of fraud, we are 
willing, with reservation as discussed below, to support the proposed Statement and related 
amendments as part of a broader effort along the lines described on page 11 of the exposure 
draft to improve the performance of the profession in detecting material misstatements of 
financial statements due to fraud. We strongly encourage the AICPA to carry out the efforts 
described on page 11 of the exposure draft to improve the skills and knowledge of auditors in 
detecting fraud.
Although we believe it is appropriate for the auditor to consider risk factors in planning the 
audit and to document such consideration, we object to the list of risk factors in paragraphs 15 
through 18. We fully appreciate the care and effort taken in developing these risk factors and 
recognize that many of them may give the auditor insight, but we do not believe it is 
appropriate to include a list of such detail and length in auditing standards. Many of the risk 
factors are not clear indicators of fraud. They may often have been present when frauds have 
occurred, but may also frequently exist when frauds have not occurred. The list also gives a 
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judgment about the risk of material misstatement to a highly procedural checklist approach. The 
very fact that a list of such detail is included in auditing standards rather than supporting 
guidance will tend to increase the credibility of the risk factors beyond the degree to which they 
are useful indicators of possible fraud and bolster unwarranted second guessing of the auditor’s 
assessment of risk.
We suggest that the list of risk factors be abbreviated along the lines of the examples of risk 
factors at AU 316.10 and that other risk factors, both general and those related to particular 
industries, be included in AICPA Risk Alerts. In this way, auditors would have access to the 
guidance but auditing standards would not be burdened by unnecessary detail, and unwarranted 
second guessing would not be bolstered by standards level guidance. The use of Risk Alerts to 
provide risk factors also has the advantage of flexibility and timeliness. Risk Alerts provide a 
means to remind auditors of risk factors each year and to address new ones or ones specific to 
certain industries.
The attachment to this letter contains other comments for your consideration. Please contact 
John Fogarty at (203) 761-3227 if you wish to discuss our comments.
Sincerely,
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such a way that the CPA does not bear sole responsibility when fraud is not detected in the course of the 
audit In addition, the auditor’s standard opinion should emphasize both management’s responsibility for 
detecting fraud, and the fact that GAAS can only provide reasonable assurance that material fraud will be 
detected. While the standard auditor’s report does refer to the reasonable assurance concept, the public’s 
focus on fraud, and the resulting attention given fraud by the profession warrant specific language in the 
auditor’s report about the level of assurance contemplated by the auditor’s procedures as they relate to 
fraud.
One of the direct benefits of emphasizing management’s role in preventing and detecting fraud is likely to  
be the ability of the CPA to make clients aware that deficiencies resulting from management’s efforts or 
attitude will affect the cost of the audit. The proposed standard does not communicate to the client any 
direct relationship between management’s efforts and the extent (read: cost) of the auditor’s procedures in 
this area. SAS No. 55 is a good example of the profession’s attempt to involve management in the process 
of reducing the cost of the audit. The summary preceding the proposed SAS refers to guidance on 
engagement letters to be provided at a later time. The inclusion within the proposed SAS of examples of 
engagement letters which alert clients to their responsibility would be beneficial.
The proposed standard does not provide guidance regarding to whom to communicate a finding, or 
suspicion, of fraud when the auditor believes that the owner of a small business with no truly independent 
Board of Directors or any audit committee is involved in the fraud. This situation is not uncommon when 
fraudulent financial reporting is the problem in small clients. When the auditor believes the owner is 
involved in the fraud, withdrawal from the engagement may be seen as the only appropriate action, but this 
may expose the auditor to legal liability if there was fraud and the owner was not involved, or if third parties 
are harmed by the fraud even if an auditor’s report was not issued. Some form of guidance should be 
provided in this standard.
Paragraph No. 33, concerning the evaluation of audit test results, appears to require the auditor to consider 
whether any misstatement discovered in the course of the audit may be indicative of possible fraud. In 
smaller clients, the audit process often results in the identification of accounting errors, and those errors are 
often numerous and, in many cases, immaterial. If each of these errors requires that the auditor consider 
that the error is indicative of fraud, and that such consideration and the resulting determination must be 
documented in the auditor’s workpapers, the cost of such audits will likely be increased beyond the benefits 
gained from such procedures. I believe that the first sentence of this paragraph should refer to material 
misstatements, as well as considering immaterial misstatements in the aggregate as to whether any trend 
in the misstatements appears to indicate that fraud may be involved.
I do question the ASB’s decision to include the guidance in the proposed SAS as a new SAS. I don't 
believe that the guidance breaks new ground in this area, but rather it provides a significant enhancement 
in the information available to auditors in applying the standards of SAS No. 53. I think it would be 
preferable to put the guidance in a new Audit Guide. This might prevent the appearance that our prior 
standards were insufficient and that new standards were required. I would rather the profession portray 
itself as merely providing continuing guidance in this important area. This would also make it easier for the 










Paragraphs 11 and 12
The phrase “risk of material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud” is used in 
paragraphs 11 and 12, and then abbreviated to “risk of material misstatement due to fraud” in 
the remainder of the proposed Statement. We recommend that the first occurrence have a 
footnote that defines the phrase or refers to the use of the abbreviated phrase similar to 
footnote 1 to SSAE No. 3, Compliance Attestation, and that the abbreviated phrase be used in 
paragraph 12.
We believe the last sentence of footnote 5 to paragraph 12 should read: “Furthermore, any-the 
assessment of audit risk may identify the presence of other fraud risk factors that the auditor 
should consider.”
Paragraph 13
We believe the first two sentences would be more understandable if they read as follows: “The 
auditor should also obtain the client’s view regarding the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud through inquiry of management. Information obtained from such inquiries may identify 
fraud risk factors that affect the auditor’s assessment and related response.”
Paragraph 18c
Regardless of whether the listing of fraud risk factors appears in the final Statement or in 
AICPA Risk Alerts, it is unclear what is meant by the example risk factor of “accounting 
system in disarray.”
Paragraph 24
We believe the construction of the last sentence of paragraph 24 is awkward and the distinction 
between “cumulative process” in the preceding sentence and “ongoing process” in the last 
sentence is unclear. Accordingly, we propose the following paragraph:
The assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud is a cumulative process 
that includes a consideration of risk factors in combination. Fraud risk factors may come to 
the auditor’s attention while performing procedures relating to acceptance or continuance 
of clients and engagements, during engagement planning or obtaining an understanding of 
an entity’s internal control, or while conducting field work. Conditions may be identified 






Although the phrase “issuing an opinion” in footnote 10 to paragraph 25 is consistent with 
paragraph 9 of SAS No. 47 (AU section 312.09), we believe such phrase should be updated to 
recognize SAS No. 58 and, accordingly, should read as either “expressing an opinion” or 
“issuing a report.”
Paragraph 28
We believe that the reference to SAS No. 73 in the last bullet should be to paragraph 12, 
“Using the Findings of the Specialist,” rather than to paragraph 11, “Relationship of the 
Specialist to the Client.”
Paragraph 32
We recommend that the first sentence be revised to read “ . . . the assessment of the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud is a cumulative process-one-and-one-that-should-be-ongoing 
throughout-the-au d it”
Paragraph 33
We believe that the third sentence of paragraph 33 should be toned down by relating it to the 
effect on the financial statements; for example, “. . . fraud involving misappropriation of cash 
from a small imprest fund normally would be of little significance to the auditor in assessing 
the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements because . . . .” We also 
recommend that a cross-reference to the auditor’s communication responsibilities be added 
because clients will not necessarily perceive such situation as of little significance.
Paragraph 35, footnote 14
We recommend that the reference to paragraph 10 of SAS No. 7 in the last sentence of 
footnote 14 be revised as follows: “Furthermore, as specified in paragraph 10 of SAS No. 7, 
Communications Between Predecessor and Successor Auditors (AICP A, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 315), there-may-be provides guidance concerning communication 
to the predecessor auditor.”
Paragraph 36
We recommend that the first sentence of paragraph 36 be revised as follows: In planning the 
audit, the auditor should document in the working papers evidence of the performance of the 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud (see paragraphs 11-24), including 




considered” [emphasis added] is intended to mean that the auditor should document the 
auditor’s response to those risk factors. Because the very next sentence includes a requirement 
that the documentation include the auditor’s response, we believe that both the duplication and 
the lack of clarity can be eliminated by deleting the phrase “including how fraud risk factors 
were considered.”
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37 implies that there is a responsibility for the auditor to communicate about the 
auditor’s consideration of fraud whether or not the auditor has matters to report. The 
discussion in paragraphs 38 and 39, however, deal only with situations in which there is 
evidence of fraud or where fraud risk factors have been identified. We believe that it was not 
intended for the auditor to communicate when the auditor does not have any reportable 
matters. Furthermore, we do not understand why the first sentence of footnote 15 to the 
heading to paragraphs 37-40 relating to the applicability of the requirements to communicate is 
included and we are concerned that it could be inferred to exclude fraud relating to 
misappropriation of assets and situations in which intent cannot be determined. Accordingly, 
we recommend that paragraph 37 be revised to read as follows and that footnote 15 be 
eliminated:
37. Communications about possible fraud may involve senior management, the audit 
committee16 and, when appropriate, others outside the entity (see paragraph 40). The 
communication may utilize terms other than fraud—for example, irregularity, intentional 
misstatement, misappropriation, defalcation—if there is possible confusion with a legal 
definition of fraud or other reason to prefer alternative terms.
Paragraph 38
We recommend that a cross-reference back to paragraph 33 be added at the end of the second 
sentence of paragraph 38 (see comment above with respect to paragraph 33)
Paragraph 40
To be consistent with the premise that the auditor does not have responsibility for determining 
intent, we recommend that this paragraph read: “The disclosure of possible fraud to parties 
other than . . . ” to cover situations in which it may not be clear whether fraud has occurred. 
Various paragraphs
Certain references in the proposed Statement and appendices fail to cite that the S AS referred 
to has been amended. We believe that all references to SAS No. 1 (sections 110 and 230), SAS 
No. 22, and SAS No. 47 should indicate such statements “as amended.” Paragraphs requiring
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modification include paragraphs 10, 11, and 26, and footnotes 5 and 6 of the proposed 
Statement; footnote 2 to Appendix A; footnote 1 and paragraphs 14 and 15 of Appendix C.
Additionally, the proposed Statement does not always cite the related AU section (e.g., 
reference is only made to SAS No. 47 in footnote 6).
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Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager 
Audit and Atest Standards 
File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
This leter is in response to the request for comments on the exposure draft for the proposed SAS 
titled "Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit". We are a regional firm located in 
upstate New York and provide services to both for-profit and not-for-profit clients of varying size and 
complexity throughout New York State. This exposure draft and its potential effect on our clients and 
our practice causes us significant concern. The comments below address some of those concerns as 
wel as raise some questions which need to be addressed.
1.  General Comment
As stated in the exposure draft, our responsibility as auditors is to address and be concerned 
with material misstatements in the financial statements. It appears that the general public and 
the users of financial statements stil do not understand what our responsibility is in the 
performance of an audit of financial information. We see this proposed professional standard 
as an attempt to close the expectation gap by raising our responsibility to a higher level at a 
significant cost and not raising the understanding of the user to what our responsibility actualy 
is. However, if this is the level of responsibility the public wants us to assume, then they and 
our clients should be wiling to pay for it; but that wil not be the case. We believe that the 
public wil see this performance standard as an investigatory step which almost guarantees that 
fraud wil be detected whenever it exists. Firm defenses to litigation wil be weakened in that 
the perception wil be that we should have uncovered the fraud, whether concealed or not, and 
that someone has been injured and should be compensated.
To perform engagements under this new standard wil be more costly as it wil require more 
inquiry, documentation and judgement to adequately cover these risk areas. Fee sensitive for- 
profit clients and not-for-profit clients, whose funding is limited, wil question where is the value 
added by performing these procedures. Is the added cost of performing these procedures on 
every engagement worth the added "cost" to every client when material frauds which harm the 
public are probably infrequent? We ask that the Board explain the rationale whereby it is 
expected that there would be no increase in cost to either the firm or the client.
2.  Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Throughout the exposure draft there is a recurring theme, “Intent to defraud is often to dificult 
to determine", "..concealed fraud which may be hard to uncover", and "..that the risk factors 
or conditions for fraud to exist may also be the result of circumstances other than fraud". In
reviewing the many risk factors indicated in the fraudulent financial reporting section, we have
AUG 16-1996
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seen most of them present in many organizations, both for-profit and non-for-profit. year after 
year. Only in a utopian world would we expect not to find these factors. Therefore every 
engagement could contain some of the characteristics and we would have to perform 
additional procedures on every engagement to limit our exposure and perhaps detect a fraud.
We are trained accountants and auditors not investigative or enforcement professionals. The 
risks that Investors, creditors or other financial statement users take should not be mitigated by 
finding a new scapegoat or someone to perform investigations for free.
3. Misappropriation of Assets
The process of Inquiring and subsequently investigating employee relationships, attitudes or 
pressures can be a highly sensitive area. We question whether we have the legal right to 
inquire into some of the risk factors which are outlined in the exposure draft. In most cases we 
are at our client for a brief period of time performing the audit engagement once a year which 
certainly does not appear to be enough time or exposure to adequately observe the behavior 
of employees. We are not psychologists. Will we be Invading the privacy of our clients* 
employees and be subject to possible litigation? Who are the most appropriate employees to 
address the inquiries to and If they respond that It is none of our business what do we do? 
Employers may not even be aware of any of these factors and what happens when factors may 
be present but no fraud exists and we perform certain inquiries? We are not aware of any 
laws we may be violating, but there could be some and could that result in possible litigation? 
What happens to our practice when we become known as Investigators Instead of auditors and 
word spreads that we treat our clients as if they are guilty of some fraud?
4. Controls
This exposure draft is the ultimate “big GAAS", “little GAAS" debacle. Many small, closely - 
held companies are aware that fraud can occur but have controls which rely heavily on the 
owner/manager. Situations like the ones below do exist in any number of engagements:
a. The owner/manager falls to display or communicate an appropriate attitude regarding 
internal control and the financial reporting process.
b. Not only does the owner dominate the profit making process, but dominates the entire 
company. And there Is no board of directors and no audit committee.
c. The only monitoring of significant controls is the owner's ability to be present at various 
times throughout the company. The owner's reliance is entirely based on the ability to 
observe and, documentation, where this is the key control procedure, does not exist.
d. Perhaps, if we can convince the owner that a control is missing or not working, a 
correction will be made, but doing nothing about it is more often the rule than not.
e. Generally there Is little staff turnover.
f. As a closely held company, there are no securities laws to violate.
g. The owner does not even know what “opinion shopping" is.
h. There are always demands to complete the audit and get the tax return done on time. 
Whether they are unreasonable or not is very difficult to determine.
I. Communication Is almost always restricted to the owner.
j. There are almost always related party transactions between commonly owned 
companies and the owner or any number of friends and sometimes relatives.
08/16 ’96 18:37 ID :Marv in  & Co. -  Albany FAX: PAGE 4
3
Many of the procedures In this exposure draft are common sense Issues which practitioners have been 
dealing with for many years. However, we have yet to see a fraud that Impacted any Investor or 
creditor in our practice unless It was perpetrated by the owner. Employee fraud? Yes, we have seen 
this several times, but almost never In amounts substantial enough to materially harm the organization 
financially and it is almost always covered by employee dishonesty bonds.
With all of the above said, and now we may be required to use all this information to impact Just about 
every audit procedure, when will we ever finish the audit. I think never. Like government regulators, it 
appears that the profession continues to tax the small enterprise that would like to have an audit, and 
probably would benefit from having one, but can no longer afford to do so. And what about those 
organizations required to be audited, more fee related issues to consider and address with no clear 
value/added service by the auditor.
We ask that you give consideration to these comments and appreciate the opportunity to respond to 
this exposure draft.
Very truly yours.
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Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager, Audit and Attest Standards 
File 2690
American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue o f the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino;
We are pleased to submit this letter in support o f the proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.
We support the intention of the Auditing Standards Board in improving the fieldwork 
performance guidance in this important area, while reinforcing that the current responsibility o f 
auditors, as set forth in the standard auditor's report, is appropriate. W e agree with the essential 
concepts o f the proposed SAS.
Within the context, o f this overall support, we have the following suggestions for improvement in 
the Statement, None o f these should be considered major comments, and all are offered in the 
interest o f enhancing the clarity of the document.
Par. 7 - We suggest expanding the last sentence to read, "...nor are auditors trained as or 
expected to be experts in such authentication."
Part 9 - We suggest that the first sentence be revised to read, "...may alert the auditor to a 
likelihood th a t frau d  may exist." We make this suggestion because we believe that the presence 
o f risk factors often will not be linked to actual fraud (i.e., possible existence) but that the reason 
we would look to risk factors is to assess whether there is a likelihood o f  fraud sufficient to 
warrant an audit reaction.
Part 10 - In order to emphasize the point, we suggest expanding the last sentence to read, "...only 
reasonable assurance that material misstatements in the financial statements, including 
m isstatem ents resu lting  from fraud, are detected."
Par, 12, fn 5 - In order to avoid the perception that checklists are the only way to approach the 
assessment., we suggest, revising the second sentence of the footnote as follows, "...may meet tins 
requirement using different approaches or categories of risk factors..,'
Par. 16.a - Under the first bullet, we suggest adding the following additional sub-bullet: "Poor 
internal control over financial reporting, which may include one or more o f the following;
C oopers &  Lybrand L.L.P., a registered lim ited liability partnership, Is a member firm  o f Coopers & Lybrand (internationa l).
inadequate accounting systems; numerous manual entries in an otherwise automated environment; 
or an inability to  meet internal and/or external reporting deadlines."
Par. 16.a - Under the last bullet item, we suggest that the first sub-bullet be modified to delete the 
phrase "including 'opinion shopping'.'1 We believe that the characteristic applies without this 
phrase and the inclusion of the phrase may cast aspersions on a service that the ASB has 
specifically countenanced through the issuance of SAS No. 50. In addition, we suggest that the 
fourth sub-bullet be enhanced to say, "Domineering management behavior in dealing with the 
auditor, which may include attempts to influence the auditor's scope.", to  alert practitioners to this 
risk factor.
Par. 1 8 c  - We suggest modifying the last bullet to read: "Lack o f adherence to a mandatory 
vacation policy for employees performing key control functions," as it is the lack o f  adherence, 
and not only the lack o f a policy, that increases the likelihood of fraud relating to misappropriation 
o f assets.
Par, 28 - We suggest adding a footnote to the section o f the fifth bullet relating to related parties: 
"SAS No. 45, Related Parties (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. I, AU sec. 334), provides 
guidance on related party relationships and transactions. Particular attention should be given to 
transactions that may be outside the ordinary course of business (see AU sec. 334,06)."
Par, 33 - We suggest changing the reference to an "imprest fund" to a "petty cash fund," since the 
term "imprest fund" is not commonly used.
Par. 35 - We are concerned that the order o f the paragraphs could lead an auditor, or another 
party, to  conclude that the ability of the auditor to withdraw, pursuant to paragraph 35, cannot be 
executed until the steps contained in paragraph 34 have been followed. W e do not believe this 
was the intention o f  the document. Therefore, we suggest adding at the end o f the paragraph the 
following sentence, "The auditor may elect to withdraw from the engagement at any during the 
consideration o f the risk o f fraud and is not obligated to perform any additional auditing 
procedures, including those discussed in paragraph 34, following withdrawal."
We have no suggested changes to Appendices A, B, or C.
Please contact James S. Gerson at (212) 536-2243 if you have any questions.
Very truly yours,
L . L . P .
Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P., a registered limited liability partnership, Is a member firm of Coopers & Lybrand (International).
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Ms. Jane M. M ancino, Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690 
AICPA
1211 Avenue o f  the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Jane M. Mancino:
Enclosed is the State o f  New Jersey Office o f the State Auditor's response to the AICPA's 
exposure draft "Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit."
The AICPA should be commended in addressing the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud in 
financial statement audits. It is difficult to ascertain whether this proposed standard and its 
implementation will adequately address the public's concern and negative feelings towards the 
profession. However, the guidance should provide a heightened awareness o f fraud issues in 
planning the audit and assessing risk.
When materiality factors are rolled into the equation, as it must be in a financial statement audit, 
rarely will fraud be a paramount concern. More often fraud issues will be considered at a lower 
materiality level and become a communication consideration for the auditor as the proposed 
standard highlights in Paragraphs 37 to 40.
Often, fraud will involve an illegal act. The proposed standard touches upon this issue in 
footnote 2 in terms o f  "intent", but it doesn't go far enough in linking misrepresentations and 
misappropriations to illegal acts. Further guidance is also needed in highlighting how far the 
auditors "investigation" should proceed. Consideration must be given to the possibility o f 
weakening any potential criminal proceeding. These concerns may arise based on indications 
from test results where the auditor can not conclusively state that fraud exists "in a legal sense." 
These concerns will be more pervasive than those arising from the auditors' consideration of 
material fraud.
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Relating to the above issue Paragraph 28 lists specific examples of testing approaches that might 
be applied due to a suspected fraud. Specifically, interviewing personnel involved in areas in 
which a concern about the risk of material misstatement due to fraud is present. Performing such 
interviews may alert the perpetrator to destroy evidence which may adversely affect the 
investigation for law enforcement individuals.
In addition, Paragraph 34 requires the auditor to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to 
determine whether, in fact, material fraud exists and, if so, its effects. The standard should 
remind the accounting profession that auditors are trained in accounting and auditing not law 
enforcement evidence gathering.
Paragraph 38 requires auditors to bring the evidence of fraud to the attention of an appropriate 
level of management. The paragraph does not disclose whether the communication should be in 
oral or written form. The paragraph should be expanded to describe under which circumstances, 
oral or written communication is recommended and what should be in the communication.
Overall, the proposed SAS is well written and provides reasonable guidance. We would 
appreciate it if you would consider our comments, 
response; please contact me at (609) 292-1897.
If you have any questions regarding this
Respectfully Submitted
Thomas R. Meseroll, CPA 
Technical Director
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Ms. Jane M. Mancino 
Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards 
File 2690 
AICPA
1211 Avenue o f the Americas 
New York, NY- 10036-8775
Dear Jane M. Mancino:
The AICPA Auditing Standards Board has issued an exposure draft "Consideration o f Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit" for general comment. I have reviewed the exposure draft and my 
comments follow.
The AICPA should be commended in finally recognizing the auditor's responsibility to detect 
fraud in financial statement audits. However, the standard should be modified in the following 
areas.
Paragraph 2 thru 10 define fraud in an accounting or legal perspective. Fraud, also, has the 
criminal aspect. Someone convicted of fraud may receive a prison sentence. Recently, a 
financial analyst who admitted embezzling $667,000 from the Exxon Research & Engineering 
Co. in an elaborate fraud was sentenced to a four-year prison sentence and ordered to make full 
restitution to Exxon. The standard should remind the auditor that auditing for suspected fraud 
may put the auditor at physical risk if the auditors diligently pursue their investigation.
Paragraph 13 requires inquiries of management as to whether the risk factors are in existence to 
commit fraud. W hat management personnel would tell their auditors that fraud exists under their 
supervision? Asking these questions to management may, also, hurt the auditor-auditee 
relationship by indirectly accusing management of not doing their job in detecting fraud.




Paragraph 15 thru 18 list risk factors relating to fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets. The auditor should use these risk factors to determine whether or not 
to accept the engagement. If an in-coming audit firm knows that the entity has several of these 
risk factors, the firm is just asking for trouble by accepting the engagement.
Paragraph 28 lists specific examples of testing approaches that might be applied due to a 
suspected fraud. Specifically, interviewing personnel involved in areas in which a concern about 
the risk of material misstatement due to fraud is present. Performing sqch interviews may alert 
the fraudulent individual to destroy evidence which hinders the investigation for law enforcement 
or even to cause bodily harm to the auditor. Auditors are not trained in law enforcement 
techniques.
In addition, Paragraph 34 requires the auditor to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to 
determine whether, in fact, material fraud exists and, if so, its effects. The standard should 
remind the accounting profession that auditors are trained in accounting and auditing not law 
enforcement evidence gathering. The auditor may contaminate the evidence. The AICPA may 
also be legally responsible for requiring the accounting profession to obtain this evidential matter 
and subsequently the auditor encounters bodily harm.
Paragraph 38 requires auditors to bring the evidence of fraud to the attention of an appropriate 
level of management. The paragraph does not disclose what type of communication - oral or 
written. The paragraph should be expanded to describe under which circumstances, oral or 
written communication is recommended and what should be in the communication.
Paragraph 40 seeks to limit the accounting profession's legal liability on fraud detection. Why 
should the auditor perform all the additional work required by this new standard if the AICPA is 
only worried about the profession's legal liability?
Appendix B Paragraph 6 states "The auditor with final responsibility is responsible for the 
assignment of tasks to, and supervision of, assistants." In a CPA firm the partner has the final 
responsibility for an audit. This individual, rarely, assigns tasks to the assistants. Therefore, the 
final sentence in Paragraph 6 should be deleted.
If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact me at (609) 777-2889.
Respectfully Submitted,
AJG/dst
Anthony J. Glebocki, CPA 
Technical Staff Manager
NEW JERSEY STATE LEGISLATURE
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES
OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR
KPMG Peat Marwick llp
599 Lexington Avenue Telephone 212 909 5400
New York. NY 10022
Telefax 212 909 5699
August 19, 1996
Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
We are pleased to respond to the Auditing Standards Board’s request for comment on the 
exposure draft: “Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, Consideration o f Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit and Amendments to Statements on Auditing Standards No. 1, 
Codification o f Auditing Standards and Procedures, and No. 47, Audit Risk and 
Materiality in Conducting an Audit” (the Proposed Statement). We support the issuance of 
the Proposed Statement, however, we present the following comments and suggestions for 
the Board’s consideration:
1. We recommend expanding the reference to SAS No. 54 in footnote 1 of the 
Proposed Statement to include the auditor’s consideration of the possibility of 
illegal acts. For example, the first sentence of the footnote could be replaced with 
the following:
The auditor’s consideration of the possibility of illegal acts and 
responsibility for detecting misstatements resulting from certain 
illegal acts is described in SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts By Clients 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 317).
2. In attempting to operationalize the Proposed Statement, we believe there are a 
number of implementation issues which the Board and the AICPA may wish to 
consider now in order to facilitate that later process. For example, paragraph 12 of
the Proposed Statement states that the auditor should specifically assess the risk of 
material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud. We interpret this to 
mean that the auditor is required to make a substantive assessment of the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud; which is more than simply addressing fraud risk 
factors identified as a matter of happenstance, but is less than actively searching for 
fraud risk factors.
We believe the operationalization of paragraph 12 would be facilitated by adding the 
following sentence after the second sentence in the paragraph:
Fraud risk factors may be identified or come to the auditor’s 
attention while considering acceptance or continuance of the audit
K P M G  Peat Marwick lip
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engagement, during engagement planning, when obtaining an 
understanding of an entity’s internal control, or at other times during
 the course of providing audit procedures.
Another area where further implementation guidance should be provided in the 
Proposed Statement is in the consideration of fraud risk factors relating to 
misappropriation of assets. For example:
• How is an auditor expected to measure “dissatisfaction” or “unusual” 
changes in behavior?
• Does the auditor have sufficient or any contact with employees who have 
custody over the types of inventories described in paragraph 18(a) to make a 
reasonable assessment? Would the auditor be required to have such 
contact?
For example, if inventories are observed as of an interim date (e.g., three 
months before year end) and the audit report and financial statements are not 
issued until three months after year end, would the auditor be expected to 
maintain some level of contact with the people responsible for the inventory 
during that six month window in order to address this potential risk factor? 
Given that the span of time is six months, it is possible for there to be 
change in behavior, etc.
• What does “observable changes in behavior” mean? Does this mean a 
change in lifestyle? A change from extrovert to introvert? Within what 
context is it being used in paragraph 18(b)?
3. The second sentence of Appendix C, paragraph 5 (amendment of SAS 47), states 
that “An audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards is 
not intended to detect misstatement that are not material to the financial statements.”
We recommend conforming the wording of the sentence to be consistent with the 
wording found in Appendix A, paragraph 2 (amendment of SAS 1) as follows:
“The auditor has no responsibility to plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance that errors or fraud that are not material 
to the financial statements are detected.”
While we recognize that the fraud risk factors listed in paragraphs 16 and 18 of the 
Proposed Statement are only examples and are not intended to be all-inclusive lists, 
we recommend the following amendments to two of the fraud risk factors in 
paragraph 16(c) as follows:
4
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• Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those 
close to year end, that pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
• Threat of imminent bankruptcy, foreclosure, or hostile takeover.
We support listing the example fraud risk factors in the body of the Proposed 
Statement.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide our comments and suggestions on the Proposed 
Statement.
Very truly yours,
L. Paul Kassouf & Co.,PC.
Certified Public Accountants
2208 University Boulevard • Birmingham, AL 35233-2393 
Telephone (205) 322-8636 
Facsimile (205)324-0135
August 19, 1996
Ms. Jane M. Mancino
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: Audit and Attest Standards 
File 2690
Dear Jane:
Enclosed are comments I have received regarding the exposure draft for a proposed 
Statement on Auditing Standards, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit.
I am currently serving as chairman of the Audit Standards and Procedures 
Committee of the Alabama Society of Certified Public Accountants, and these 
comments were requested from members of the committee.
Sincerely
L. PAUL KASSOUF & CO., P. C.
Charles D. Dobbs, CPA 
Member of the Firm
CDD:aeb
Enclosure
cc: Ms. Susan Stallworth 
Alabama Society
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I am submitting the following comments regarding the ASB’s exposure 
draft on fraud considerations.
a) Paragraph 12: An example would be useful at the end of this paragraph.
b) Paragraph 18(c): While the factors given are appropriate, this section 
could be improved by emphasizing risk factors peculiar 
to an EDP environment. Perhaps, the factors could be 
focused on general and application controls.
c) Paragraph 28: The ASB attempts in one paragraph to cite specific examples 
of responses to a fraud risk assessment. While the discuss
ion is interesting, much more emphasis is needed. At a 
minimum, an appendix should be devoted to this crucial 
section. I suggest chat the ASB consider a separate audit 
guide on this area.
d) Paragraph 35: The question arises as to whether there are situations 
where the client is diligent and cooperative, yet consid
eration should still be given to withdrawing.
e) Paragraph 40: I believe this paragraph should reiterate the possibility 
of withdrawing. In some engagements, neither a,b, c or d 
would apply, yet the client refuses to accept an audit 
report disclosing a fraudulent transaction. Withdrawing 
from the engagement would be appropriate.
Overall., the finalized standard should focus more on EDP systems with 
more of the discussion addressing issues confronted in a computer environment. 
Provide more examples of audit considerations in OLRT and distributed computer 
environments. Finally, since the internet may be the primary medium for future 




Montevalo, Alabama 35115-6000 Telephone: 205/665-6530 






Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
 
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed statement on auditing standards titled 
Consideration o f  Fraud in a  Financial Statement Audit. I appreciate the time and effort spent by 
the AICPA in preparing the statement and reviewing the responses.
I  am a student at Brigham Young University, and I am excited to take part in the standard-setting 
process at this early stage o f my career. I hope that my contribution will be o f  value to your 
committee.
I f  you need to contact me, I can be reached at (801) 375-1157, or by e-mail at 
broberts@yvax.byu.edu. Thank you again.
Best wishes,
• R. Bryce Roberts
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According to  the World Competitiveness Yearbook, the “United States leads the world in 
competitiveness.” In such a competitive country, businesses are often tem pted to  use overly 
aggressive accounting policies and procedures to make the company look better. Every public 
company searches for ways to improve its net income and earnings per share figures. As a 
student at Brigham Young University, I have learned about the FASB’s conceptual framework 
and the role that conservatism plays in accounting. I recognize the need to  properly assure the 
fairness o f  the financial statements. I have learned about the importance o f  and judgment required 
in performing a good audit in conformance with GAAS. In the coming years, if  I  as an auditor  
don’t  do my job well, then an undetected fraud could cost the public a  fortune, not to  mention the 
cost to my firm’s integrity and to my own career.
The exposure draft titled Consideration o f  Fraud in a  Financial Statem ent Audit is a 
welcome addition to  the professional literature. As a student, I applaud the efforts o f  the ASB 
and its parent, the American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), to close the 
expectation gap between auditors and financial statement users. I am pleased that the draft rules 
provide specific guidance to the auditor on how to detect a material fraud, especially the type o f 
“fraud that would affect a company’s share price or credit rating.” As I prepare to enter the 
professional world, I am grateful for better guidance on key factors in detecting potential fraud. 
With the advent o f  the electronic age and the resulting decrease in paper shuffling, new staff 
accountants are required to analyze information now more than ever. I w ant to  make sound 
judgments and ask critical questions as soon as I begin working. I believe this draft will help me 
make good decisions and take proper actions.
I am more concerned with fraudulent financial reporting than I am w ith the 
misappropriation o f  assets, since misappropriation is generally an internal problem, while 
fraudulent reporting affects the general public directly. As I understand auditor responsibility, my 
first loyalty is to  the public interest, and then to my client. Even though the passage o f  last year’s 
Private Securities Litigation Act gave “strong protections against legal liability for accountants,” I 
think that this draft will remind auditors that they are not absolved o f  their public responsibilities 
in detecting fraud.  
The issuance o f  this exposure draft will add “independent assurance to  the credibility of 
financial statements upon which our capital and credit markets depend.” I like the extra 
responsibility this gives to the auditor. Auditors are paid to assure the fairness o f  a company’s 
financial statements. I  think that the auditor ought to be held accountable for detecting material 
misstatements, whether the misstatements be intentional or unintentional. The exposure draft
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clarifies this responsibility clearly and concisely. I hope this draft will help auditors better 
understand the duty they have always assumed, particularly helping those auditors who may not 
have fully realized that duty.
I also appreciate the way that the exposure draft incorporates past experience into current 
practice. In school, I have studied several classic fraud cases, including ZZ Z Z  Best, Phar-Mor, 
McKesson-Robins, and Lincoln Savings and Loan. In the exposure draft, the ASB committee 
points out characteristics and procedures that would have detected these frauds. For example, in 
paragraph 24, the draft says that auditors should recognize a potential problem due to  “the 
unavailability o f  other than photocopied documents when documents in original form are expected 
to  exist.” I believe the ZZZZ  Best fraud would have been uncovered much sooner i f  the auditors 
had insisted on reviewing the original supporting documentation. In paragraph 28, the draft says 
that the auditor should “visit locations or perform certain tests on a surprise basis.” I f  the 
Coopers &  Lybrand auditors had been able to refer to this rule, I think the Phar-M or fraud might 
have been caught in its inception. A final example is in paragraph 16c, which states that auditors 
should recognize a red flag when “significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions [occur] 
close to  year end that pose difficult ‘substance over form’ questions.” The Hidden Valley sham 
transaction in the Lincoln Savings and Loan debacle might have been effectively detected if 
Arthur Andersen had realized the importance o f this proposed rule.
I would like to  make a couple o f suggestions. As I join the auditor ranks next year, I am 
concerned that my inexperience may cause me to miss an important detail o r that my supervisor 
will discount questions I feel should be investigated further. From case studies, it seems to  me 
that some frauds w ere left uncovered because everyone just overlooked the  obvious. The Mattel 
case is a good example. “Bill and hold” was clearly marked on several invoices, but apparently no 
one bothered to  ask about its significance. I don’t want to ever be guilty o f  not detecting a fraud 
when I or my supervisors should have detected it. To that end, I would suggest that Appendix B, 
paragraph 6 be amended to  include a sentence such as, “Supervisors should respond quickly and
  respectfully to  questions asked by subordinates and follow up on those responses.” Referring 
again to  the M attel case, a senior auditor told the staff auditor to obtain a  better explanation for  
the $7 million discrepancy between the general ledger sales and the sales invoice register.
However, it appears that no one followed up on the senior auditor’s request. I hope and believe 
that mistake was an isolated case; however, I know how easy it is to forget to follow up, 
especially with other time and audit pressures.
The other suggestion I want to make is that the ASB and the AICPA continue to publicize
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what audits do and do not assure, especially as it relates to fraud. I know the AICPA has 
addressed the “expectation gap” in numerous ways, but I feel the profession must continue to do 
so. For example, the profession could choose to call an audit by a different name, so that users 
will not confuse an IRS or SEC audit with a GAAS audit. The profession might also do 
something as simple as bolding the words “reasonable assurance” in the opinion paragraph. 
Whatever the decision, the expectation gap needs to be bridged. I think this fraud draft is an 
excellent first step towards obtaining that goal.
By using these new standards, I feel much more comfortable about issuing unqualified   
audit opinions for corporations to the general public. I believe that this standard will increase 
professional skepticism and reaffirm its importance in every audit. I hope that auditors will use 
this standard to  step back and critically analyze potential fraud opportunities. I  think that by 
applying these rules, auditors will detect more frauds. As a result, managers that might have 
considered fraud will now have to reevaluate their positions. Hopefully, more o f  these managers 
will vote for honesty and integrity. If  company leadership follows this course, businesses will be 
healthier and audits will be better. Thank you.
R. Bryce Roberts
Accounting Student - Brigham Young University
AICPA
Division for CPA Firms
August 15, 1996
Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690
American Institute of CPAs
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New Y o r k ,  N Y  1 0 0 3 6 - 8 7 7 5
Res Exposure Draft on Proposed SAS Consideration of Fraud In a 
Financial Statement Audit and Amendments to SASs No. 1, 
Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures, and No. 47, 
Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit
Dear Ms. Mancino:
One of the objectives that Council of the American Institute of CPAs 
established for the Private Companies Practice Executive Committee is to 
act as an advocate for all local and regional firms and represent those 
firms’ interests on professional issues, primarily through the Technical 
Issues Committee (TIC) . This communication is in accordance with that 
objective.
TIC has reviewed the proposed guidance contained in the above referenced 
exposure draft and is pleased to provide the following comments and 
suggestions.
General
TIC concurs with the Board that auditors and the public need a clear 
indication that auditors have a responsibility to plan and perform the 
audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether fraud or error exists 
that would cause financial statements to be materially misstated. While we 
believe this proposal will increase audit costs for certain audits, we also 
believe these are costs that must be borne if the profession is to maintain 
its credibility with the public. Therefore, it is important that, the AICPA 
ensure that this standard and ,all n e c e s s a r y  " o p e r a t i o n a l "  g u i d a n c e  b e  
issued in a format that will minimize misunderstanding and help local firms 
apply it as efficiently and effectively as possible.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, NJ 07311-3881 (201) 938-3005 • (212) 318-0500  • fax (2 0 1 1 938-3404
The £PA,I. Never Underestimate The Value?"
2Basic Approach
We support the Board's objective to focus attention on the auditor's 
responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance 
regarding the existence of any fraud that could materially misstate the 
financial statements. However, we believe this objective can be achieved 
more effectively by amending existing standards. Such an approach would 
avoid creating unnecessary confusion or erroneous perceptions that are 
likely to occur if fraud guidance were issued as a separate standard. 
However, if the Board decides to retain its separate standard approach, we 
ask you to address the following concerns we believe will hinder local 
firms in implementing the guidance efficiently:
♦ Assessing the potential risk of the existence of fraud is an integral 
part of the inherent and control risk assessment process. However, 
the proposal seems to require a separate assessment of fraud risk 
when, in fact, amended paragraph 31 of SAS No. 47 continues to permit 
either separate or combined assessments of inherent and control risk. 
This seeming contradiction may create the impression that the 
proposal's assessment is unrelated to, or different from, that 
required by SAS No. 47.
This perception of a separate assessment may also cause auditors and 
users of financial statements to conclude that the auditor is assuming 
a greater degree of responsibility for the detection of fraud than 
that currently existing in the standards.
♦ TIC firmly believes that one way to make GAAS more user friendly is to
provide practitioners with easy to understand "how-to", or 
operational, guidance. However, TIC is concerned that including such 
guidance in the standard itself, may lead practitioners to mistakenly 
believe that each suggestion or example must be reflected in their 
audit program, thereby causing a significant over application of audit 
procedures.
In addition, auditors are already considering most of the 43- risk 
factors listed in paragraphs 16 through 18 when assessing inherent and
. control-risk. Listing them within the body of the standard may lead 
an auditor to believe they must be considered a second time as a part
. of a fraud risk assessment. For this and other reasons we consider it 
especially important that the 43 risk factors be removed from the body 
of the statement. We urge the Board to seriously consider relocating 
all "how to" or operational guidance into an appendix to the standard.
♦ We are concerned that the proposal will create the perception in 
auditors and the public that it requires a lower materiality threshold 
for detecting fraud. For example, when the assessment of the risk of
3material misstatement due to fraud is great enough, paragraph 27 
states that the nature, timing and extent of the audit procedures may- 
need to be modified. It suggests that an increase in the extent of 
the audit procedures could be accomplished by an increase in sample 
size. However, in planning small business audits, it is common for 
auditors to assess all risks; i.e., control risk, inherent risk, etc., 
at the maximum. In such cases, the auditor determines the size of the 
sample in relation to planning materiality. But, following the 
suggestion in paragraph 27 to use a larger sample size because of the 
risk associated with the potential for a material misstatement due to 
fraud, will have the effect of reducing planning materiality. 
Auditors understanding this relationship may assume that the presence 
of this "new" risk factor requires them to lower the materiality 
threshold previously set, when the risk of fraud and its effect on 
materiality may already have been adequately addressed in the current 
assessments of inherent and control risk.
Potential Impact on Audits of Small Businesses
TIC believes that in the small business environment the proposed standard 
could result in an unwarranted substantial increase in audit time and 
costs. For example, many of the 43 risk factors listed in paragraphs 16 
through 18 can be expected to be present in most small company audits. 
Some of the risk factors particularly common to these audits include 
domination of management without compensating controls, inadequate 
monitoring of significant controls, unusually high dependence on debt, debt 
covenants ,that are difficult to maintain, accounting system in disarray, 
and lack of appropriate segregation of duties or independent checks.
Also, the first sentence in paragraph 33 states: "...when audit test 
results identify a misstatement in the financial statements, the auditor 
should consider whether such misstatement may be indicative of fraud." In 
the small business environment, it is common for auditors to propose a 
significant number of adjusting journal entries in connection with their 
audits. This sentence appears to require the auditor to evaluate every 
proposed adjusting entry to determine if it is indicative of fraud; 
especially since, according to footnote 2'on page 15, the auditor usually 
cannot determine intent when he or she finds misstatements that need 
correction. In our opinion, this will add cost to an audit with little or 
no benefit.
We recommend that the Board review all aspects of the proposal that could 
significantly impact small business audits and consider expanding (in an 
appendix) the guidance intended to help these auditors apply the standard 
more efficiently.
* * *
F L O R ID A  IN S T IT U T E  O F  C E R T IF IE D  P U B L IC  A C C O U N T A N T S
325 WEST COLLEGE AVENUE • P.0. BOX 5437 • TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32314 
TELEPHONE (904) 224-2727 • FAX (904) 222-8190
July 11, 1996
Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards 
File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
The Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards Committee of the 
Florida Institute of CPA's (Committee) has reviewed and discussed 
the AICPA Auditing Standards Board (ASB) Exposure Draft Proposed 
Statement on Auditing Standards entitled Consideration of Fraud 
in a Financial Statement Audit and amendments to Statements on 
Auditing Standards No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and 
Procedures, and No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting 
an Audit dated May 1, 1996 (ED). A summary of our comments 
follows.
GENERAL COMMENT
Committee members welcome additional guidance on a topic of this 
nature, specifically addressing the issue of fraud. In general, 
we feel that, if SAS 1 as it currently exists, is properly 
applied, auditors' already have the responsibilities addressed in 
the ED. Nevertheless, we see the value of highlighting the fraud 
potential, given the current financial atmosphere.
Some members expressed concerns respecting the competence of CPA 
auditors' in detecting fraud. They felt that fraud detection 
skills are much more specialized and refined than general audit 
skills. Their concerns included whether an auditor should 
consider including a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) on the audit 
staff, either on a permanent or temporary basis, as is currently 
done in specialized industry situations.
We have addressed specifically the section entitled Commentator 
Guide to Significant Issues, starting on page 8 of the ED and 
paragraphs on certain other pages.
Jane M. Mancino, AICPA 




Our response to the question raised in the first sentence is that 
SAS 53 does not necessarily clearly articulate the auditor’s 
responsibility.
SEPARATE STANDARD ON FRAUD
We believe a separate standard on fraud might be appropriate, 
especially one that specifically deals with the auditor’s 
responsibilities in fraud and/or suspected fraud areas.
CHARACTERISTICS AND DESCRIPTION OF FRAUD
We agree with the ASB’s conclusions.
IMPERATIVE TO ASSESS THE RISK OF MISSTATEMENT DUE TO FRAUD
The committee's answer to the question is yes. Members’ stated 
that such a requirement already exists in the SAS literature.
RISK FACTORS
The committee believes that the standard should contain 
categories of risk factors and specific risk factors, even if 
such consideration requires more than the current amount of 
documentation.
THE AUDITOR'S RESPONSE TO FRAUD RISK
The committee supports the ASB position stated on page 10. On 
page 25, the bullet paragraph entitled ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL 
would read better, in our opinion, if the last sentence of that 
paragraph, sans "In addition", became the first sentence of the 
same paragraph. It would better address the hierarchy of the 
command chain in audit engagements.
DOCUMENTATION OF THE ASSESSMENT
There is a need to document the fraud risk assessment. It should 
be part of the audit work papers.
COMMUNICATION TO MANAGEMENT AND OTHERS
The members see the comments to be adequate and proper.
COSTS AND BENEFITS
We agree that the proposals appropriately balance costs and 
benefits.




In addition to guidance proposed, the committee members' see a 
need for a Fraud Audit Guide, and an appendix of illustrative 
examples of fraud practices. It should also address the issue of 
use of a CFE as an audit resource.
OTHER SPECIFIC ITEMS
Paragraph 8., page 17 discusses collusion and/or management 
fraud. How can the auditor be protected when such circumstances 
exist? How can the fraud be detected? If not detected, what is 
the auditor’s exposure?
The discussion of RISK FACTORS RELATING TO MISAPPROPRIATION OF 
ASSETS is a valuable start. It emphasizes factors which an 
auditor currently uses to assess Inherent and Control risk 
exposure.
The members' expressed concern that the guidance in paragraph 25 
on page 24 may need to be amplified further.
Paragraph 7 on page 16 helps highlight areas of exposure that 
auditors' are increasingly becoming aware of. Such areas include 
the ability to create duplicate originals, using photographic 
copy methods, the lack of originals and/or "hard copy" 
documentation in the electronic age and the short term 
availability of documentation when volumes are great and/or 
storage capacity is limited. Has ASB considered directly 
addressing these issues separately, or together with this ED?
We appreciate the opportunity to share our views and concerns and 
comment on the Exposure Draft. Members of our committee are 
available to discuss any questions you may have about this 
communication.
Very truly yours,
Steven M. Berwick, Chairman
FICPA Committee on Accounting Principles
and Auditing Standards
Task Force which coordinated this response: 
William J. Odendahl, Jr., CPA (352-620-0035) 
Jeffrey B. Kramer, CPA (954-760-9000)
%GEO. S. OLIVE & C .llc
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
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Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Atest Standards, File 2690
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New.York,NY 10036-8775
This leter represents our Firm’s response to the exposure draft of the Proposed Statement on 
Auditing Standards Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. We applaud the 
Auditing Standards Board’s consideration of this dificult area. We hope that the comments 
included below wil assist the ASB in ariving at a final Statement that can be appropriately 
implemented by auditors.
While Statement on Auditing Standards No. 53 was intended to eliminate the “expectation gap” 
between the public and the auditing profession with respect to the auditor’s responsibility to detect 
fraud, the gap stil exists. The ASB has indicated that the proposed statement would provide 
guidance to auditors and clarify the auditor’s responsibilities with respect to fraud detection, not 
expand the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud. We believe that the statement, as writen in the 
exposure draft, actualy expands the “expectation gap” instead of contracting it. The standard 
appears to go beyond curent legal requirements and expose auditors to greater liability risk. We 
believe the statement should be revised in the folowing areas:
• examples in consideration of fraud risk
• examples for additional audit procedures to perform in response to the risk of misstatement due 
to fraud
• responsibility for client inquiry
• documentation requirements
Paragraphs 16 and 18 of the exposure draft identify “examples” of fraud risk factors. While these 
lists certainly reflect situations in which fraud could occur, many of them also describe the normal 
working environment of a smal business. Several of the risk factors listed are vague (e.g., 18.b.2: 
“employees with access to assets susceptible to misappropriate who are known to be dissatisfied” 
— known by whom?). In addition, the lists are not industry-sensitive. We believe these lists 
should be removed from the statement. They are beter suited for inclusion in training material on 
fraud detection or an implementation guide than in the standard. We believe the auditor should use 
his professional judgment in determining the factors to consider, not be bound to a list dictated by 
the standard.
We believe the specific examples of testing to be applied in response to the fraud risk assessment 
(Paragraph 28) should be removed from the standard. Again, this guidance, as writen, does not 
reflect concerns unique to a specific industry, nor does it relate the audit testing to the presence of 
specific risks.
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Paragraphs 13 and 28 specifically indicate the auditor should inquire of management about the risk 
of material misstatement due to fraud. Other paragraphs seem to allude to the need to inquire of 
management (e.g., paragraphs 16,18 and 28). We believe the statement should be clearer on the 
extent to which the auditor must inquire of management, versus what he may become aware of in 
the course of performing his planned audit procedures.
We believe the statement is not clear enough on the documentation requirements imposed by the 
standard. The reference in paragraph 36 to documenting any changes to the initial assessment of 
the risk of material misstatement due to fraud seems open to broad interpretation. When combined 
with the language used in other paragraphs it would appear that the consideration of fraud would 
be documented:
GEO. S. O L IV E  &  CO.
• when considering client acceptance (paragraph 24)
• in the planning stage, during initial risk assessment and including the results of client inquiry 
(paragraphs 16, 18 and 24)
• in obtaining an understanding of an entity’s internal control (paragraph 24)
• with each proposed audit adjustment (paragraph 33)
• in concluding on the audit (paragraph 32)
We recommend that the ASB consider the appropriate level of documentation and present the 
expectation clearly in a paragraph on documentation.
In addition to these concerns about the implementation of this new standard, we have concerns 
about client relationship issues and liability risks inherent in this document. Additional time will be 
required on each audit to document the assessment of fraud risk, etc. We believe it will be difficult 
to convince a client of the value of that additional time when we are giving no additional assurance 
on the risk of misstatement due to fraud. In fact, we believe any discussion of additional fees with 
respect to “auditing for fraud” will increase the client’s expectations of our responsibility to detect 
fraud. This “expectation gap” may result in increased potential litigation from users of audited 
financial statements. We are concerned that the documentation of the fraud risk factors may be 
open to misinterpretation by attorneys and jurists. While these “business factors” are not a reason 
to avoid an appropriate auditing standard, we believe the ASB should take these factors into 
consideration in writing the standard.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this exposure draft. Please direct any questions 
about our response to James E. Morris, Director of Assurance Services, 201 N. Illinois Street,
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August 13,1996
Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Exposure Draft on Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, “Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit”
Dear Ms. Mancino:
The Accounting and Auditing Committee of the Houston Chapter of the Texas Society of 
Certified Public Accountants is pleased to submit its comments concerning the Exposure Draft 
(ED) entitled Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS)-Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit.
GENERAL COMMENTS
Highly publicized “audit failures” do more damage to the accounting profession than any other 
occurrence. The committee applauds the Auditing Standard Board’s (ASB) efforts to direct 
auditors’ attention to the potential for fruad in audit engagements and to clarify auditors’ present 
responsibilities. In addition, AICPA communication initiatives regarding the ED will initially 
serve to positively influence the public’s and business community’s perceptions of the auditor’s 
responsibilities toward fraud. However, this committee is concerned that the ED may not 
significantly reduce the number of audit failures resulting from lack of fraud detection. There is 
little new or revolutionary in the ED with respect to the detection of fraud, beyond that which is 
already provided by GAAS. The purpose of the ED thus appears to be to increase auditors’ 
awareness of fraud detection. Accordingly, in the long-term, the existence of the ED might well 
serve to further incite the public’s criticism of the accounting profession.
Characteristics and Description of Fraud
The ASB concluded that because both fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriations of 
assets can result in a material misstatement in financial statements, a new standard on fraud 
should encompass both forms of fraud. The SAS notes that the auditor must be most concerned 
with “fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of the financial statements” (paragraph 
2). The standard goes on to describe two such acts: 1) misappropriation of assets and 2)
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fraudulent financial reporting. However, misappropriation of assets does not always result in a 
material misstatement of the financial statements (e.g., a theft might be reported correctly as a 
loss in the financial statements). Conversely, fraudulent financial reporting may not be the result 
of misappropriation of assets. For example, a recent investigation of fraudulent financial 
reporting case by Mary Kay Cosmetics did not reveal any misappropriation of assets. Further, 
while material misappropriation of assets may occur at any level of the company, material 
fraudulent financial reporting usually only occurs with the knowledge of key members of the 
management team (e.g., PharMor, Mary Kay Cosmetics, Miniscribe, etc.). Along the same 
lines, most internal controls are directed toward preventing or detecting employee 
misappropriation of assets; there are significantly fewer controls directed toward management’s 
fraudulent financial reporting. These two types of fraud are so different that auditing standards 
for their detection and prevention should be considered separately.
The committee therefore recommends that the proposed SAS be split into two SASs. The first 
should be directed toward the prevention and detection of misappropriation of assets (still 
separate from the assessment of unintentional errors). The second should be directed 
specifically at the detection and prevention of management fraud. There are several benefits to 
this revised structure. First, the procedures necessary for specifically assessing the potential for 
management fraud may encourage auditor independence. Second, additional guidance could be 
provided with respect to the procedures necessary if either employee or management fraud is 
suspected. For example, “surprise” inventory observations are often discussed with 
management prior to the inventory observation date (e.g., PharMor)—the surprise is directed at 
the company’s employees rather than management. If management fraud is suspected, no 
notification should be made at all.
Risk Factors
The ASB concluded that a specific assessment of risk factors is needed to add assurance that the 
auditors’ responsibility regarding detection of material misstatement due to fraud is 
appropriately addressed. The committee agrees with this approach. However, the committee 
recommends that specific risk factors that are not based on empirical evidence should be 
removed from paragraphs 16 and 18. Upon review of the risk factors listed, it is clear that 
several of the factors are based on anecdotal evidence, making the list of factors look more like 
a “laundry list”. The committee recommends that the SAS’s risk factors be determined based on 
the auditing profession’s existing knowledge and experiences and on findings resulting from 
prior litigation related to audit failures resulting from a lack of detection of fraud. The basis on 
which the risk factors are determined should be described in the SAS. Further, percentages of 
factors which have been present in previous “audit failures” could be provided as a benchmark.
Costs and Benefits
A necessary consequence of the new standard will be increased engagement costs for both the
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audit firm and the client. Auditors will need to perform additional tests and documentation to 
satisfy the requirements of the proposed SAS. These additional costs will be passed on to the 
client. Some of the additional work can be performed through analytical procedures, for which 
the costs are less significant. However, the same may not be said for other work such as 
additional inventory test work. The irony of the client paying for this cost related to fraud 
detection is that this additional cost in no way guarantees or perhaps correlates with the 
detection of fraud.
A second cost issue is the impact that the new standard may have on audit litigation. By taking 
increased responsibility for the detection of fraud, the auditor may be exposing himself/herself to 
additional legal liability. This may not a be a concern as there are many court cases which have 
found that GAAS is not an adequate defense for auditor negligence. The new standard may 
simply be writing into GAAS that for which the courts are already holding auditors responsible.
The views expressed in this response are those of a majority of committee members. Some 
members may hold different views on certain aspects of the ED. All members were encouraged 
to submit their individual responses to the AICPA.
The Accounting and Auditing Committee of the Houston Chapter appreciates the opportunity to 
comment on the exposure draft. Should you have any questions concerning our response, please 
contact Dr. Timothy Louwers at (713) 743-4848.
Very truly yours,
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSTON CHAPTER OF THE 
TEXAS SOCIETY OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
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Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690
American Institute of CPAs
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
The Auditing Standards Subcommittee of the Accounting and Auditing 
Committee of the District of Columbia Institute of CPAs has reviewed the 
Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, Consideration o f Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit. The Subcommittee believes that the guidance 
included in the proposed statement will, if given adequate consideration 
throughout an audit, improve auditor effectiveness in detecting material 
misstatements, including those which may be the result of management or 
employee fraud. The Subcommittee offers the following observations and 
changes to the proposed statement.
Separate Standard on Fraud
The Subcommittee does not believe that a separate standard setting forth the 
auditor's responsibility for the detection of irregularities, such as those 
resulting from fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets, 
is necessary since the proposed statement is intended to provide guidance 
on the auditor's existing responsibility and does not increase that 
responsibility. Furthermore, since the risk of fraud is an element both of 
control risk and inherent risk, we believe that an auditor's responsibility to 
document his or her consideration of fraud risk factors should not exist 
separate from an auditor’s existing responsibility to document his or her 
understanding of the entity's internal controls and internal control structure 
under AU Section 319. Many of the risk factors listed in the proposed 
statement are things that can and should affect an auditor’s assessment of an 
entity's control environment. The Subcommittee recommends that AU 
Section 319 be amended to include a description of the fraud risk factors 
and that the documentation requirements include the auditor's consideration 
of these fraud risk factors. We further recommend that AU Section 316 be 
amended to include the characteristics and description of fraud included in 
the proposed statement.
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The Auditor's Response to Fraud Risk
Many on the Subcommitee found it difficult to reconcile the statement that 
an auditor has no responsibility to determine intent found in footnote 2 with 
the statement that an auditor should consider whether material
misstatements are or may be the result of fraud found in paragraphs 32-35. 
These paragraphs strongly suggest that the auditor make a determination as 
to whether known misstatements were the result of management or 
employee fraud and to respond by, among other things, obtaining evidence 
to determine whether, in fact, material fraud exists, and, if so, its effects. 
Furthermore, paragraphs 36 and 37 state that these determinations should be 
documented as a change in the auditor's risk assessment and evidence of 
possible or actual fraud should be communicated to the appropriate 
management level or the audit commitee.
Fraud is very difficult to prove, even in a court of law. Auditors are not 
engaged to, and are not by themselves qualified to, make such 
determinations. Consequently, the Subcommitee does not feel that an 
auditor should have a responsibility for making a determination as to 
whether fraud did or did not occur. We recommend that the proposed 
statement clearly state this and that the language in footnote 2 be 
emphasized more prominently throughout the statement. We do agree, 
however, that auditors should, in light of any material misstatements, 
reevaluate their assessments of control risk and tests of balances and 
transactions. We also agree that auditors should gauge management's 
response to the auditor's request that the entity's financial statements be 
adjusted and that further testing is necessary in determining whether to 
withdraw from the engagement.
Further, the proposed statement continues to view the auditor's response to 
fraud risk from a purely substantive audit approach. Many on the Sub
commitee did not believe that traditional tests for fraud are being regularly 
performed on audits. Consequently, future guidance on implementing this • 
proposed statement needs to include a description of suggested types of 
substantive audit tests to be performed when faced with fraud risks in 
particular industries and common account balances and transactions. 
Sincerely,
Scot E. McNulty, CPA 
Chairperson
Accounting and Auditing Commitee
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Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to the exposure draft (ED), Consideration o f Fraud in 
a Financial Statement Audit. We believe that the ED provides necessary clarification and 
guidance on auditor responsibility for detecting fraud. However, we identified three areas in 
which you may want to consider providing additional guidance or clarification.
First, we believe expectations are high for auditors to detect fraud in the government arena and 
therefore, we would appreciate additional guidance for addressing fraud in auditing government 
entities. Many of the risk factors presented in the ED are most pertinent to audits of profit- 
oriented organizations in the private sector. While some of the suggested risk factors included in 
the ED are universal to all types of audit engagements, we also would appreciate inclusion of 
factors that may address some of the unique characteristics of a government audit environment. 
For example, in anticipation of upcoming elections, there may be incentives or pressures to 
present certain government programs in a favorable light to secure re-election or to ensure the 
continuation of a controversial program in the event of a change in political parties. Such political 
changes could increase the risks of fraudulent financial reporting. In another example, 
government programs that provide payments to several individuals, such as entitlement programs, 
may increase the susceptibility of assets to misappropriation, especially if the program is 
administered across multiple agencies or levels of government. Periodically including the various 
listings of risk factors in the ED factors that may be especially pertinent to government may help 
auditors better recognize the importance of considering fraud as part of financial audits of 
government entities.
Second, we believe that additional communication with the auditee is needed to clarify their 
understanding of the auditor’s responsibilities to detect fraud as part of our financial audits. 
Paragraph 13 indicates that the auditor should inquire of management to obtain the client’s view 
regarding the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. While we believe that this 
communication can be an excellent step for both parties to identify areas of risk, we have 
concerns that management may misinterpret the reasons for the inquiries. It is possible, without 
explicit communication to the contrary, that management may believe that the auditors are testing 
for fraud related to the specific areas noted during discussions. If the auditor deems the risk of 
material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud is not significant and performs no 
additional audit work in the area, management may mistakenly rely on the audit to detect fraud. 
While paragraph 37 discusses communication with the auditee regarding results of the auditor’s
Ms. Jane M. Mancino 
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consideration of fraud, we believe that the auditing standard also should suggest that the auditor 
clearly communicate with management regarding the responsibilities of the auditor versus those of 
management relating to controls to detect and prevent fraud.
In the government arena, such communication may involve clarifying the auditor’s responsibility 
for detecting fraud as it may relate to the level of statements upon which the auditor opines. For 
example, although the auditor may be auditing the combined financial statements, often 
expectations exist that the auditors will detect fraud material to a specific program or individual 
fund, regardless of the materiality of the program or fund relative to the combined statements.
The final area relates to documentation of the assessment of risk as discussed in paragraph 36.
The proposed standard does not provide guidance on how this risk should be assessed. Should 
the risk be assessed qualitatively, such as at a low, moderate, or high level, or should it be 
assessed on a quantifiable basis? While we do not believe the standard should specifically 
prescribe how the assessment of risk should be completed or documented, additional guidance 
would be appreciated and may help increase consistency in the profession.
We appreciate the efforts of the Auditing Standards Board on this important project and the 
opportunity to provide our comments. Should you have any questions or need additional 
information regarding our response, please contact myself or Ryan Voge, who coordinated our 
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Re: File 2690
Dear Ms. Mancino:
We are pleased to submit our comments on the proposed auditing standard, "Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit" (the ED). Our comments on the content and substance of the ED are presented 
below. Our responses to the questions presented in the "Commentator Guide to Significant Issues" on 
page 8 of the ED are included in Exhibit I. Lastly, our editorial comments are included in Exhibit I.
Overal Comments
We believe the objective of the ED, to clarify the auditors' responsibility for the detection of intentional and 
material financial statement misstatements (fraud), and give more definitive guidance to enhance the 
auditors' ability to discharge this responsibility, is needed and appropriate. Unfortunately, there is 
evidence that both clarification and improved performance are needed as demonstrated by continuing 
instances of material fraudulent financial reporting undetected by the auditor.
The responsibility to detect material misstatements due to fraud is critical to investors' and analysts' 
confidence in the financial reporting process, as wel as the continued wel-being of U.S. financial markets. 
Therefore, the additional audit effort to implement this proposal, which is expected to be minimal in the 
vast majority of cases, is warranted.
Notwithstanding the benefits of improved clarity and performance criteria, the final statement must be 
carefuly balanced. That is, while clearly stating the auditor's fraud detection and performance 
responsibilities, it must not create expectations that, given the inherent limitations in the audit process, 
cannot be met. Our comments below are intended to maintain that balance.
Principal Comments
Internal Control (paragraphs 22, 23 and 26)
We believe more emphasis needs to be placed on internal control. In many cases, weak or nonexistent 
internal controls create a risk of fraud. Therefore, an understanding — and in many cases an assessment - 
of operating effectiveness wil assist the auditor in properly assessing fraud risk associated with identified 
risk factors. Also, increased emphasis wil sensitize the auditor to the absence of internal controls to deter, 
prevent and detect fraud that make the enterprise vulnerable to intentional material misstatements of the 
financial statements. Lastly, such increased emphasis should result in improved communications to senior 
management of the need to address this critical aspect of reliable financial reporting.




1. Adding additional emphasis (paragraph 22, i.e., during the consideration of risk factors stage) to the 
importance of obtaining an understanding, and w here appropriate assessing operating effectiveness, 
of internal controls that address identified fraud risk factors. To accomplish this, guidance could be 
added that suggests the auditor consider whether there are internal controls in place that mitigate 
identified fraud risk factors in the incentives/pressures and management integrity categories (see our 
point "Fraud Risk Categories" below). If the auditor is unable to identify adequate controls designed 
to address, or others which mitigate, the identified fraud risk, the auditor may be unable to design 
substantive procedures to reduce the detection risk to an acceptably low level. In those situations, the 
auditor should consider whether to resign from the engagement. This focus adds the necessary 
emphasis to the importance of controls to the auditor's fraud risk assessment, and causes him  or her 
to consider their impact upon auditability at an early stage in the audit.
2. Expanding the guidance in paragraph 23 to include a narrative description of best control practices to 
deter, prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting. We believe the prior draft appendix 
(removed from the final ED) would be useful information for drafting the additional narrative. 
Alternatively, the prior appendix, edited as appropriate, could be reinserted into the final standard.
3. Noting that for some entities and industries (e.g., the casino industry), the incentives relate primarily 
to m isappropriation of assets and in these cases the auditor ordinarily should devote more attention 
to assessing the operating effectiveness of internal controls that mitigate this risk. Such an example(s) 
could be added to paragraph 17.
Description and Characteristics of Fraud (paragraph 2 and related discussion in paragraphs 3 through 5)
We strongly support the auditor's responsibility to "plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable - 
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by 
error or fraud," reaffirmed in paragraph 1 of the ED. This responsibility, as it applies to fraud, runs to 
intentional material misstatements of the financial statements regardless of the underlying motive (e.g., 
inflate earnings to meet analyst's expectations or to conceal a theft of company assets). The ED selects one 
of the motives; i.e., m isappropriation of assets, and treats it as though it were a type of fraud for which the 
auditor has a detection responsibility, independent from the responsibility to detect material misstatements 
of the financial statements.*
* Our experience has been that most misappropriations (a) usually involve the very acts cited in paragraph 
7 which the ED acknowledges the auditor is not trained to detect and (b) do not result in a material 
misstatement of financial statements in any one reporting period. Furthermore, it has also been our 
experience that incentives other than theft of company assets have been the principal reason for fraudulent 
financial reporting.
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This separate treatm ent implies, inappropriately, that the auditor's detection responsibility runs to the 
underlying cause of a material misstatement. Furthermore, elevating misappropriation of assets as a 
separate type of fraud creates its own risks—an expectation gap risk. For example, the auditor could be 
held accountable for (a) losses caused by poor management decisions (e.g., concealed trading losses 
misconstrued as a misappropriation), 0?) failing to report deficiencies in internal controls over safeguarding 
assets that provided the opportunity to steal, and (c) failing to detect a misappropriation not necessarily 
material to the financial statements, but material in absolute amounts.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we suggest that the two types of fraud be collapsed into a 
single encompassing concept (i.e., "material misstatement due to fraud" as used throughout the ED), with 
significant focus on the auditor's responsibility to detect material misstatements due to fraud. The corresponding 
discussion of underlying causes would include examples w here misappropriation of assets is involved. 
Alternatively, but less preferably, the two categories could be relabeled in a way that avoids the risk of 
misunderstanding.
Fraud Risk Categories (paragraphs 15 through 18)
Paragraph 6 identified two key considerations important to the assessment of fraud risk; incentives or 
pressures and opportunities (or vulnerabilities; see comment regarding paragraph 6 in "Other Comments" 
below). However, this easily understood concept is not carried through in the discussion of fraud risk 
factors in paragraphs 15 through 18. These two factors, together w ith management integrity, form the 
environment in which fraud m ay occur. Consistent w ith this model, w e believe these three fraud risk 
categories should be the only overall categories applicable to all cases of fraud resulting in materially 
misstated financial statements (including those where m isappropriation of assets is involved):
o Vulnerabilities—effect of internal controls 
o Facts that might bear on the integrity of management 
o Incentives and pressures
Additionally, we believe a fourth category is necessary to accumulate fraud risk "indicators." Thesediffer 
from fraud risk factors in that they are not causal, but rather indicate that a fraud may have occurred. It 
w ould appear that auditors w ould be better able to operationalize the fraud risk assessment using these 
four categories, and secondly, most of the examples cited in  the ED fall under one of these categories.
We also believe this approach will focus the auditor's attention on the two most important factors in a 
fraud risk assessment, internal controls and management integrity. Incentives and pressures are certainly a 
consideration, bu t those factors can be found in almost every audit engagement. Whether management or 
others succumb to those pressures and incentives depends solely upon the integrity of the individuals 
involved, and w hether the internal control environment w ould enable a fraudulent act to occur (i.e., 
vulnerability).
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As discussed above, we believe m ore emphasis needs to be placed on internal control since that is w hat 
reduces an entity's vulnerability risk, and this four category approach will do just that. In addition, this 
emphasis will elevate the importance of internal controls in a fraud risk assessment along with the 
reporting of deficiencies in  the financial reporting process to senior management.
If the Board decides not to revise the fraud risk categories as suggested above, we suggest that the three 
categories for risk factors relating to fraudulent financial reporting should be consistent with the risk 
factors relating to m isappropriation of assets—i.e., the latter contains a separate category for controls while 
the former does not.
Inquiries of M anagement (paragraph 13)
Paragraph 13 calls for the auditor to "inquire of management regarding the client's view regarding the risk 
of material misstatement due to fraud." We have two suggestions w ith respect to this important 
procedure. First, the results of that inquiry should be documented in the work papers as it is a critical step in 
identifying both risk factors and areas that might call for additional audit work. Secondly, we recommend 
that the standard be more specific as to whom to direct those inquiries. We suggest that, at a minimum, the 
inquiries be directed to, w hen applicable, the chief executive, operating and financial officers, the controller 
and the director of internal audit a n d /o r  others with similar oversight responsibilities.
Relatedly, we suggest that the inquiry of management address two issues: (1) management's knowledge of 
any fraud or fraud risk factors and (2) the basis for management's knowledge including any steps taken to 
deter, prevent and detect fraud. This inquiry emphasizes to management their responsibility with respect 
to material misstatements due to fraud as well as the need to have in place and monitor, internal controls 
over that risk. Relatedly, a lack of controls or significant weaknesses therein discovered as a result of such 
inquiries may be a "reportable condition." We suggest adding this guidance and cross referencing the 
discussion to paragraph 39.
Documentation (paragraph 36)
We agree with the requirem ent to docum ent the fraud risk assessment along the lines described in 
paragraph 36. Furthermore, we suggest that documentation of the fraud risk assessment at completion of 
the audit be made whether or not the results of fieldwork increase the initial fraud risk assessment. To 
require documentation only w hen there is an increase, fails to provide evidence that the auditor considered 
the results at the end of the engagement. It is inconsistent to require documentation in the planning stage 
where a rela tive ly  sm all p e rcen tag e  o f the  a u d it  effort is expended, and not require documentation at the 
completion of the audit which reflects 100% of the audit effort and audit results. In our opinion, an explicit 
documentation requirem ent is critical to enhancing the auditor's performance. Also, working paper 
evidence explicitly addressing fraud risk at the completion of the audit is equally, if not more important, 
than evidencing the risk assessment at the planning stage.
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Other Comments (in ED paragraph order)
Title
The present title is too broad in that it implies responsibility for immaterial fraud. We suggest inserting the 
w ord "material" before "fraud" to be consistent with the guidance in AU 110 and AU 316 and 
appropriately relate the title to the auditor's responsibility.
Footnote 2
Given the discussion in the ED and the requirement for the auditor to assess w hether identified
misstatements are indicative of fraud (paragraph 33), w e have difficulty understanding the discussion in 
Footnote 2. It would seem that the whole purpose of this standard is for the auditor to assess, as difficult as 
it m ight be, intent and consider the implications of intentional misstatements. We suggest deleting the 
third sentence in Footnote 2 to simplify the guidance.
Paragraph 6 (Incentives/Pressures and Opportunities)
"Opportunities" has a positive connotation which may be inappropriate for describing fraudulent 
behavior. We suggest that "perceived opportunity" be replaced by "vulnerability." We feel that 
vulnerability better describes the condition(s) which expose the entity to the risk of material misstatements 
due to fraud.
Paragraph 16 (Additional Risk Factors)
In our experience, the following additional risk factors are important indicators of potential fraud. We 
encourage the Board to consider their inclusion in the appropriate categories, subject to the final resolution 
of those categories.
♦ Lines of business or activities that involve material "off balance sheet" exposures (e.g., trading in 
commodities or derivatives).
♦ Financial performance reports are not available prom ptly and directly from the company's main 
accounting systems, but require m anual intervention.
♦ Failure to record write-downs of inventories, receivables (bad debt reserves), or plant and equipment 
w hen there are significant declines in revenues, slowdowns in receivables and inventory turnovers, or 
poor market reception of new products.
♦ Significant percentage changes in sales, accounts receivable, accounts payable and inventory that fail 
to correspond to one another. [Fraud Indicator, see comments regarding paragraph 24.]
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♦ The lack of controls over financial information and services provided over the Internet.
♦ Increased capitalization of expenses compared to prior periods an d /o r competitors (i.e., higher than 
industry norms). [Fraud Indicator, see comments regarding paragraph 24.]
♦ Declining valuation reserves without clear economic justification.
♦ Interest expense significantly out of line w ith  recorded interest bearing debt obligations (may indicate 
unrecorded loans). [Fraud Indicator, see comments regarding paragraph 24.]
♦ The company is preparing to list on a securities exchange and the m argin of compliance w ith the 
listing requirem ents (e.g., total assets, net w orth and net income) is tight.
Paragraph 24 (Other Conditions or Indicators)
Paragraph 24 details a num ber of other conditions which w e believe are im portant "indicators" that impact 
the auditor's fraud risk assessment. First, we suggest that these factors be described as fraud risk 
indicators. Second, we suggest, at a minimum, that there should be a cross-reference in the earlier 
discussions of fraud risk factors to the discussion of indicators cited in paragraph 24, pointing out that 
these oftentimes may have been identified in prior audits.
Alternatively, the Board could create a fourth "category" called "indicators" that would include these 
factors and be presented in the earlier discussion of fraud risk factors. Having all of the risk factors along 
w ith these im portant indicators in one place, we believe, will facilitate a better fraud risk assessment and 
emphasize that the risk factors identified and considered in  planning should also be kept in mind during 
fieldwork.
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24 correctly acknowledges that the fraud risk assessment is an ongoing process. We suggest that 
because of the continuing nature of the fraud risk assessment that that "obligation be stated in paragraph 12, 
consistent w ith  our suggestion that all of the fraud risk factors and indicators be set forth in  one section of 
the standard.
Paragraph 25
AU 230, paragraph 11 (in the proposed am endm ent thereof) states that, "The independent auditor's 
objective is to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to provide him or her w ith a reasonable basis 
for forming an opinion. In the great majority of cases, the auditor finds it necessary to rely on evidence that is 
persuasive rather than convincing (emphasis added)." We believe that due to the inherent limitations of the 
audit process, the auditor always accumulates evidence that is persuasive rather than convincing. The 
implication that there are times when such evidence may need to be convincing could easily be linked to
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fraud since it is a rare case (i.e., the minority). We acknowledge that there are degrees of persuasiveness that 
will reflect the risk associated w ith a particular audit area. However, we don 't believe it is appropriate for 
the auditor particularly in  the case of a fraud risk assessment, to be held to a "convincing" criteria. We also 
acknowledge that this is a direct quote from AU 326, paragraph 20. Therefore, we suggest that both the 
amendment to AU 230 and paragraph 20 of AU 326 delete the words, "In the great majority of cases." 
Paragraphs 25 and 35
The last sentence in paragraph 25 acknowledges that, in some circumstances, the auditor m ay conclude that 
it is not practicable to increase the audit work sufficiently to address the identified fraud risk, and that 
withdrawal may be the only appropriate step. We believe this sentence should be strengthened further — 
when the auditor concludes that the risk runs primarily to the integrity of management at the highest levels 
(i.e., those who sign the general representation letter), the auditor ordinarily should resign from the 
engagement or disclaim an opinion. Serious reservations (i.e., persuasive evidence exists) about the integrity 
of senior management cannot be overcome through substantive audit procedures, and, in our view, 
precludes the auditor from  relying upon w ritten representations from those whose truthfulness is called 
into question.
Paragraph 28
We suggest adding to the ED's auditor response guidance, a preference for testing significant accounting 
estimates through developm ent of an expected amount (by independent calculation or use of a specialist) 
or examination of subsequent events rather than by reviewing and testing the process by which accounting 
estimates are developed. We also suggest, that when fraud risk factors are present, guidance encouraging 
the auditor to consider perform ing a background check on managem ent be added. Lastly, the guidance 
regarding confirmations could be expanded to suggest that w hen fraud risk factors exist, the confirmations 
may need to include more and different information, could be sent to different people and may require 
more exhaustive non-reply procedures.
Paragraphs 28 through 30 ,
The discussion of auditor response in these paragraphs is, at times, redundant and confusing. If the Board 
simplifies the Description and Characteristics of Fraud (as discussed above), we believe m uch of the guidance 
in these paragraphs could be combined and simplified. We suggest doing so by collapsing the three 
paragraphs into one, perhaps two, paragraph(s) that sum m arize responses designed to detect material 
misstatements due to fraud.
SAS No. 7
We encourage the Board to consider the impact of the ED on the requirements of SAS No. 7. Specifically, 
the inquiries and the limited working paper access set forth in SAS No. 7 may not be adequate to elicit all
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the information that m ight be relevant in assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting in a first-time- 
through engagement.
SAS No. 19
The Board should consider w hether the wording of the general representation letter should be revised in 
light of the new fraud standard. This w ould be more than just a conforming change. For example, to 
document the inquiry of managem ent called for in paragraph 13 of the ED, a representation could be 
added; "There are no (we have informed you of) subsidiary locations, business segments...or financial 
statement categories where significant fraud risk factors exist or m ay be likely to exist." Also, the 
representations could include the steps management has or intends to take to address identified fraud 
risks. In addition, since the term  irregularities is replaced w ith the term(s) fraud or material misstatements 
due to frau d , other changes to SAS 19 and the sample representation letter are necessary.
Very truly yours,




Responses to Questions Posed in the "Commentator Guide to Significant Issues"
1. Does SAS No. 53 clearly articulate the auditor's responsibility to detect and report errors and 
irregularities?
We believe the auditor's responsibility to detect and report errors and irregularities as set forth in SAS 
No. 53 needs clarification.
2. Should the auditing standards contain a separate standard on fraud or continue w ith a standard that 
encompasses both fraud (i.e., irregularities) and error?
A separate standard devoted exclusively to fraud is appropriate because user expectations are high, and 
evidence to date indicates that those expectations are not being fully met.
3. Should a new standard on fraud encompass both fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriations 
of assets?
We do not agree that the new standard on fraud should treat fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets as two separate and equal types of fraud for the reasons set forth in our 
response.
4. Should the auditor, in a financial statement audit, be required to specifically assess the risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud?
We strongly believe that the auditor should be required to specifically assess the risk of material 
financial statement misstatements due to fraud in much the same fashion that current auditing 
standards require the auditor to address inherent and control risks.
5. Should the proposed standard contain categories of risk factors that the auditor should consider, 
specific risk factors, both, or neither?
We believe the SAS should contain categories of risk factors; however, we disagree w ith the way the 
exposure draft has categorized the sample risk factors, for the reasons noted in our comment letter.
6. How should the auditor respond to the risk assessment?
We generally agree w ith  the guidance provided for responding to the risk assessment.
7. Is there a need to docum ent the fraud risk assessment, and if so, w hat should be documented?
We concur with the requirem ent to document the fraud risk assessment, and as our comment letter 
points out, suggest that the final SAS go even further than the ED.
-1-
8. Should the auditor's communication responsibilities to management, the audit committee and others 
change w ith  the proposed standard?
We agree w ith incorporating into the new standard the existing SAS 53 communication responsibilities.
9. Comments regarding costs and benefits.
Finally, for the reasons cited in the introductory part of our comment letter, the potential benefits (while 
not quantifiable) to the financial markets from enhanced auditor performance justifies the increase in 
audit effort (which, as noted above, will be minimal in the vast majority of audit engagements, but 





1. The standard should clarify via footnote whether it also applies to audits 
of elements of a financial statem ent or incomplete financial 
presentations.
2. At the end of the first sentence, there should be a footnote reference to 
paragraphs 3-7 of SAS No. 47.
13. Management should not be described as the client; therefore, delete "the
client's" and insert "their."
16a. Third line of bullet point regarding portion of management's
compensation derived from bonuses, etc. — we suggest adding cash 
flows; "...aggressive targets for operating results, financial position or 
cash flows."
26. We believe that requirem ent (b) in the first bullet of paragraph 26 is
confusing. We suggest deleting "increased recognition of the need to 
corroborate management...." and replacing w ith "increased 
corroboration of management...."
32. The second sentence should be revised to read, "At the completion of the 
audit, the auditor should consider...."
33. In the second sentence, fifth line, consider changing the word 
"employee(s)" to "personnel." Some practitioners may not consider a 
senior management person an employee.
-1-
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Technical Manager, Audit and Attest Standards 
AICPA
1211 Avenue o f the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Exposure Draft
“Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit” 
File 2690
Dear Ms. Mancino:
We are pleased to have this opportunity to comment on the exposure draft listed above. 
We support the guidance included in the exposure draft. However, we have the 
following comments for consideration by the Board prior to issuance o f the proposed 
standard.
The discussion on misappropriation of assets should be expanded to emphasize that the 
auditor's responsibility is to determine whether the financial statements are fairly stated 
and not whether misappropriations are detected. For example, a misappropriation may 
have occurred but the financial statements are fairly stated. The current document 
could imply that the auditor is responsible for detecting misappropriations regardless of 
their impact on the financial statements.
Paragraph 13 requires inquiry of management to obtain the client’s view regarding the 
risk o f material misstatement due to fraud. We believe that this inquiry is consistent 
with the guidance included in SAS 78. Because the exposure draft and SAS 78 will be 
effective at the same time, we suggest that the sentence, “This inquiry could be 
performed as part o f  obtaining an understanding o f  the internal control risk 
assessment component. ” be added to the end of paragraph 13 to assist auditors in 
understanding the interrelationship between these two standards.
Paragraph 22 paraphrases the auditor’s responsibility under SAS 78. However, the 
paraphrase appears to broaden the auditor’s requirement for understanding controls 
although we do not believe that was the intent. We suggest that the sentence be 
changed to “SAS No. 55.... requires the auditor to obtain a sufficient understanding of
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the entity’s internal control over financial reporting to plan the aud it....” (proposed 
change in italics).
Paragraph 23 discusses an entity that has established a fraud prevention program and 
states that the auditor may consider its effectiveness. We suggest that the first sentence 
be changed to "If the entity has established a program that includes proactive steps to 
prevent, deter, and detect fraud, the auditor may consider the existence o f such a 
program and adjust the audit approach accordingly."
Paragraph 36 discusses the documentation o f the auditor’s risk assessment and 
response. We strongly encourage the AICPA to finalize the implementation guidance 
for this requirement and present it to the Board prior to the final balloting of the 
proposed standard.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments or to provide any further information we 
have that would be helpful in completing the proposed standard.
Sincerely,
Ernst & Young  llp 2000 National City Center 
1900 East 9th Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44114-3494
■ Phone: 216 861 5000
August 23, 1996
Ms. Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690
American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue o f the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
Dear Ms. Mancino:
Ernst & Young LLP supports the exposure draft Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards 
(SAS), Consideration o f  Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, including superseding SAS No. 
53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities, and amending 
SASs No. 1, Codification o f  Auditing Standards and Procedures, and No. 47, Audit Risk and 
Materiality in Conducting an Audit. We believe that the exposure draft provides improved 
guidance for auditors in the area of fraud detection and will assist auditors in meeting their 
responsibilities.
The appendix to this letter includes certain comments for improving the exposure draft.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments and recommendations with members of the 
Auditing Standards Board or its staff.
Sincerely,






The last sentence of this paragraph states that “when considering the 
significance of fraud risk factors, the auditor may wish to assess whether there 
are specific controls that mitigate the risk.” We agree with this statement, but 
believe that the guidance is incomplete as it does not cover situations where 
missing controls exacerbate the risk. Paragraph 20 illustrates the effects that 
deficient controls may have on the assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud.
We suggest that the last sentence of this paragraph be amended to also direct 
auditors to consider the effects of deficient controls.
This understanding often will affect the auditor’s consideration of the significance of fraud 
risk factors. In addition, when considering the significance of fraud risk factors, the auditor 
may wish to assess whether there are specific controls that mitigate, or additional control 
deficiencies that exacerbate, the risk.
We understand that the Board does not expect that the auditor will always need 
to respond to the assessed risk of material misstatement due to fraud. However, 
the second sentence does not state this intention as clearly as it might. 
Accordingly, we suggest this paragraph be clarified to make explicit that the 
degree of risk influences whether a response is necessary as well as the nature of 
the response.
25. A risk of material misstatement due to fraud is always present to some degree. 
Consequently, whether a response is necessary, and if so, the nature of the 
auditor’s response is influenced by the degree of risk assessed. In some cases, 
even though some of the fraud risk factors are present, the auditor’s
judgment may be that audit procedures otherwise planned are sufficient to
respond to the risk factors. In other circumstances, the auditor may conclude
that the conditions indicate a need to modify procedures. In these cases, the 
auditor should consider whether the assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud indicates a need for an overall response, one that is 
specific to a particular account balance, class of transactions or assertion, or both. 
The auditor also may conclude that it is not practicable to modify the procedures 
that are planned for the audit of the financial statements sufficiently to address the 
risk, in which case withdrawal from the engagement with communication to 






Paragraph 25 discusses the idea that the auditor’s response to the results of the 
assessment of material misstatement due to fraud is influenced by the degree of 
risk assessed, and that in some cases “audit procedures otherwise planned are 
sufficient to respond to the risk factors,” and “in other circumstances the auditor 
may conclude that the conditions indicate the need to modify (otherwise 
planned) procedures.”
In discussing possible ways that the nature, timing, and extent of procedures 
may need to be modified, we suggest that paragraph 27 be amended to 
incorporate (and reemphasize) the concepts from paragraph 25 as follows:
27. Depending on the degree of risk assessed, the nature, timing and extent of procedures 
may need to be modified in the following ways:
Consistent with our comment regarding paragraph 27, we suggest the following 
revisions to the second and third sentences in this paragraph. We believe that 
these changes help to clarify the relationship between the degree of risk assessed 
and the testing approach that might be applied.
28. Specific responses to the auditor’s assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud will vary depending on the types or combinations of fraud risk factors or conditions 
identified and the account balances, classes of transactions, and assertions they may affect. 
If these factors or conditions indicate a particular risk requiring an audit response for 
applicable to specific account balances or types of transactions, audit procedures 
addressing these specific areas should be considered that will, in the auditor’s judgment, 
limit audit risk to an appropriate level in light of the risk factors or conditions identified. In 
determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit work to be performed in response to the
risk  of material misstatement due to fraud identified with respect to specific-account
balances classes of transactions, and assertions, The following are specific examples of 
the nature, timing, and extent of the audit work that might be performed in these 







This paragraph provides examples of specific responses to the auditor’s 
assessment of the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. We believe that these 
examples are intended to assist auditors who already have concluded that a 
specific response to the risk is appropriate. Therefore, we consider the 
introductory “if statements” regarding these responses to be confusing and 
unnecessary, and suggest that they be deleted.
• Revenue Recognition. If there is a risk of material misstatement due to fraud-that
may involve or result in.improper revenue recognition, I t may be appropriate to
confirm with customers certain relevant contract terms and the absence of side 
agreements -  inasmuch as the appropriate accounting is often influenced by such 
terms or agreements.
•  Inventory Quantities. If-a-risk-of-material-misstatement due to fraud-exists in 
inventory-quantities Reviewing the client’s inventory records may help to 
identify locations, areas or items for specific attention during or after the physical 
inventory count.
The fourth sentence of this paragraph indicates that auditors may evaluate 
control risk differently in situations where they have concluded that the risk of 
asset misappropriation is significant. We believe that this sentence is confusing, 
because it is unclear why control risk may be evaluated differently in each of the 
situations described.
In order to better identify the “specific responses” discussed in this paragraph as 
“audit responses,” we suggest the following changes to the first sentence. Also, 
we believe that there may be situations where the procedures discussed in the 
last sentence of this paragraph would be performed in lieu of the other 
procedures discussed. Accordingly, we suggest that this sentence be revised to 
replace “in addition” with “in certain circumstances.”
31. Usually the audit response to a risk of material misstatement due to fraud related to 
misappropriation of assets will be directed towards affect certain account balances and 
classes of transactions. Although some of the audit responses noted in paragraph 29 may 
apply in such, circumstances, the scope of the work should be linked to the specific 
information about the misappropriation risk that has been identified. For example, where a 
particular asset is highly susceptible to misappropriation that is potentially material to the 
financial statements, obtaining an understanding of the control activities related to the 
prevention and detection of such misappropriation and testing the operating effectiveness 
of such controls may be warranted. In certain circumstances addition, physical inspection 











We suggest that the last sentence of this paragraph be revised to take into 
consideration the fact that the accumulation may indicate that sufficient 
procedures have been performed.
Such an accumulation may provide further insight into the risk of material misstatement 
due to fraud and suggest whether there is a the need for additional or different audit 
procedures to be performed.
The second sentence of this paragraph requires, among other things, that fraud 
risk factors and other conditions that “significantly impact the risk of material 
misstatement” due to fraud be documented. In the third sentence of this 
paragraph, additional documentation requirements are established “if during the 
performance of the audit, fraud risk factors and other conditions are identified 
that cause the auditor to believe that the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud has increased.”
We suggest that the documentation requirements in the second sentence of this 
paragraph be made consistent with the requirements in the third sentence, and 
that in planning the audit, only fraud risk factors and other conditions that 
“indicate a need for an overall response, one that is specific to a particular 
account balance, class of transactions or assertion, or both,” be documented.
The documentation should include any fraud risk factors that the auditor believes, 
individually or in combination, indicate a need for an overall response, one that 
is specific to a particular account balance, class of transactions or assertion, 
or both, significantly impact the risk- of material misstatement together with the 
auditor’s response to those risk factors (see paragraphs 25-31).
We suggest that the discussion of reasonable assurance in this paragraph also 
include an explicit link to the concept of “audit risk,” as provided below. In 
addition, we suggest that a footnote be added to refer auditors to new paragraph 
27 of SAS 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit.
10. The exercise of due professional care allows the auditor to obtain reasonable assurance 
that the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or 
fraud. Absolute assurance is not attainable because of the nature of audit evidence and the 
characteristics of fraud, and the fact that there is always some audit risk.
We believe the last sentence of this paragraph is out of place in the context of 
the paragraph. As an alternative, we suggest that the concepts in this sentence be 
incorporated into paragraph 12 of the proposed amendment to AU section 230.





This paragraph provides guidance that auditors should consider in an audit o f an 
entity with operations in multiple locations or components, including factors to 
consider in assessing the extent to which auditing procedures should be 
performed at selected locations or components. We believe that factors (a) and 
(e) are very similar and suggest that the concept o f materiality, as discussed in 
(e), be incorporated into (a), and that (e) be deleted.
State of Michigan
ffice of the Auditor General 
201 N. ashin ton Square 
ansin , ichian 48913
(517) 334-8050 
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homas H. c avish, C.P.A. 
Auditor General
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Ms. Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager, Audit and Atest Standards (File 2690)
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
We have reviewed the AICPA Exposure Draft (ED) of the proposed Statement on 
Auditing Standards, entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, and 
generaly agree with the proposed guidance. The ED is wel writen, easy to comprehend, 
and should provide information (e.g., specific risk factors relating to fraudulent financial 
reporting and to misappropriation of assets) that is essential for the auditor. We do, 
however, have the folowing comments for consideration by the Auditing Standards Board 
(Board) in developing the final Statement.
1. According to the transmital leter, the AICPA held an on-line conference on the 
Accountants Forum on CompuServe on June 19, 1996. The purpose of that 
conference was to explain the provisions of the ED and to alow suficient time for 
questions and answers. We fuly support the concept of on-line conferences for future 
proposed pronouncements, and we appreciate the Board taking the initiative on this 
important ED. However, by the date of the on-line conference, respondents had only 
a few weeks to review the 47-page ED, which had an exposure period ending on 
August 15, 1996. To provide sufficient time for respondents to understand the issues 
involved and, thus, increase conference participation, we suggest that the AICPA 
schedule future on-line conferences for proposed pronouncements nearer (within 30 
days) to the end of the exposure periods.
2. Paragraph 15, on Page 18, lists three categories of risk factors that relate to fraudulent 
financial reporting—management characteristics, industry conditions, and operating 
characteristics and financial stability. Because of the dominance and influence of 
management characteristics, we suggest adding a sentence in Paragraph 15 (similar 
to the second sentence in Paragraph 17), such as ’The auditor’s consideration of the 
risk factors in categories b. and c. may be influenced by the nature and extent to 
which the risk factors in category a. are present.” Also, because certain individual
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risk factors (e.g., domination of management by a single person or inadequate 
monitoring of significant controls) appear more frequently than other factors, we 
suggest adding the following two sentences in Paragraph 15: "Certain risk factors 
may be present on many typical audit engagements; others will appear rarely. 
However, the auditor should consider each risk factor important, regardless of the 
frequency of its presence."
3. In Paragraph 16.b., on Page 20, the fourth risk factor, relating to industry conditions, 
begins "Rapid changes in the industry, such as significant declines in customer 
demand...." Because that example more appropriately indicates a declining industry, 
we suggest that it be relocated with the third risk factor in Paragraph 16.b., to read 
"Declining industry with increasing business failures and significant declines in 
customer demand."
4. Also in Paragraph 16.b., on Page 20, we suggest adding a fifth risk factor, "Cyclical 
or seasonal industry in which purchases or sales fluctuations impair the financial 
stability of the entity." Toy retailing, food processing, and consumer goods 
manufacturing are examples of cyclical or seasonal industries.
5. In Paragraph 18.b., on Page 21, we suggest expanding the third risk factor, relating 
to employee relationships or pressures, to read "Unexplained unusual and observable 
changes in behavior and/or lifestyle of employees with access to assets susceptible to 
misappropriation." Changes in lifestyle (e.g., larger residence, new recreational 
vehicles, lavish vacations) may be separate and distinct from changes in behavior.
6. In Paragraph 24, on Page 24, the first two examples of problematic or unusual 
relationships between the auditor and the client are "Denied access to records or 
facilities" and "Denied access to certain employees, customers, vendors, or others 
from whom audit evidence might be sought." If the auditor is denied access to 
material information, the limitation on the scope of the audit may require the auditor 
to qualify his/her opinion or to disclaim an opinion. We suggest that the Board 
include a footnote in the final document, reminding the auditor of the potential scope 
limitation if either of the two examples in Paragraph 24 exist.
7. Paragraph 34, on Pages 28 and 29, lists four actions that the auditor should take if 
he/she has determined that a material misstatement is, or may be, the result of fraud. 
The fourth action is "If appropriate, suggest that the client consult with legal counsel."
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To provide more practical guidance, we suggest that the Board expand Paragraph 4.d. 
(perhaps by footnote) to include examples of circumstances in which it would be 
appropriate for the auditor to suggest that the client consult with legal counsel.
8. Paragraph 41, in Appendix C on Page 47, states ’’This Statement is effective for audits 
of financial statements for periods beginning after June 30, 1984. The amendments 
are effective for audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after 
December 15, 1997.” For consistency with Paragraph 41, on Page 31, and the last 
sentence in the explanatory paragraph on Page 37, we suggest that Paragraph 41 in 
Appendix C be expanded to include, as a third sentence, "Early application of the 
amendments is permissible.”
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Exposure Draft. If you have any 
questions, or desire further details on our comments, please contact me or Jon A. Wise, 
C.P.A., Director of Professional Practice.
Sincerely,
Thomas H. McTavish, C.P.A.
Auditor General








Jane M. Mancino, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
File Reference 2690
AICPA
1211 Avenue o f the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Board Members:
The Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards Committee o f the California Society of 
Certified Public Accountants (AP & AS Committee) has discussed the exposure draft o f - 
the proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit, dated May 1, 1996 and has several comments about the proposed 
standard.
The AP & AS Committee is a senior technical committee o f our state society. The 
committee is comprised of 50 members, of which 14 percent are from national CPA firms, 
54 percent are from local or regional firms, 24 percent are sole practitioners in public 
practice, 4 percent are in industry, and 4 percent are in academia.
The committee favors issuing the proposed statement by a 2 to 1 margin because it is in 
agreement with the concepts outlined therein. Those not in favor believe that SAS No.
53, Errors and Irregularities is adequate. Their belief is that the proposed statement is 
merely a procedural guidance document for what the profession is or should already be 
doing. However, the committee also favors changes in the current exposure draft. The 
areas o f  concern are discussed below.
Issue 1: F rau d u len t financial reporting and m isappropriation o f assets
The draft, as currently written, discusses fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets separately. The committee believes that the standard could be 
improved if more discussion related to the two areas was blended.
In the consideration of risk factors section, paragraphs 19-24, it would be helpful to 
provide a discussion of considerations of risk factors relating to fraudulent financial 
reporting and misappropriation of assets occurring together. We realize that fraudulent
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financial reporting and misappropriation of assets are regarded in the proposed statement 
as two separate types of fraud; however, we believe that there are circumstances in which 
both can occur and not be mutually exclusive. These should be discussed so that the 
auditor is aware that fraud and fraud factors are not an either/or situation.
Issue 2: Procedural Guidance
A majority o f  the committee believes that the procedural guidance in the standard is 
acceptable; however, a minority strongly believes that the guidance should be placed in an” 
Auditing Procedures Study rather than in the standard itself. The minority feels that the 
procedures should be used to enhance guidance in the detection o f  fraud and should not 
become the standards themselves. The standards should clearly state that the auditor is 
required to  specifically assess the risk o f  material mis-statement due to  fraud and not 
provide a cookbook o f procedural guidance -  which in and of themselves become the 
standards that we will be held to.
The minority further believes that the procedural guidance should be more industry 
specific. Since the application of techniques should be tailored to the specific industries 
(Banks and Savings & Loans, Broker-Dealers, Employee Benefit Plans, etc.) generic 
procedural guidance in the proposed statement comes up short.
The minority, as well as the majority, believes that the yearly Audit Risk Alerts should 
highlight procedural guidance as well as provide the auditor with any new or additional 
guidance that may not have been included in the statement.
Issue 3: Additional Procedural Guidance
The Committee felt that, in addition to the procedural guidance already provided, the 
auditor should be made aware that risk factors not only include the consideration o f the 
overstatement o f assets and revenues or the understatement of liabilities and expenses but, 
in some situations, may also result in an understatement o f assets and revenues or the 
overstatement o f liabilities or expenses. Such risk factors may be present in a buy-sell or a 
single owner dominated tax driven situation.
Issue 4: Smaller Companies
The committee felt that more discussion should be included in regards to the 
considerations of risk factors of smaller companies (paragraph 21). Many smaller 
companies present the auditor with different sets of financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets risk factors and therefore the considerations of risk factors in 
assessing risk are different. The last sentence of that paragraph merely alludes to small
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companies being different. We believe that a short discussion o f why they are different o r  
factors to look for because they are different would be helpful.
Issue 5: Continuing Education
The committee was in agreement that, while not a part of the proposed statement, 
continuing education on fraud should be an important part of the release of the statement. 
There was majority agreement that CPE courses and an Auditing Procedures Study 
specifically related to fraud be developed and implemented as soon as possible.
While larger firm personnel will have in house and industry specific training, the smaller 
firms will not. This is a void that definitely needs to be filled.
* * *
The committee appreciates the opportunity to respond and hopes that these points assist 
you in your deliberations. The committee will be happy to clarify any of the points raised. 
Sincerely,
Jessie C. Powell, Chair
Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards Committee
cc: Michael G. Ueltzen, President
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Ms. Jaiie M. Mancino
Technical Manager, Audit and Attest Standards 
American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue o f the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: File 2690
Dear Ms. Mancino:
The Committee on Corporate Reporting (CCR) o f the Financial Executives Institute (FEI) appreciates the 
opportunity to comment on the AICPA Auditing Standards Board Exposure Draft (ED) "Consideration 
o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit." CCR agrees that an expanded standard is needed to clarify the 
auditor’s present responsibilities to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from 
material misstatement due to fraud. W e support the proposed statement and amendments but believe 
greater emphasis needs to be placed on the cost/benefit issue through additional comments requiring the 
auditor to consider countervailing controls and the size and nature of the firm. Following are our specific 
comments.
A uditor’s D etection Responsibilities
We believe the proposal will serve to clarify the auditor’s responsibilities to detect fraud that is material 
to the financial statements, and thereby provide more consistency in practice.
Separate S tandard  on F raud
We agree that a separate standard providing guidance on fraud detection encourages greater emphasis and 
consistency in the assessment of the likelihood of management fraud materially affecting financial 
information. The new standard will address the misconceptions in the market, by the public and with 
clients about the role o f auditors in fraud detection.
C haracteristics and  Description of F raud
We agree that the new standard should encompass both fraudulent reporting and the misappropriation of 
assets since both types o f fraud can create material misstatements of financial results.
Im perative to Assess the  Risk of M isstatement Due to F raud
While CCR agrees that the auditor should specifically assess the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud, we would suggest that paragraph 13 of the proposed standard include guidance that the auditor’s 
communication with management also should identify the controls and risk management practices that 
may mitigate risks.
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Risk Factors
We suggest that greater emphasis be placed on the need for the auditor to use professional judgment when 
assessing the significance of risk factors. Firm size and the nature of business activities clearly place 
different levels o f importance on the various risk factors listed. These factors may also change over time. 
W e would suggest that an introductory paragraph be added before the listings in paragraphs 16 and .18 
o f the proposed standard to provide more direct guidance that the auditor use professional judgement and 
explicitly consider the size and nature o f the firm when determining the relevant risk indicators. This 
may help clarify that the risk factors listed are neither mandatory nor exhaustive. While paragraphs 19- 
24 discuss some of these issues, a concise statement before the lists o f risks factors would serve to clarify 
their use.
A uditor’s Response to F raud  Risk
W e agree with the guidance provided in the proposed standards.
Docum entation o f the  Assessment
We recommend that the documentation o f the assessment include not just the risk factors identified but 
also an assessment o f the client’s internal control policies and practices that may or may not be effective 
in mitigating the risks. Communication by the auditor to management would be enhanced by reference 
to documentation o f the assessment, both to discuss weakness and to emphasize the importance o f controls 
currently in place.
Com m unication to M anagem ent and Others
CCR believes that the auditor’s existing communication responsibilities are appropriate and, therefore, 
supports the use o f the same guidance for communication o f findings under the new fraud standard.
Costs and  Benefits
W e suggest stronger guidance on the need to consider the application of these amendments to smaller 
entities. Risk factors must be assessed from a very different perspective given the nature o f small 
organizations and the prohibitive costs and infeasibility of fully implementing the same internal control 
procedures that may be appropriate in larger organizations. To emphasize this issue, we recommend that 
specific paragraphs be added where appropriate, e .g ., paragraphs 16 and 18, 25-27 and 32-35. Such 
guidance may also be useful in the implementation information that will be developed by the AICPA.
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Im plem entation Guidance
Since many members believe the proposed new guidance only clarifies the existing role o f the auditor in 
fraud detection, we would not expect to see significant additional fees as a result of the new standard. 
Guidance should remind auditors to carefully review any new procedures with the client well before any 
revisions o f audit procedures are made in the engagement.
CCR appreciates the opportunity to comment on the ED. We will be pleased to discuss our comment 
with you at your convenience.
SKG/afc
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BARBARA J. HINTON 
Legislative Post Auditor 
Kansas
Jane Mancino, Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2690 
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Mancino:
On behalf of the National State Auditors Association (NSAA), we 
appreciate the opportunity to respond to the exposure draft (ED) on the proposed 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS), Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit and amendments to SAS No. 1, Codification o f Auditing 
Standards and Procedures, and No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting 
an Audit. The following comments are based on the individual responses we 
received and are not intended to represent the views of all individual members. 
Individual state auditors are encouraged to comment separately.
We generally agree with the ED and found it to be well written and easy to 
comprehend. The following are our comments on the specific issues raised by the 
Auditing Standards Board (ASB).
cwrfExwntner^ fES 1 • Does SAS No. 53 clearly articulate the auditor ’s responsibility to detect and
Public Accounts report errors and irregularities?
We believe SAS No. 53 does not adequately articulate the auditor’s 
responsibility to detect and report errors and irregularities. The increasing 
public interest in fraud and frequent litigation and criticism of the auditing 
profession appear to be indicative of a need for more specific guidance and 
clarification of the auditor’s responsibilities.
2. Should the auditing standards contain a separate standard on fraud or 
continue with a standard that encompasses both fraud (i.e., irregularities) 
and error?
We believe a separate standard on fraud is appropriate. The proposed 
statement addresses items to consider in the planning stages that were not as 
clear under SAS No. 53. We believe the proposed statement does not 
substantively change the auditor’s responsibilities for detection, but does
Relmond P. Van Daniker, Executive Director for NASACT 
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enhance the guidance to ensure the auditor meets that responsibility. By specifically 
assessing the risk of material misstatements due to fraud, the auditor is better able to 
respond appropriately to the results of the assessment (paragraphs 25 through 31).
The proposed amendments to SAS No. 47 clearly address the auditor’s responsibilities with 
respect to errors. They also make the discussion on audit risk and materiality more 
complete; e.g., footnote. 13 to paragraph 35 provides a cross-reference to the proposed 
fraud statement. Other proposed amendments integrate the auditor’s consideration of 
internal control (SAS No. 78). The proposed amendments result in a more complete 
package for the auditor.
Finally, a separate statement on fraud may be more successful than SAS No. 53 in bridging 
the expectations gap between auditors and the users of financial statements. Of particular 
importance is the use of the word “fraud” rather than “irregularities” for the understanding 
of the users.
3. Should a new standard on fraud encompass both fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation o f assets?
A new standard on fraud should provide guidance on detecting material misstatements 
caused by both types of fraud. Although fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation 
of assets may both result in material misstatements in the financial statements, there are 
distinct differences that need to be separately addressed. Also, from the standpoint of a 
financial statement user, a material misstatement from either one has the same impact.
4. Should the auditor, in a financial statement audit, be required to specifically assess the risk 
o f material misstatement o f the financial statements due to fraud?
We believe the auditor should be required to specifically assess the risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud. This will ensure that risk is 
appropriately addressed in the audit and that the audit procedures are designed to reflect 
that level of risk. However, we believe we have already been required to make the 
assessment as part of the control and inherent risk assessments made during the 
engagement. This proposed standard merely requires us to document separately the risk 
related to fraud.
5. Should the proposed standard contain categories o f risk factors that the auditor should 
consider, specific risk factors, both, or neither?
We believe the proposed standard should contain both categories of risk factors and specific 
risk factors so long as the standard presents the categories and specific risk factors as 
examples only, recognizing (as stated in paragraph 14) there are many variations of the two
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types of fraud relevant to the financial statement audit. Categories of risk factors and the 
specific risk factors will provide expanded operational guidance to assist auditors with 
satisfying their fraud detection responsibilities.
6. How should the auditor respond to the fraud risk assessment? (Note: The ASB concluded 
that the auditor should consider whether there is a need for an overall response, one that is 
specific to a particular account balance, class o f transactions or assertion, or both.)
The proposed standard adequately provides detailed guidance for the auditor to respond to 
the fraud risk assessment — whether it is an overall response, one that is specific, or both. 
Examples of specific responses provided in the proposed standard are helpful. However, as 
we reviewed paragraph 16, we noted that many of the factors listed do not apply to the 
governmental entities we audit. We suggest that risk factors specific to certain industries or 
entities be identified and made available to auditors through audit guides, the annual Audit 
Risk Alerts, or other practice tools.
7. Is there a need to document the fraud risk assessment, and i f  so, what should be 
documented?
We concur that the assessment process, including the risk factors considered, should be 
documented in the working papers. Adequate documentation will provide evidence that the 
auditor has considered and addressed potential risk factors and, when appropriate, has 
modified the risk assessment if he/she concludes that the risk of material misstatement due 
to fraud has increased. Documentation should contain the elements discussed in paragraph 
36 of the ED.
8. Should the auditor's communication responsibilities to management, the audit committee 
and others change with the proposed standard? (Note: The ASB concluded that the 
auditor's existing communication responsibilities were appropriate and, thus, the proposal 
reaffirms those responsibilities.)
We agree with the ASB’s conclusion that the communication responsibilities expressed in 
SAS No. 53 continue to be appropriate for the proposed SAS. However, in paragraph 38, 
it could be emphasized that the auditor needs to exercise caution when communicating 
evidence of fraud to management due to the possibility that management itself may be 
involved in the fraud.
9. In developing guidance, the ASB considers the relationship between the costs imposed and 
the benefits reasonably expected to be derived from financial statement audits. It also 
considers the differences the auditor may encounter in the audit o f the financial statements 
o f smaller entities and, when appropriate, makes special provisions to meet those needs. 




with its extensive deliberations, the proposals appropriately balance costs and benefits. 
Do you agree? How much additional work, i f  any, will this proposed SAS create for your 
audits?
Overall, we believe the proposed SAS adequately balances costs and benefits. We will 
probably see an increase in audit costs related primarily to the documentation requirement, 
although it will not be significant. As previously noted, the proposed statement does not 
substantially change any already existing requirements. Auditors are currently required to 
design the audit to detect and report material errors and irregularities under SAS No. 53. 
Documenting scope decisions and the reasons for those decisions should already be a part of 
the audit. Any additional time to document the consideration of the risk factors will be 
minimal and will be balanced by increased effectiveness in developing audit procedures and 
identifying fraud. Therefore, the documentation of the risk assessment required in paragraph 
36 should not add significant cost or work in audits currently undertaken.
This concludes our comments to the specific issues raised by the ASB. Many state 
auditors also offered suggestions for improvements to several individual paragraphs and sections 
of the document. We have not included these specific comments in this composite response but 
have encouraged each state auditor to respond individually to the ASB.
We appreciate the efforts of the Board on this project and the opportunity to provide our 
comments. Should you have any questions or need additional information regarding our 
response, please contact Kinney Poynter of NAS ACT at (606) 276-1147 or me at (504) 339- 
3839.
Daniel G. Kyle 
President
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Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager - Audit and Attest Standards
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue o f the Americas
NewYork ,N Y  10036-8775
Re: File R ef No. 2690
Dear Ms. Mancino:
The Chase M anhattan Corporation (Chase) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Proposed 
Statement on Auditing Standards, Consideration o f  Fraud in a  Financial Statement A udit (the ED). 
Although we agree that the auditor should be responsible for detecting financial statement fraud, Chase does 
not support the issuance o f  this document as a final standard.
The Fraud SAS lists 53 risk factors that if  identified as existing should provide the auditor with reasons to 
increase the nature, timing and extent o f his audit procedures. Unfortunately, as a  result o f  pervasive 
competitive pressures, this list is applicable to virtually every company in today’s environment. Thus, 
auditors will be faced with the dilemma that the auditing literature tells him that fraud may exist, but in 
99.99%  (or even some higher amount) o f the audits no fraud exists. Accordingly, auditors will find it 
difficult to avoid unproductively employing their resources to comply with the ED.
In addition, the ED does not address two troubling situations that could occur in complying with the ED:
•  The auditor could find one, some, or all o f  the factors present, but after his audit planning and testing, he 
finds no evidence o f fraud. How should the auditor document this absence o f fraud despite the existence 
o f one/some/many o f the factors?
•  I f  in the planning process, the auditor finds none o f the factors present (albeit a  situation we think 
unlikely in today’s environment - as discussed above) is the auditor absolved from auditing for fraud?
In short, attempting to incorporate the specific ‘risk factor list” into audits will most likely hinder the auditor 
by creating either too many subjective ‘judgment calls” or the documentation quandaries discussed above. 
The risk factor list is not the right approach to developing an objective standard that is to  assist the auditor in 
detecting fraud and thereby reducing its occurrence. As an example o f these problems, we have included in 
the Appendix to  this letter a  sampling o f risk factor from this list that will not enhance the detection o f  fraud.
The foregoing delineates problems arising from the Assessment o f  the Risk o f  M aterial M isstatement Due to 
Fraud  section o f  the ED (pages 17 to 24). W e also have concerns about The A uditor’s  Response to the 
Results o f  the Assessment section o f the ED (pages 24 to 29). Most examples presented in this section relate 
to  industrial manufacturers and do not reflect the operating reality o f today’s World, in which many 
companies are providers o f  services (whether financial or not), not manufacturers. These examples do not 
help the auditor audit for fraud in service companies.
W e again thank the AICPA for the privilege o f responding to this proposal. I f  you should have any further 





16. a Management seting unduly aggressive financial 
targets and expectations for operating personnel.
16.a A practice by management of commiting to 
analysts, creditors, and other third parties to 
achieve what appear to be unduly aggressive or 
unrealistic forecasts.
16.b New accounting, statutory, or regulatory 
requirements that could impair the financial 
stability or profitability of the entity.
Chase Comments
It is not possible to objectively define “unduly.”
In addition, such targets may be part of the 
company’s success.
If management does achieve its forecasted results, 
the preceding forecasts are by definition not 
“unduly aggressive or unrealistic.” On the other 
hand, in today’s market, if management does not 
achieve its forecasted results, such a failure (the 
“practice” mentioned as a risk factor) has swift 
consequences to a company and its management 
irrespective of the existence of fraud.
Stock price of public company wil reflect any 
such new requirements. Unless these 
requirements immediately raise going-concern 
issues, they should not be “red flags” for fraud.
16.b High degree of competition or market saturation, 
accompanied by declining margins.
16.b Rapid changes in the industry, such as
significant declines in customer demand, high 
vulnerability to rapidly changing technology or 
rapid product obsolescence.
16.c  Significant pressure to obtain additional capital 
necessary to stay competitive considering the 
financial position of the entity - including need 
for funds to finance major research and 
development or capital expenditures.
16.c  Unusualy rapid growth or profitability, 
especialy compared with that of other 
companies in the same industry.
High degree of competition/market saturation are 
normal business conditions for al industries. 
Declining margins is normal for most industries. 
None of these conditions are risk factors for 
fraud.
These are factors for al business and should not 
be used as a potential indicator of fraud.
These conditions could be factors for al business 
and should not be used as a potential indicator of 
fraud.
This condition has been true of many companies 
(such as Microsoft during its short existence); to 
argue the existence of fraud for this reason alone 
is inappropriate.
16.c  Unrealisticaly aggressive sales or profitability 
incentive programs.
Cannot “unrealistic” only be defined ex post 
facto? Any program that, is met becomes realistic 
by definition. This factor is impossible to 
document objectively.
